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Resumo 
O objectivo a que este trabalho se propõe abarca o tratamento da recepção de Hegel em 
Portugal, especificamente no pensamento do autor oitocentista Oliveira Martins. Estendendo-se 
em certos momentos a outros autores da chamada geração de 70 como Antero de Quental.  
 Um primeiro capítulo introdutório debruça-se acerca do estado dos estudos sobre Oliveira 
Martins e Hegel em Portugal. No que toca a Oliveira Martins, tais estudos são vistos tanto de um 
ponto de vista de estudos que incluam Hegel, bem como outros de carácter mais geral. Em relação 
a Hegel é abordada a questão da sua recepção assim como é feita uma passagem por alguns 
autores onde a sua presença foi mais marcante. 
 De seguida, ainda neste capítulo introdutório, são feitas algumas considerações sobre método, 
bem com alguns apontamentos críticos sobre conceitos e categorias. Abordagem que se prende 
em boa medida com a ideia de conceitos como construções históricas, à qual são dados alguns 
exemplos da pertinência dessa história conceptual para o trabalho em questão. 
 No capítulo subsequente em que o Germanismo de Oliveira Martins será tema em 
desenvolvimento, há primeiro uma chamada de atenção para o que consiste esse Germanismo em 
Oliveira Martins, onde tem um significado mais cultural. 
 Segue-se um olhar pela educação, interesses e leituras de Oliveira Martins, onde sobressaem 
os estudos não convencionais, que conjugados com um autodidatismo e facilitado por um 
ambiente eclético, o irão ajudar a furar os cânones estabelecidos e a apresentar ideias originais. 
Chegando assim mais facilmente às modernas ideias europeias. 
 Uma curiosidade juvenil levá-lo-á de encontro à filosofia alemã. As linhas de evolução do 
pensamento filosófico em Portugal serão também alvo de preocupação, tendo como finalidade o 
seu enquadramento até se chegar a Oliveira Martins. Devido ao interesse pela política, o 
federalismo que o fascinou aquando da sua juventude, provinha enormemente da Alemanha. 
 Temos depois a leitura inicial de Hegel e a relação que Oliveira Martins faz entre Hegel e a 
filosofia Alemã, próxima da concepção de idealismo alemão, dando uma certa unidade às ideias 
produzidas na Alemanha. São observadas algumas semelhanças entre esses pensadores, não 
descurando as diferenças. 
Oliveira Martins chega aos pensadores alemães como fruto de uma reflexão própria. O 
Germanismo do seu amigo Antero de Quental vinha já desde Coimbra como confessa em carta 
autobiográfica. Nessa carta constam importantes informações sobre Hegel e a cultura Alemã, 
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estudando inclusive a língua alemã como parte desse interesse, apesar das dificuldades no seu uso 
e compreensão. 
Um segundo momento terá como base fontes desse Germanismo. Enumerando-se as fontes 
disponíveis a Oliveira Martins, ainda que incertas, sabe-se contudo que terá lido com certeza Vera, 
Lerminier e Ahrens. Desenvolvendo-se mais pormenorizadamente acerca de Augusto Vera, 
principal fonte directa dos textos de Hegel, assim como acerca de problemas nas traduções de 
Hegel.  
Seguem-se as fontes liberais e socialistas que se formam à volta de Cousin, em antigos alunos 
seus. Começando primeiramente pelos liberais, passa-se depois para os socialistas, em que 
Proudhon e o seu fraco entendimento de Hegel, deixam uma marca indelével em Oliveira Martins. 
Sendo também mencionadas algumas figuras do socialismo francês que comungam de um certo 
Hegelianismo, inclinando-se Oliveira Martins no entanto para a crítica liberal de Hegel. A França 
será a cultura de transição entre a Alemanha e Portugal. 
Um último momento deste capítulo centra-se á volta da integração de Hegel no pensamento 
de Oliveira Martins. Para a crítica e os elogios que este lhe move, assim como a cultura alemã no 
âmbito deste pensar e integrar de Hegel. Fazendo-se também demarcações entre várias doutrinas 
e as próprias ideias de Oliveira Martins, que veremos têm origem também noutros pensadores 
como Fichte ou Kant.  
Proudhon e o entendimento que este tem de Hegel deram os fundamentos para o Hegel dos 
seus primeiros escritos. Concentrando-se nas diferenças e de seguida nas semelhanças entre 
Oliveira Martins e Hegel, é feita uma avaliação desse hegelianismo de Oliveira Martins. 
No próximo capítulo sobre o pensamento social e político de Oliveira Martins, começa por ser 
feita a referência ao socialismo de Proudhon traçando-se a sua evolução e trajectória. Com 
referências a alguns pontos importantes na sua concepção histórica da humanidade e a relação 
com o socialismo. Passando pelo caso específico de Portugal e os seus problemas económicos e 
sociais, em que Oliveira Martins devido aos seus fracassos reformadores, se aproxima de posições 
mais autoritárias. 
Na parte seguinte o enfoque será na doutrina política de Oliveira Martins que se vai 
progressivamente aproximando de um socialismo de estado. Em que a visão societária mais 
individualista da juventude ganha contornos colectivos e o organicismo social se mostra em força. 
Algumas correções de doutrina que enceta levá-lo-ão a uma outra leitura de Hegel, mais simpática 
quanto à concepção de estado. 
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A ideia de ditadura ou de Cesarismo paira por esta altura também em Oliveira Martins, 
levando-o a um aproximação da monarquia e ao abandono das teses republicanas e federalistas, 
assim como ao ideário Proudhoniano. Sendo um problema que se insere na relação autoridade-
liberdade que vai sendo objecto de reflexão por parte de Oliveira Martins e que se pode dizer 
herdeira de Hegel, prosseguindo até aos nossos dias tal debate. Silva Cordeiro irá acusá-lo de ser 
o introdutor do Germanismo na política, ou seja, de um autoritarismo doutrinário. 
É feita também referência à sua actividade como pregador social, falando directamente para 
as classes médias apelando à reforma. Uma preocupação com o público que o levará a um projecto 
de educação do mesmo com a sua Biblioteca das Ciências Sociais. 
Por fim neste capítulo é feita uma análise do seu projecto político para Portugal, as propostas 
que desenvolve e algumas semelhanças com Hegel quanto a leituras políticas e concepções de 
estado. Bem como a sua participação política no quadro parlamentar e as propostas que lá 
apresenta. 
O lugar da monarquia em Hegel e em Oliveira Martins é também posto em evidência. A 
concepção de aristocracia e parlamentarismo liberal como sistemas políticos em boa medida 
coincidentes é semelhante em ambos os autores. Contudo Oliveira Martins vai aproximar-se do 
monarca e também dessa “aristocracia de sangue” que antes criticara, tendendo nos seus últimos 
escritos para ideias mas conservadoras. 
O último capítulo ocupa-se da filosofia da história e historiografia de Oliveira Martins, 
concentrando-se primeiramente na ideia de modelos em história. A história vista segundo modelos 
e as críticas que lhe são movidas, tal como a que é feita a Hegel e à sua concepção dialéctica como 
um modelo panlogista. Crítica que também é movida a Oliveira Martins devido a um suposto 
apriorismo que o animou e a tendências mais abstractas ou generalizadoras. 
Consideram-se depois o(s) chamado(s) modelo(s) historicista(s) em que o seu significado 
envolve a existência de diferentes concepções deste conceito. Existindo mesmo opositores ao 
conceito de historicismo e novas leituras que favorecem a historicidade em vez do historicismo 
enquanto conceito operativo no entendimento da história.  
Apesar da evidente deslocação temporal e da multifacetada compreensão deste conceito, este 
debate contêm contudo em boa medida muitas dos problemas que fazem parte do horizonte em 
que Oliveira Martins se move. Entre os quais o problema das leis em história e a da separação 
entre ciências do espírito e ciências da natureza. 
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Avança-se depois para a tradição historiográfica em que Oliveira Martins se insere. Como seja 
a história sobre um ponto de vista de algumas tendências como o romantismo, em que certos 
temas se afirmam em detrimento de outros, como o caso do favorecimento do individuo no seio 
do colectivo. As múltiplas origens do romantismo, entre as quais Fichte, e as suas várias fases 
tornam a sua classificação árdua. A historiografia de Oliveira Martins insere-se no entanto neste 
romantismo, contudo já numa fase de desagregação. 
A história como totalidade e a classificação de diferentes tipos historiográficos em Hegel e 
como se aportam estes em Oliveira Martins será o próximo tema em destaque. O que essas 
classificações implicam e as observações que Hegel faz entre passado e futuro são temas que 
tomam também parte em Oliveira Martins. A finalidade da história e uma história universal à 
maneira de Hegel ou Kant são vistas em certa medida negativamente por Oliveira Martins, que vai 
desenvolvendo uma concepção da história ligeiramente diferente. 
Por fim, o trabalho finaliza com a filosofia da história em Oliveira Martins e como se configura 
o pensamento Alemão e Hegel no quadro desta. Temos as suas primeiras concepções numa carta 
remetida a Batalha Reis, aquando da polémica com Júlio de Vilhena sobre o carácter da idade-
média, e depois no seu O Helenismo e Civilização Cristã que no entanto tendem a ser matizadas 
para outras com cariz mais pessimista, aproximando-se também das ciências naturais. 
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Abstract 
The objective of this study is to identify and understand, by who and how was Hegel received 
in the historical and philosophical culture of Portugal. In the thought of Oliveira Martins we find 
Hegelianism to be fruitful and the interest more evident, therefore he seems the most appropriate 
candidate for the said study of Hegel's reception in Portugal. This work will focus on Oliveira Martins’s 
philosophical incursions and his political program, while still being open to other authors, particularly 
those belonging to his generation. 
The sources by which Hegel was read in Portugal, are in great part translations or 
interpretations of Hegel. Some of which are not rigorous and misrepresent some points and/or lose 
Hegel’s conceptual significance. Augusto Vera, the main translator and interpreter of Hegel, above all 
to the French Language, is one such case. The historical events and the social environment of this 
epoch should also be taken into account, especially Prussia’s expansionism, which will affect the 
understanding of Hegel's philosophy. In such an undertaking this study is faced with the problematic 
of interpreting the various readings of Hegel, being them with regards to his philosophy as well as in 
other political derivations. 
In Martins’s letters to Alexandre Herculano philosophy is an early theme of debate which lets 
us foresee his subsequent development. The personal correspondence with Antero de Quental, the 
best known poet and philosopher of that epoch, also proves the reading and study of Hegel. The 
reception of Hegel in Portugal and the objectives of this work pose such questions as: In what context 
were the political and economic problems attempted to be resolved in light of their readings and 
understanding of Hegel? What difficulties did the Portuguese authors faced in their understanding of 
Hegel? These problems can therefore be seen as external or internal to the reception of Hegel and 
they will be attempted to be explain by looking at their root causes. 
 
Keywords: 
Hegel, Oliveira Martins, History, Philosophy, Germanism 
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1.1 Introduction 
The present work on Hegel’s reception in Portugal is guided by the following question: How is the 
presence of Hegel to be seen in Oliveira Martins’s thought and why? The studies on Oliveira Martins 
have been focused mainly on two fundamental areas. The first being history and the second being his 
socio-political thought. The philosophical basis of these two considerations have been mostly left out 
or have only been mentioned, without further development and explanation. This is the case with 
Hegel, one of Oliveira Martins’s main sources, whose works had an influx in various aspects of his 
thought. 
An isolated case where the philosophical aspects of Oliveira Martins are studied is the graduation 
dissertation of Maria Helena Álvares Pinto Loureiro (1964). Loureiro’s dissertation, which runs through 
various authors and makes a close relationship between Proudhon and Hegel, affirms that Oliveira 
Martins did not opt for any of them, but produced rather a “marriage” of both Hegel’s notion of history 
and totality with Proudhon’s moral considerations1. The idea that the moral philosophical precepts 
emanating from Proudhon are contrary to Hegel’s idealism seems correct but, as Hallensleben 
correctly asserts2, this is not the case with German idealism as a whole. The relation between Hegel, 
Proudhon and German idealism is more complex then portrayed by Loureiro’s dissertation. 
When Loureiro focuses on the philosophical aspects of Oliveira Martins and reaches the conclusion 
of his eclectic tendencies, the original provenience of those ideas, how Oliveira Martins understood 
Hegel, the sources he had available and a critical evaluation of his conclusions are lacking. 
This work does on the contrary the inverse. It is focused on the philosophical/theoretical sources 
of Oliveira Martins and the ideas he has matured through his readings and reflections, while occupying 
itself with Hegel and other German sources. It takes what has been done on Oliveira Martins as a basis, 
                                                          
1 “o escritor propícia o casamento do hegelianismo” … “com um moralismo tradicionalmente laico, de tipo 
proudhoniano” Maria Helena Álvares Pinto Loureiro, Aspectos Filosóficos do ecleticismo de Oliveira 
Martins[texto policopiado], Dissertação de licenciatura apresentada em ciências históricas e filosóficas, Lisboa, 
1964, p.120. 
This is also an idea advanced by Fernando Catroga when he writes about Antero de Quental, as he asserts that 
to his “initial formation [which was] of French origin and of a democratic orientation, [he] mated a philosophy 
of history of Hegelian inspiration”. / “A formação inicial de Antero foi de origem francesa e de orientação 
democrática, à qual acasalou uma filosofia da história de inspiração hegeliana” Fernando Catroga “O problema 
Político em Antero de Quental – um confronto com Oliveira Martins” in Revista de história das Ideias, vol. 3, 
Coimbra, 1981, p.416. 
2 Oliveira Martins approximation to moral socialism, draws him closer to German idealism but Hallensleben 
notes that “Martins separates himself from Hegel – and as a result from Marx-, when he appelals to the 
German idealism / “trennt sich Martins von Hegel – und damit von Marx -, wenn sich auf den deutschen 
idealismis beruft” Ekkehard Hallensleben, J.P. Oliveira Martins und der Sozialismus in der “generation von 
1865“, [s.n], Köln, 1959. 
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buts redirects those lines of research to the Hegelian philosophical aspects and brings them to 
forefront in this study. 
An important admonition should be made first. The place of Hegel’s philosophy in relation to his 
own historical time, is circumscribed to some concrete situation and the historical moment that he 
integrates is different from that of Oliveira Martins. The international socialist movement for example 
is not contemporaneous to Hegel. Therefore any study of this kind must be attentive to the contexts 
and the historical time(s) under study while having the following in mind: Hegel was a philosopher who 
lived between the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of nineteenth century; Oliveira Martins 
was a social critic, historian and economist living in the second half of the nineteenth century. A 
comparison between both thinkers would be inappropriate under these terms, as Hegel is a source to 
Oliveira not a contemporary. 
In what concerns Hegel, his reception in Portugal has largely been left unnoticed. The delay by 
which some of his ideas penetrated national territory can be explained by the linguistic and cultural 
barriers hindering such developments. Oliveira Martins, as one of the most prominent intellectuals of 
his generation, is probably, alongside Antero de Quental, the author whose interest in the philosophy 
of Hegel is more clearly manifested. 
The sources for this work are the books, essays, articles and correspondence of Oliveira Martins 
and other authors of his generation, some of whom he befriended. The texts about German philosophy 
available to Oliveira Martins, which tend to be French in origin, are also another source and of course 
the direct German texts, some of which could be read in translated versions. 
The personal library of Oliveira Martins contains some of those translations. There are no notes in 
these books but some passages are underlined3. It is difficult to ascertain whether Oliveira Martins 
underlined those passages himself though, because it seems that the foreign language books or the 
books difficult to acquire passed through various hands. Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature for instance 
appears to have belonged to Antero de Quental. Therefore these books tended to be marked with the 
name of the owner and appeared to be lent out to friends. 
The books in which some manuscript notes can be read are those of Proudhon, where some 
interesting economic and social concerns could be found, such as this: “Freedom (individual) is the 
fatal path to go from authority (supreme) to solidarity (humanitarism). The political revolution is the 
same as the economic [one]”4. These are most likely Oliveira Martins notes but then again, this is 
                                                          
3 See for instance pages 43-47, 51, 52, 94 of Hegel’s Lectures on Philosophy of History present in Oliveira 
Martins’s library. 
4 “A liberdade(indivíduo) é o caminho fatal para passar da autoridade(suprema) para a 
solidariedade(humanitarismo). É a revolução política a mesma que a económica” See for this note page 12 of 
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uncertain because in addition to the earlier aformentioned reasons, Oliveira Martins’s personal library 
also had a bumpy ride until it arrived at the University of Coimbra archives. Before it came to its present 
location it was part of the library of a catholic seminar in Valadares and before that in Cucujães. In 
those travels it was plundered of important works and it is not certain whether the notes in those 
books are his notes, as they could have been added or altered in some way5. 
With the aforementioned objectives in mind, this work begins after this introductory chapter, by 
looking into Hegel’s Germanism and the integration of Hegel’s thought within Oliveira Martins’s 
theoretical framework, with a passage through the sources he had access to. It then moves to his social 
and political thought, his adherence to socialism and his conception of state and politics. While looking 
into Hegel along the lines of his Philosophy of Right, Oliveira Martins’s ideas with Hegelian contours 
are traced and some allusions to the points of contact are made. 
In the last chapter, the philosophy of history of Oliveira Martins and his historiography will be the 
topic of discussion. The understanding of history by Oliveira Martins and the critiques drawn against 
philosophy foresees a complicated relationship with Hegel, as Oliveira Martins comes closer to the 
natural sciences. He then thinks those natural sciences provide the basis for history even if the 
methods of history are different from those of natural sciences. 
There are reflectons on history that find place both in Oliveira Martins and Hegel such as, the 
different historiographic prisms and ways of looking at history or the relations between past and 
future. Oliveira Martins defends a philosophy of history different from that of Hegel because he denies 
the possibility of a universal history; he sees philosophy of history more as a tendency in the historical 
development that could be looked for only in thought. 
The evolution towards such a position does not invalidate some of the propositions he had set 
forward, particularly the important place of the Germanic world in the historical development. While 
generally a continuity can be seen in his thought, we can still see an evolution towards a different 
orientation. His earlier position is reflected in a letter to Jaime Batalha Reis as well as in his O Helenismo 
e Civilização Cristã, where the division between natural and spiritual sciences is already visible. Starting 
in the 1880s, he increasingly distrusts those “sciences of the spirit”(ciências do espírito) and the laws 
applied to history through philosophical speculation. 
                                                          
Proudhon’s Théorie de l'impot, question mise au concours par le Conseil d'État du Canton de Vaud en 1860, to 
be found in Oliveira Martins’s library. 
5 See for a wider exposition on these issues the introductory study of the library’s catholic where some of the 
missing works and other short-comings are mentioned. Paula Fernandes Martins, A biblioteca de Oliveira 
Martins, introdução de Martim de Albuquerque, Guimarães Editores, [s.l], 2009, pp.7-.15 
See also Carlos Câmara Leme “A biblioteca de Oliveira Martins: do seminário de Valadáras para a universidade 
de Coimbra. A 'joia da coroa' da biblioteca geral de Coimbra” in Público, 10 of April of 1993, pp.34-35. 
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1.2 The present state of studies on Hegel and Oliveira Martins in Portugal 
The relation between the two authors put in evidence, requires first a short overview of the 
studies that have been made, as part of this work on the reception of Hegel in Portugal focused around 
Oliveira Martins. 
 The studies can be seen at least in three different levels, the study of Hegel’s presence in 
Oliveira Martins, the studies on Oliveira Martins and lastly the studies on Hegel in Portugal. 
The treatment of Hegel as a main topic in the work of Oliveira Martins is something that has 
not been done yet, the closest we have to an work of this nature is Maria Loureiro’s study Aspectos 
Filosóficos do ecleticismo de Oliveira Martins about the ecletic tendencies in Oliveira Martins’s 
philosophical thought. In this study Hegel is one of the main references under analysis and she 
addresses the problem under the banner of the “influences” he suffered from various currents. 
Another graduate thesis that follows the same path is Maria do Carmo Nieto Guimarães’ thesis: 
Oliveira Martins, politico e historiador: Influência da filosofia alemã (1941). By posing the problem in 
such a way, either the thought of the influenced or the influencer of the idea under analyses, is 
accordingly at some point merely accessory to the exposition. And as such the problem posited in this 
way does not take into account the process of thinking, maturing and integration of the ideas Oliveira 
Martins came to know from the source texts. 
Another way to pose the problem is a comparison between the two authors, such as the 
comparatist effort Francisco Elias de Tejada makes between Oliveira Martins and Durkheim6. The 
objective proposed in this work, however, even if a consideration of the idea of influences and a 
comparatist effort is not completely dismissed, is rather to look at the marks of Hegel in the thought 
of Oliveira Martins. 
The relation between Oliveira Martins and German thought in a broader sense, which also 
includes Hegel, has had its presence in some studies about Oliveira Martins. This topic is discussed for 
instance by W. Kreutzer who dedicates the third part of his essay Oliveira Martins e o pensamento 
alemão da sua época to Oliveira Martins and Hegel7, as well as in Jorge Nemésios’s book entitled 
Oliveira Martins – O seu filosofar e o historicismo do homem: estudo compreensivo (1955), where the 
topic of historicism is discussed. 
There are other studies which, although not focusing specifically on Hegel, look at the 
theoretical sources of Oliveira Martins, where Hegel and Hegelians are some of the references. This is 
                                                          
6 See Francisco Elias de Tejada, "Oliveira Martins y Durkheim" in Gil Vicente, 2nd series, II, 7-8, 1952, p.97-109. 
7 See W. Kreutzer “Oliveira Martins e o pensamento alemão da sua época” in Estudos Sobre Cultura e Literatura 
Portuguesa e Alemã, Accções Integradas Luso-Alemãs Coimbra-Würzburg, coordenação Ludwig Scheidl, 
Minerva, Coimbra, 1997. 
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the case with George le Gentil (1935) and Álvaro Manuel Machado (1990s). Le Gentil for instance starts 
by saying Oliveira Martins “suffered an ascendant, moreover durable and efficient, of Fichte and 
Hegel8, proceeding to the sources where “he could have known Hegel by Vera’s translations and from 
the already disseminated work in France, of Charles de Rémusat about modern German philosophy”9, 
and according to him, by the influence of Hegel he “adheres to the thesis of society as superior to the 
individuals”10. Therefore for le Gentil, Oliveira Martins’s reading of Hegel boils down to the problem of 
the relation between society and the individual11, while Álvaro Machado focuses on the movement of 
German culture as it arrives in Portugal, which is altered by its passage through France. The mixture of 
poetry and philosophy produces a French Germanism that is characteristic of a new literary school in 
France12. 
As for the studies on Oliveira Martins, they are numerous and this second level of studies 
(according to our earlier definition) more often than not also deals with Hegel. A good example is the 
well know Oliveira Martins biography by Guilherme d’Oliveira Martins, where Hegel is said to have a 
determinant weight in his thought on various occasions. 
It could be said that during the whole 20th century the interest in Oliveira Martins is 
manifested in all the great intellectual figures such as Fidelino Figueiredo, Oscar Lopes, António José 
Saraiva, Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, Eduardo Lourenço and above all in António Sérgio. 
Due to the limits of this introduction an exhaustive listing of the written works about Oliveira 
Martins goes beyond its capacity. Some works that should, however, be emphasized are Augusto 
Santos Silva study of Oliveira Martins socialism, the various outstanding books of Fernando Catroga on 
historiography, theory of history and 19th century culture, Carlos Maurício books on the reception of 
Oliveira Martins’s thought and finally the studies of Sergio Campos Matos on heroism and other topics. 
In terms of history of historiography and theory of history, Oliveira Martins has also always 
been a central figure to those who concentrate on these themes13. The ideas put forward by Oliveira 
                                                          
8 “sofreu o ascendente, aliás durável e eficaz, de Fichte e de Hegel” G. le Gentil, Oliveira Martins (Algumas 
fontes da sua obra), Cadernos da Seara Nova, estudos literários, Seara Nova, Lisboa, 1935, p.26. 
9 “ele podia ter conhecido Hegel pelas traduções de Vera e pela obra já disseminada em França, de Charles de 
Rémusat sobre a moderna filosofia alemã” idem, ibidem, p.36. 
10 “adere à tese da sociedade superior aos indíviduos, admitindo, com todas as suas consequências, a 
concepção hegeliana do maquiavelismo” idem, ibidem, p.37. 
11 See idem, ibidem, p.38. 
12 See Álvaro Manuel Machado “A critica literária em Oliveira Martins: Paixão e Ciência ou o Germanismo 
afrancesado” in Revista da Universidade de Coimbra, vol. 18, Coimbra, 1999, p.239-245. 
13 See on this topic: 
Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, Ensaios III. Teoria da história e historiografia, Sá da Costa, Lisboa, 1971. 
Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, História Breve da Historiografia Portuguesa, Lisboa, Editorial Verbo, 1962. 
Luís Reis Torgal et al, História da história em Portugal sécs. XIX-XX., vol. 1, Círculo de Leitores, [s.l], 1996. 
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Martins and his generation have transited to the 20th century, which, even with the work of critique, 
have had a lasting influence. Some of the ideas of Oliveira Martins which will be a recurrent topic of 
discussion are for instance the idea of decadence14, the nature of history and its ends, civilizational 
types/races and society as an organism, besides all the historical theses he proposed. 
There are many other works which focus on a multiplicity of subjects, from the dramatic, 
artistic and tragic history of Oliveira Martins to the place of humanity in his work, with a passage on 
religious, philosophical and anthropological themes15. From all these different and temporally wide-
spaced works, the international congress held in Coimbra in April of 1995, 150 years after Oliveira 
Martins’s birth, with the title Oliveira Martins: Literatura, História, Política, is a landmark in the 
Martinian studies. 
In what concerns the study of Oliveira Martins’s thought and work, there is still much to be 
done. He wrote extensively throughout his life and even though he did not make a living directly from 
writing, it can be said this was a second profession and source of income. He explored a variety of 
narratives, from fiction to journalism, writing a bit of everything. This led Silva Cordeiro to affirm that 
what we can find in Oliveira Martins are opposing views and that he “fluctuates with the wind of 
momentary impressions”16. Such an evaluation although excessive could be said to partially conform, 
especially with regards to his journalistic work.  
His intellectual development certainly has a rational explanation and the balances and counter-
balances we can often find in his work have some coherence when viewed in light of the positions and 
tendencies he progressively moves to. These are not so easily grasped in isolated readings, where our 
point is to show that there is still much room to explore in the complexity of his mind. The publication 
                                                          
Miriam Halpern Pereira, "A historiografia contemporânea sobre o século XIX" in Ler História, 1991, 21, pp.93-
125. 
Pedro Vilas Boas Tavares, "Da ideia de cultura à cultura Portuguesa: reflexões sobre o devir histórico em 
Oliveira Martins" in Problemáticas em História Cultural, Porto, instituto de cultura Portuguesa, 1987. 
14 See António Machado Pires, A ideia de decadência na geração de 70, 2nd ed., Lisboa, Vega, 1992. 
15 See for all the designated themes the following books: 
Carlos Manuel Coelho Maurício, A imagem humana: o caso de Oliveira Martins [Texto policopiado], 1867-1955, 
Lisboa, [s.n.], 1995. 
António Manuel Antunes de Matos Ferreira, O pensamento de Oliveira Martins sobre religião [texto 
policopiado], Provas complementares de doutoramento em História (História Contemporânea), Universidade 
de Lisboa, [s.n], Lisboa, 2005. 
Carmo Salazar Ponte, Oliveira Martins, a história como tragédia, Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, Lisboa, 
1998. 
M. Viegas Guerreiro, Temas de antropologia em Oliveira Martins, Instituto de Cultura e Língua Portuguesa, 
Lisboa, 1986. 
Jorge Seabra, Oliveira Martins. Raça e filosofia da história, Coimbra, Faculdade de Letras, 1992. 
16 “flutua à ventoinha da impressão momentânea” Joaquim Silva Cordeiro, A Crise em seus aspectos morais, 
Estudo introdutório, organização e notas de Sérgio Campos Matos, 2nd ed., Edições Cosmos, 1999, p.144. 
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of his “complete works” starting in the 50s, which, even if not entirely complete, contains the main 
ones, has no doubt promoted the interest in Oliveira Martins and helped in its study. 
Finally the reception of Hegel and the studies about him in Portugal are two matters that relate 
to one another. Can we circumscribe the reception of Hegel to a given period? Or is it still taking place 
today? These are debatable questions and to clear up some doubts, Hegel’s reception in Portugal is 
situtated here in the 19th century, while more detailed studies on Hegel would still require a longer 
maturing process of critique. 
In the studies about Hegel an enduring presence can be seen in the juridical considerations of 
his philosophy17, with the examples of Cabral de Moncada and Jose Brandão. Vamireh Chacon, 
however, in his short essay on the reception of Hegel in Brazil and Portugal, considers that the early 
juridical appropriations of Hegel were Neokantian, therefore we cannot properly speak of a 
Hegelianism thereafter: 
“From then on it is excessive to speak properly of hegelianism in Portugal. What happens there 
and continues, consists of Orlando Vitorino’s, Carmo Ferreira and António José Brito research, 
especially by last one, a scholar of various Hegelian hermeneutics, [which happen to be] disperse, at 
some point compiled in books. After a long phase of a Neokantian appropriation of the German 
idealism by the juridical philosophers, from which Cabral de Moncada is the greater expression, the 
Hegelian studies have been gaining maturity also in Portugal”18. 
The authors mentioned specifically as Hegelian are a more recent development. The absence 
of other Hegelian sources in Chacon’s essay becomes apparent, particularly the works of Joaquim de 
Carvalho and Vasco de Magalhães Vilhena in which Hegel is object of reflexion, as in Joaquim de 
Carvalho’s essay Hegel e o Conceito de História da Filosofia19. But those partial conclusions seem on 
                                                          
17 Interestingly João Luis Oliva comes to the conclusion that “The political-constitutional Martinian discourse 
accompanied therefore, the main lines of his contemporary juridical thought” and as a result “at the end of the 
last century, his ideas were frequently citated” Oliva still considers, however that, nonetheless these ideas of 
Oliveira Martins give prominance to collective rather than individualistic societal models, they are still far from 
those shared by Hegel. / “O discurso político-constitucional martiniano acompanhava, assim as mais marcantes 
linhas do pensamento jurídico seu contemporâneo” … “nos finais do século passado, as suas ideias eram 
frequentemente citadas.” João Oliva “Oliveira Martins e o Socialismo catedrático” in Revista da Universidade 
de Coimbra, vol. 18, op. cit. p.134 et 136. 
18 “Dai em diante é excessivo falar de hegelianismo propriamente dito em Portugal. O que lá houve e 
prossegue, consiste na pesquisa de Hegel por Orlando Vitorino, Carmo Ferreira e António José Brito, em 
especial por este último, um scholar de várias hermenêuticas hegelianas, dispersas, em tempo reunidas em 
livros. Após a longa fase de apropriação neokantiana do idealismo alemão pelos jusfilosófos dos quais Cabral 
de Moncada é a maior expressão, os estudos hegelianos vêm adquirindo maturidade também em Portugal.” 
Vamireh Chacon “A recepcção de Hegel em Portugal e no Brasil” in Hegel, a Moralidade e a Religião, n.3, 
editing by Denis L. Rosenfield, Jorge Zahar editor, Rio de Janeiro, 2002, p.146. 
19 See G.W.F. Hegel, Principios da filosofia do direito, tradução de Orlando Vitorino, Guimarães editores, Lisboa, 
1976, p.3 
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the whole correct and from António Sérgio’s preface written for Oliveira Martins’s Teoria do Socialismo 
we can read the main lines along which this critique moves. The suspicion or even negative idea of 
Hegel’s philosophy as obscure and unintelligible had a strong presence in Portugal. 
The translations of Hegel’s aesthetic texts(1952) by those associated with the Filosofia 
Portuguesa movement, which looked for a national character to Portuguese philosophy will also 
provide reflexions and studies on Hegel. But Orlando Vitorino, who is part of this philosophical 
movement, focusing however not only on Hegel’s aesthetics, but also on his philosophy of right, will 
still tell us in the preface of his translation of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1958) that Álvaro Ribeiro, 
the main figure of the said movement, has “reverted from Hegel to Aristoteles”20. Vitorino also 
dedicates a chapter to Hegel’s reception in Europe and Portugal in an earlier interpretative book of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right21. 
The Hegelian readings of Marxists will make an important contribution to the study of Hegel 
as well. In addition to the already mentioned Magalhães Vilhena, we will see in Eduardo Chitas’ PhD 
thesis on the topic of Hegel and the Enlightenment and in various José Barata-Moura books, detailed 
studies on Hegelian problematics. 
Other scholars that have occupied themselves more exclusively with Hegel are Manuel Ferreira 
Carmo, João Lopes Alves, Joao Augusto da Silva (João Medina), Mário Donas, Edmundo Balsemão Pires 
and Diogo Ferrer, these are mostly part of a younger generation where Hegelian studies have taken 
some thematic guided orientations22. Despite its merits such studies remain circumscribed to specific 
academic circles and still lack the breadth of a wider divulgation. 
 
 
                                                          
20 “Revertendo de Hegel para Aristoteles” G.W.F. Hegel, Princípios da Filosofia do Direito, tradução de Orlando 
Vitorino, Guimarães editores, Lisboa, [1959], P.XXIV 
21 See Orlando Vitorino, Introdução filosófica à filosofia do direito de Hegel, Sociedade de Expansão Cultural, 
Lisboa, 1961, Pp.31-44. 
22 See for the mentioned authors: 
João Augusto da Silva, Dialéctica da totalidade na Fenomenologia do espírito de Hegel, Tese de Licenciatura 
apresentada à faculdade de letras da Universidade de Lisboa, 1965. 
Manuel José do Carmo Ferreira, Hegel e a justificação da Filosofia: Iena, 1801-1807, Imprensa Nacional – Casa 
da Moeda, Lisboa, 1992. 
João Lopes Alves, O estado da razão: da ideia hegeliana de Estado ao Estado Segundo a ideia hegeliana, sobre 
os principios da filosofia do direito de Hegel, Colibri, Lisboa, 2004. 
Mário Donas, O conceito “direito” e a linguagem na filosofia do direito de G.W.F. Hegel, Coimbra editora, 
Lisboa, 2006. 
Emundo Balsemão Pires, Povo: eticidade e razão, Imprensa Nacional – Casa da Moeda, Lisboa, 2006. 
Diogo Ferrer, Lógica e realidade em Hegel, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa, 2006. 
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1.3. Theoretical considerations about Concepts and Categories in Oliveira Martins and Hegel 
When looking at the conceptual apparatus of Oliveira Martins we may notice that it differs 
from the concepts used by Hegel even if the words in some cases remain the same. Not only the 
conceptual meaning of these words shared by both thinkers differ from each other, but these concepts 
have different meanings from what we take them to be today as well. There is as such a history of 
concepts which has been accounted for by a segment of the social sciences. This does not mean, 
however, that we can apply this scheme to every situation and in our study particularly, the movement 
brought about by culture, has in some cases broadened Hegelianism to extents that only a shadow of 
the original thought remains.  
The problem that poses itself is to find the points of connection, a difficulty that is increasingly 
accentuated the more these thought-theories are intertwined, being a problem which upwells to the 
question of making philosophy after Hegel. If there truly existed a Hegelianism, how true it was to 
Hegel in each case is another matter and here is not the place for concerns over Hegel’s orthodoxy. 
We should, however, certainly also consider, as part of this same issue, thinkers which are not Hegelian 
but have in any case taken some conceptions from Hegel and both of them, Hegelianism and these 
thoughts with roots in Hegel, co-exist in time. The history of concepts is, on the one hand, something 
much more noticeable when we look at the distante past, but ,on the other hand, in thinkers that are 
contemporaneous to each other, as in this case, the processes that are at play are mostly of a different 
kind. We can call them a more basic level of the dialectics of culture, and these processes belong in my 
perspective to history itself, helping cementing the culture of a given epoch by giving it determination. 
I believe this perspective should also be included in the history of concepts23. 
 In identifying some of the main concepts in Oliveira Martins and Hegel, and their web of inter-
relations we have an attempt to fill a gap between both authors by bridging together. The connections 
are already in place because no man is an island, and they can be closer or wider according to the 
features they share. The concepts as the refined products of human thought are the structure behind 
any theory, with them theories become cognizable as they provide the unity of thought by unifying 
differences and oppositions. But they have themselves multiple understandings associated, with them 
concepts as merely a vehicle of signification, or as possessing explanatory powers, or as being more or 
less concrete. These are different characteristics attached to concepts corresponding to different ways 
of thinking them. 
 We can also identify in Hegel the development of a different understanding of concepts. They 
are not the product of some unalterable scheme of categories or a priori concepts as in Kant, they do 
                                                          
23 See in this respect Jörn Rüse “Historical thinking as intercultural discourse” in Western Historical Thinking, an 
International debate, edited by Jörn Rüsen, Berghahn Books, New York, 2002. 
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not belong either to a system of classification as in Aristotle, but rather have in themselves different 
degrees of reality. The categories in Hegel have primarily an objective side. The subject as the source 
of differentiation of subject and object undresses its subjectivity, becoming one with its self-alienation, 
allowing for a complete beginning, an object without any presuppositions, with no subjective 
interference, taking it as it is24. This is what Hegel defines as pure being and from it all the categories 
follow, categories that are at the same time dynamic, changing from one into the other according to 
the dialectical movement of the real. These categories as principles have their justification in their 
synthetic progression, running through the various determinate forms of being while “grasping the 
manifoldness of determinations in their unity”25. That is his early critique of Kant when he speaks of 
“quiescent dead subjects of the intelligence”, because he took these categories for granted as given 
by formal logic26. This is an observation that acquires a definitive formulation in his logic when he 
affirms that everything needs first to be proven historically27. 
 Following Hegel this work won´t be tracing the formation of these concepts with some fixed 
categorical foundation, where a history could only be said to exist of the concepts but not of a higher 
level of categories. But in here it is believed, like Hegel points out, that there is some more universal 
structure that can be called the level of categories. These categories, although belonging to a different 
level, have a conceptual meaning themselves. They have naturally a more basic function, being in this 
way persistent but not unchangeable. They are, however, the starting point for the development of 
the concept, because they are the most general, more abstract and the less determined, being above 
all logical categories. Hegel recapitulates in his Science of Logic how they are not fixed determinations 
on the one hand and on the other hand how they relate to one another, thus forming an organic unity, 
in what it can be taken as a direct reference to Kant28. Their logical process is in this sense also 
                                                          
24 See Hegel’s introductory text on his greater logic  << With what must the beginning of science be made? >> 
where he precisely says: “we have to do to ensure that the beginning will remain immanent to the science of 
this knowledge is to consider, or rather, setting aside every reflection, simply to take up, what is there before 
us.” G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, translated and edited by George di Giovanni, Cambridge university 
press, 2010, p.47. / “des reinen Wissens aus der Anfang seiner Wissenschat immanent bleibe, ist nichts zu tun, 
als das zu betrachten oder vielmehr mit Beiseitsetzung aller Reflexionen, aller Meinungen, die man sonst hat, 
nur aufzunehmen, was vorhanden ist.“ G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik I, Werke, vol 5, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt am Main, 1986, p.68. 
25 See G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, op. cit. p.707. / “die Mannigfaltigkeit von Bestimmungen in ihrer 
Einheit zu fassen” G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik II, Werke, vol. 6, op. cit. p.106. 
26 Hegel refers directly to these matter on his first lengthy work when he speaks of “die Kategorien selbst teils 
zu ruhenden toten Fächern der Intelligenz”. G.W.F. Hegel, Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen system 
der philosophie, Jenaer Schriften 1801-1807, Werke, Vol. 2, op. cit. p.10. 
But this same critique can be traced as further back as to his more youthful writings on religion and on the 
dogmatic way Kant was then being used. 
27 “What is the first in science had of necessity to show itself to be the first historically.” G.W.F. Hegel, The 
Science of Logic, op. cit. pp.65. / “Was das Erste in der Wissenschaft ist, hat sich müssen geschichtlich als dass 
Erste zeigen.” G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik I, Werke, vol. 5, op. cit. p.91 
28 ”More to the point is that the emptiness of the logical forms lies rather solely in the manner in which they 
are considered and dealt with. Scattered in fixed determinations and thus not held together in organic unity, 
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historical, this is why he starts with no presuppositions in determining them when studying the nature 
of thought, a thought that is first of all historical. Even the most basic forms of human cognition are 
historically developments of contradictions that existed in ancient societies29. The later development 
of such contradictions leading up to a higher stage is in the nature of logic, it is internal to it, hence 
with regards to its determination and categorical structuring thought determines itself in its own 
logical process by means of ascending to ways that better explain reality. 
 As pointed out earlier, categories have their own conceptual meaning, however, they should 
not be confused with the concepts and used interchangeably30.  They are knots to which we move 
while conceiving things, a position or a moment in the progression towards the concept31. It is in this 
                                                          
they are dead forms and the spirit which is their vital concrete unity does not reside in them. Therefore they 
lack proper content – a matter that would in itself be substance. The content (...) is usually sought for them 
outside them. But logical reason (...) within itself, holds together all the abstract determinations and 
constitutes their proper, absolutely concrete unity (...) it is not the fault of the subject matter of logic if the 
latter seems empty but only of the manner in which this subject matter is grasped.” G.W.F. Hegel, The Science 
of Logic, op. cit. pp.27-28. / “Sondern das Gehaltlose der logischen Formen liegt vielmehr allein in der Art, sie 
zu betrachen und zu behandeln. Indem sie als feste Bestimmungen auseinderfallen und nicht in organischer 
Einheit zusammengehalten werden, sind sie tite Formen und haben den Geist in Ihnen nicht wohnen, der ihre 
lebendige konkrete Einheit ist. Damit aber entbehren sie des gediegenen Inhalts, - einer Materie, welche 
Gehalt an sich selbst wäre. Der Inhalt (...) für sie außen gesucht werden. Aber die logische Vernunft“ (...) “das 
alle abstrakten Bestimmungen in sich zusammenhält und ihre gediegene, absolut-konkrete Einheit ist“ (...) “es 
ist nicht Schuld des Gegenstandes der Logik, wenn sie gehaltlos sein sol, sondern allein der Art, wie derselbe 
gefaßt wird.“ G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik I, Werke, vol. 5, op. cit. p.41-42. 
29 See for instance the historical importance Hegel attributes to language and its formation as revealing the 
categories of thought “An extensive and consistent grammar is the work of thinking, and its categories are 
apparent in it” G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Volume I: Manuscripts if the 
introduction and the lectures of 1822-3, edited and translated by Robert F. Brown and Peter C. Hodgson, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2011. p.117. / “Die ausgedehnte konsequente Grammatik ist das Werk des Denkens, 
das seine Kategorien darin bemerklich macht” G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, 
Werke, vol. 12, op. cit. p.85. 
30 See José Barata-Moura who speaks about this same issue: “Even if holders, by their constitutions, of a 
conceptual structure, categories cannot, however, be simply identified as, taken for, or be assimilated to, the 
concepts 
In reality, they represent and correspond to a form and a superior synthetic level of conceptual organization 
that develops fundamentally in the epistemological sphere”/ “Se bem que detentoras, por constituição, de 
uma estrutura conceptual, não podem, todavia, as categorias ser simplesmente identificadas com, tidas por, ou 
assimiladas aos, conceitos. 
Na  verdade, elas representam e correspondem a uma forma e a um patamar sinteticamente superiores de 
organização conceptual que, fundamentalmente, na esfera epistemológica se desenvolve.” José Barata-Moura, 
Totalidade e contradição: acerca da dialéctica, 2a edição aumentada e revista, edições avante, Lisboa, 2012, 
p.24. 
See also António Hespanha who traces the origin of these words and their meanings: “Cateorias. Uma reflexão 
sobre a prática de classificar” in Análise Social, vol. 38, n°168, 2003, pp.823-840. 
31 See Hegel who refers to them as knots in his logic: “Here and there on this web there are knots, more firmly 
tied than others, which give stability and direction to the life and consciousness of spirit” G.W.F. Hegel, The 
Science of Logic, op. cit. p.17. / “In diesem Netze schürzen sich hin und wieder festere Knoten, welche die 
Anhalts – und Richtungspunkte seines Lebens und Bewußtseins sind, sie verdanken Festikeit und Macht” 
G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik I, Werke, vol. 5, op. cit. p.27. 
or Pinkard who refers to them as positions to which the thought moves to “What moves in the Science of Logic 
is not the conceptions but thought itself. Each category is a position to which thought moves” Terry Pinkard, 
Hegel’s Dialectic: Explanation of Possibility, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1988, p.14 
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sense that Gadamer speaks of a new scientific character of logic, a new theory of concepts, where the 
concept is to be built from the least determinate logical categories32. Categories are therefore 
characteristic of Objective Logic, while the concepts properly - or at least the most developped form 
of the concept - are characteristic of Subjective Logic. Characteristic but not exclusive to it, concepts 
for instance will appear in previous steps of the progression but not in their defining form. Everything 
is dynamically integrated, as Hegel’s system should be taken to be. 
 The dialectics of the abstract and the concrete is of no less importance in the building up of 
the concept. In this way a concept only has significance in a universe of propositions inter-connected 
between each other forming a system that, besides giving meaning to empty words, also explains 
them33. An abstract concept is the abstraction itself taken in isolation, while a concrete concept is the 
relational unity of this first abstraction. Taken in isolation a concept would only have a symbolic 
function of designating an object, very poor in its defining ability34. But that is actually the first step in 
the dialectics of the concrete and the abstract, when the concrete empirical reality ascends into the 
abstract as thought-object and in this element moves to the concrete. 
In this attempt at explaining the concepts used by Oliveira Martins and Hegel, they will be 
informed by this deeper significance that the concept has in Hegel, taking the concepts not in isolation 
but rather looking for them in the unity of the diverse or in a systematic way. 
Kosselleck and Jurgen have studied how concepts evolve through time, a fact which is 
particularly relevant for the study of different social epochs; they stated this same problem in different 
contexts and studied this phenomenon to great extent35. I think this approach is of great use to our 
study. Not only because it becomes clear what is being spoken about when concepts such as: Nation, 
                                                          
32 See Gadamer "Hegel seeks to give logic a new scientific character by developing the universal system of the 
concepts of the understanding into a “whole” of science." 
and further on: 
"if he had decided to develop these categories right at the beginning, he would have had to presuppose both" 
(...)"In the effort to derive the interrelationship of all categories from each other" (...) "All categories are 
determinations of the content of knowledge, i.e., of the Concept. Since the content must be developed in its 
manifold determinations in order to arrive at the truth of the Concept, science must begin where there is the 
least determinacy." Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel´s Dialectic: five hermeneutical studies, Yale University Press, 
Massachusetts, 1976, pp.81-83 
33 See Pinkard for his conception of concepts in Hegel as giving an explanation rather than a signification, Terry 
Pinkard, Hegel’s Dialectic: Explanation of Possibility, op. cit. 
34 “The genuine sense, genuine content of each abstract definition taken separately is revealed through its links 
with other definitions of the same kind, through a concrete unity of abstract definitions” Evald Ilyenkov, The 
dialectics of the Abstract & the Concrete in Marx’s Capital, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982, p.37. 
35 See Reinhart Koselleck, Begriffsgeschichten, Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und Sozialen 
Sprache Mit zwei Beiträgen von Ulrike Spree und Willibald Steinmetz sowie Dutt, Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 
2006. 
Jörn Rüsen „How to make sense of the past – salient issues of Metahistory“ in The Journal for Transdisciplinary 
Research in South Africa, vol. 3, n. 1, July 2007, pp.169-221. 
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Race, Contradiction, Dialectics are mentioned, but also because in this way they relate to one another 
in the context of the whole. That is considered essential to Hegel where his concepts are integrated 
into a system. They relate to one another inside this system but with this perspective in mind, they can 
also relate to concepts outside his system of thought or even to other philosophical systems when 
viewed in light of their relationships. Javier Fernandez Sebastián considers Hegel to be one of first 
thinkers to account for this dimension of the historicity of concepts36. 
Oliveira Martins also had this approach, not in terms of a clear drawn philosophical system but 
he considered, for instance, that it is not possible to truly grasp history without the vision of the whole. 
This relationship with the culture and the conceptual frameworks of his time also shines light on how 
his conceptual construction came about. 
The concept of “povo” for example is something that others before Oliveira Martins, especially 
Alexandre Herculano which he considered a mentor on many levels, equated to what we could call the 
middle bourgeoisie. The people, as Victor de Sá notes, are taken by Alexandre Herculano as the 
“possessors” of propriety, not everyone is part of this category of “povo”37. When we see him glorifying 
the people (“povo”), he is actually talking of those who by their own power were able to ascend into 
the status of possessors, which inherently makes them free men38.  
In Oliveira Martins the word used to speak of those who acquired freedom by means of being 
possessors is bourgeoisie. Following Alexandre Herculano’s steps he also thinks that having property 
furnishes the freedom humanity strives for, in this way a parallel could be drawn between both 
concepts as they define in broad terms the same social class even if the words differ39. But contrary to 
                                                          
36 Javier Fernandez Sebastián “Historia, historiografía, historicidad. Conciencia histórica y cambio conceptual”, 
in Europa del sur y América latina. Perspectivas historiográficas, Manuel Suárez Cortina, ed., Madrid, Biblioteca 
Nueva, 2014, pp. 25-64. 
37 “by his turn, the historian Alexandre Herculano, in the same manner as Guizot and Tocquivelle in France, 
consecrated historically the victorious bourgeoisie in his Middle Ages studies. Showing the gradual ascension of 
<<the people>> that is: of the owners, those, that, since Middle Ages, could little by little reach the superior 
posts of state” / “por seu turno, o historiador Alexandre Herculano, à semelhança de Guizot e de Tocqueville 
em França, consagrou históricamente a burguesia triunfante nos seus estudos mediáveis. Mostrou a subida 
gradual do <<povo> isto é os possidentes, aqueles, que, desde a Idade Média, acederam pouco a pouco aos 
cargos superiores do Estado.” Victor de Sá, A crise do Liberalismo e as primeiras manifestações das ideias 
socialistas em Portugal (1820-1852), Seara Nova, Lisboa, 1969, p.51. 
38 “For me the people is something solemn, intelligent, laborious, they are those who possess and work” / 
“Para mim o povo é algo de grave, de inteligente, de laborioso, são os que possuem e que trabalham” 
Alexandre Herculano, Opúsculos, vol. 2, 4th ed., Bertrand, Lisboa, 1908, p.193. 
39 “the bourgeoisie is nothing but the part of the people that manages to reach liberty, acquiring as such a new 
order of priviligies, establishing a third class, the phenomenon of its formation is part of the history of the 
people” / “a burguesia não é mais do que a parte do povo que consegue alcançar a liberdade, e adquirindo por 
ela nova ordem de privilégios, estabelecer uma terceira classe, o fenómeno da sua formação faz parte da 
história do povo” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Teoria do Socialismo, Prefácio do Dr. António Sérgio, Guimarães & Co. 
Editores, Lisboa, 1974, p.202. 
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Alexandre Herculano, Oliveira Martins believes everyone can ascend to that category and following 
Proudhon’s thesis, he thinks that in fact humanity is actually tending towards equality. 
The conceptual differences between both authors are thus not only important to understand 
their mutual relations but also to understand the thought of the author itself. There is a system of 
concepts which give intelligibility to the thoughts exposed. We will see along this work how the 
constructing of certain concepts in Oliveira Martins will gain their significance contentwise. 
The next chapter will begin by looking into the Germanic elements in his thought and to his 
arrival at philosophy. In doing so it will mainly focus on his early books where the genesis of this 
tendency is engendered. 
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2. The Germanism of Oliveira Martins 
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2.1. Why This Germanism? 
 
Answering this question first demands the clarification of the reasons behind Oliveira Martins’s 
affinity towards Germany, as well as a reflection and a discussion on the meaningfulness of this 
Germanism. In Oliveira Martins this affinity means generally, the recognition of the German ideas and 
culture as occupying the highest ground in the development of modern thought. However, it does not 
imply an unconditional support for German aspirations in Europe especially towards the end of the 
century. It tends to be rather quite the opposite; it is because of Germany’s prestige on this level that 
such hegemonic pretensions were possible and when political circumstance became favourable then 
such projects were engendered, even if those pretensions fall outside classical German culture. 
 The term Germanism describes well the content of what is to be looked at in Oliveira Martins. 
The effort in making this term precise is not merely a linguistic preciousness but it aims also at clearing 
up some historical misunderstandings and doubts that may arise from it. What makes Germany 
German or Portugal Portuguese; this is the point of departure in answering the questions posed by the 
formation of a national character. Something that is or has traces of Anglosaxonism does not imply 
that this something is an anglophile construal. On a basic level we have culture as circulating elements 
while on the level of construction, although capable of defining this something, there are still many 
different elements concurring in an open interaction. For instance, Oliveira Martins by adopting some 
of the solutions that were proposed in Germany, being them philosophical, political or historical, it 
does not mean these were the only ones in the aggregate of his thoughts. Germanism is also not 
synonymous with Germanophilism. The second term seems to imply a partial view, while the first term 
embraces a whole range of elements that fall outside the spectrum of a particular sectarian 
consideration. 
The difficulty also lies in the presuppositions we have today. The formation of Germany as a 
modern nation was only accomplished at the end of the nineteenth century. If we speak of Germanism 
before this date it means something quite different, as it relates more to a cultural environment.  We 
would then already hear about Germany spoken of as a nation. Fichte’s brilliancy in his famous 
“Discourse to the German nation” exemplifies the extent to which this idea was broadcasted and 
present in the mind of the people, mostly in the intellectuals rather than “the people”. However, the 
unity that existed was greatly counterbalanced by divisions40. Hegel quite righteously realized that at 
                                                          
40 See Whaley on the term Kleinstaaterei coined on the nineteenth century to denote this internal division of 
principalities and small territories, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire: Volume II The peace of Westphalia to 
the dissolution of the Reich 1648-1806, Oxford University Press, New York, 2012. p. 187 
See also Mathias Schnettger “Kleinstaaten in der Frühen Neuzeit. Konturen eines Forschungfeldes“ in 
Historische Zeitschrift 286, 2008, pp.605-640 
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the time there was an ideal Germany, but in reality it failed to materialize, or at least it failed to do so 
in the forms which a nation-state had acquired in modern age41. For obvious reasons, this work will 
not occupy itself with moving through all the stages of the building up of Germany. But even if we 
understand in Germanism, a notion of totality, this does not mean that everything is uncritically 
accepted. Doctrines such as Pan-Germanism are only derivations of a German national project, taking 
up on past developments but moving them into other directions42.  A further analysis would show us 
not only their partiality but the slipping away from the main problem of the German nationality by 
being circumscribed into an imperialistic phase of Germany.  
Apart from the misunderstandings which Germanism may lead to, this concept is adequate as 
a point of departure for two motives. Firstly, because the medium from which Hegel came is an object 
of interest for Oliveira Martins, giving at same time insight into his reaching up for Hegel; and secondly 
because he was accused of Germanism, mainly because of his philosophical ideas and the evolution of 
his political positioning. 
The difficult circumstances surrounding Oliveira Martins’s education are an idiosyncrasy that 
should not be undervalued. The autodidacticism he was forced to, combined with the constraints of 
the Portuguese society, gave accent to an eclecticism that was already peculiar to his generation and 
even more so to the author of Portugal Contemporâneo.  
When pushed to its extremes, we can see the crudest forms in an almost pathological way so 
well displayed in Antero de Quental, who sees after all eclecticism as the tendency of the age. He tries 
to pull away from tradition, rebelling against what were then the defined aesthetical models, 
philosophical conceptions and political ideas while mounted on a multiplicity of doctrines, which could 
hardly form a coherent whole. An agitation that turned out to be unfruitful, by thoughts and projects 
which never lasted long, lacking a strategy and a systematic objective, they were ever changing to the 
point of disaggregation. He would return harm’s way to the same tradition he tried to break from, with 
the conceit of reaching harmony, only for the antinomies to appear in later stages and then again 
invest against them until reaching a point of exhaustion. 
In these moments of crisis Antero de Quental was struck by a pessimism that would become 
increasingly worse throughout the remainder of his life. There was a collective psychology, he would 
say, from which people were unable to move away. Nobody can truly change society if the people do 
                                                          
41 See G.W.F. HEGEL, Die Verfassung Deutschlands, Werke, vol 1, Op. cit. 1986. 
42See for instance Ernst Hasse as anonymous author in his Großdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr 1950 
is part of a larger group of publicists who taking on previous and then present German history support an 
expansionist nationalistic project, racist in nature. While on the other hand in eastern parts of Europe, Germans 
were as much discriminated in the imaginary of the people as were ethnic Slavs in Germany, such as the poles. 
In Dostoevsky classic Crime and Punishment, the pawn is an old greedy German lady.  
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not want this, and society is resistant to change, to surprises; it is so possessed of a mind of its own, 
that the pains and sorrows, even if foreseen, are an almost unavoidable fatality. The confession he 
gives to Oliveira Martins shows us clearly this idea:  
“I never believed that you, or anyone else, would be capable of impeding the Portuguese crisis, 
not even of deterring or mitigating it, because it always seemed to be that societies cannot be taken 
by surprise and that there are no ingenious combinations capable of imposing to the mass of man that 
which at the bottom of their heart they do not want by all means”43  
A fatality also symptomatic to the individual and his character as something deeply rooted in 
the soul, as if one could not move away from his nature, an issue that if dealt with would lead to the 
theory of essences. 
Although much more down to earth, Oliveira Martins still had his share of bitter pills and 
unresolved dichotomies between revolution and tradition. His pragmatic stance with regards to 
problems is praised by Antero de Quental44, and a pronounced working ability is noted by Antonio 
Sergio as compared to the eccentricity of Antero de Quental45. But we still see him condemning 
absolutism and Caesarism in politics, only to have him defending it later as a means to curtail the 
excesses of liberalism, as well as by reasons of bypassing a counterproductive parlamentarism which 
he criticizes. By the end of the century we see Silva Cordeiro, in a blatant allusion to the autocratic 
statism that had developed in Germany, identify him as the mentor of Germanism in politics. This later 
defense of Caesarism can only be understood as a disenchantment from politics in the interregnum 
between his parliamentary trial and his declared failure. 
When ascerting the genesis of the Germanism which protrudes Oliveira Martins’s thought and 
work, having a specific treatment in the figure of Hegel and later, for the sake of analysis, occupies 
specific domains of politics and history; it should be noted that such Germanism here in the spotlight 
will play a role in other chapters. This initial Germanism also demands a look at Oliveira Martins’s 
                                                          
43 ”Nunca acreditei que Você, nem ninguém, fosse capaz de impeder a crise portuguesa, nem sequer de a 
retardar ou mitigar, porque sempre me pareceu que as sociedades se não podem tomar por surpresa e que 
não há engenhosas combinações capazes de imporem aos homens em massa aquilo que eles no fundo do 
coração não querem de modo algum.” 29 of June [1887] letter to Oliveira Martins, Antero de Quental, Cartas, 
Leitura, organização, prefácio e notas de Ana Maria Almeida Martins, vol. 3, Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 
Lisboa, 2009, pp.112-113. 
44 See Antero de Quental letters where he refers to such skills in order to help him: “I count on you to stimulate 
me, even [to] force me to organize my future life in a rational manner” / “Conto com V. para me estimular, e 
obrigrar até a organizar maneira racional.” 23 of August of 1877 letter to Oliveira Martins, Antero de Quental, 
Cartas, prefácio e notas de Ana Maria Almeida Martins, vol. 2, Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, Lisboa, 2009, 
p.42. 
45 See António Sérgio, Ensaios, Oliveira Martins: Impressões sobre o significado político da sua obra, Tomo V, 
2nd ed., Livraria Sá da Costa Editora, Lisboa, 1981, p.13. 
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arrival at philosophy and the treatment of the conditions through which philosophy was to be found 
in the Portuguese society. 
The most recent notable changes in philosophical direction came from the time of Marquis of 
Pombal’s reformism. In this period, which comprehends the Portuguese illuminism, there are, 
according to Joaquim de Carvalho, two main philosophical tendencies46: one was the traditional 
metaphysical-theological view of a reheated scholasticism after the shock of the renaissance; the other 
one was a mitigated empirism stripped of polemical elements. In this second tendency we have on the 
one hand in the figure of Verney an empirism closer to a scientism of Newntonian extraction and on 
the other hand the followers of António Genuense in a mixture of empirism along the models of 
intellectualist rationalism47. What is characteristic of these two main tendencies is that, by the 
interference and dependency on the political powers48, they possessed a certain degree of syncretism 
to attenuate any traces of subversive ideas, from which a third tendency emerged, setting forward the 
basis of the later eclecticism that aspired to triumph over these imposed limitations.  
Complementarily, there is a new historical methodology coming out of Pombal’s reformism, 
the true destroyer of traditional monarchy. History acquired the status of a discipline to be studied 
and used in a publicist and partisan spirit in order to justify the absolutist reform, creating the 
conditions to rethink history and its epistemological statute. This partisanship naturally implied a 
partition, however, no longer comprising only the old versus the Pombalist reform but also new ideas, 
which were against such an absolutist enterprise as theorized by Luis Reis Torgal49. The same way 
Alexandre Herculano, as the starting point of modern Portuguese historiography, is tributary of these 
previous developments in historical studies, so is the tendency shown in nineteenth century 
Portuguese philosophy to these earlier reforms, in which the way to come out of Verney’s illuminism 
and Genuensism was precisely through this eclectic tendency. 
In walking the road Oliveira Martins took until his arrival at philosophy, we face the problem 
of reconstructing the past and the formation of a mind. How to give life to a lived or living something 
when science is restricted to analytical processes, divisions and differentiations, in short, the 
                                                          
46 See Joaquim de Carvalho “On a general level, the great intellectual directions were then either oriented 
towards a metaphysical-theological [sense] or [towards] a scientific-rational sense” / “De modo geral, as 
grandes direções intelectuais ou se orientaram por então no sentido metafísico-teológico ou no científico-
racional” Joaquim de Carvalho, Introdução ao ensaio de filosófico sobre o entendimento humano de John Locke, 
Obra Completa de joaquim de Carvalho, Tomo II, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, Lisboa, 1981, p.301. 
47 See António Alberto de Andrade, Verney e a cultura do seu tempo, Universidade de Coimbra, Coimbra, 1965, 
pp.380-381. 
48 See for matters on censorship and not only about censorship bodies, like the Real Mesa Censória newly 
created to centralize as well as to hinder the previous influence of the church, but censorship actually directly 
related to Marquis of Pombal, Lopes Praça, História da Filosofia em Portugal, Guimãres Editores, Lisboa, 1981, 
p.281. 
49 See Luis Reis Torgal “Antes de Herculano…” in Historia da História em Portugal sécs. XIX-XX, op. cit. pp.19-37 
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understanding which separates. How do we devise a way to capture that something in its living state 
without just enumerating a collection of data given to us by the understanding, stripped of liveliness, 
of color? This is, above all, a problem of style and Oliveira Martins considered the job of the historian 
to be that of a painter, to feel, to be imaginative and create. In history, artistically speaking, there are 
many technics, colors and materials coming out of the artist’s palette. One of them is, for example, the 
ability to find the configuration of someone in the main traces of someone else’s attributes and draw 
illustrations, a technique particularly handy in learning the past from the present. When looking at his 
Elementos de Antropologia, as he is referring to the process of humanization, we read at a certain point 
that: 
“Anthropology came, at last, to explain scientifically a fact” … “the existence of so many men, 
even within the most cultivated societies, [that are] yet positively brutes” … “Without going out of 
one’s own narrow village sphere, without inquiring about the habits and thoughts of savage people, 
neither prospect the revelations of archeology – The historian of this genre can reconstruct the 
succession of the human states, with living neighboring examples”50 
In this same way we can find in history, individual or collective figures that share a similar 
disposition, and from one we can learn traces of the other. This conception even holds synchronously. 
If we look for instance at friendships, we will find dispositions that are shared by both persons and we 
can tell plenty about someone by having information about their close friends, like in the case of 
Oliveira Martins and Antero de Quental. 
We may head too far off track from the positive datum collected from reality and in this sense 
fail to portray things realistically, but in another light it is much more effective because the produced 
effect is greater than its cause viz. the positive datum. A parallel could be drawn to Hegel when he says 
that a higher order of art is one which is not concerned with producing things realistically, following 
strict points and inferences, but rather one that excites the idea or feeling in the observer. The 
excellency of a piece of art is not fixed there, petrified in its beauty, but rather in its capacity to excite 
beauty, in moving someone to beauty by also having this beauty concretely in oneself and not merely 
as a passivity, we appreciate beauty therefore not as an externality but rather by truly living it. A piece 
of art that has for its purpose the portrayal of luminosity is the most beautiful, the more capable it is 
of producing in us the idea of light and not because light is immediately present in the object. 
                                                          
50 “A antropologia veio, por fim, explicar cientificamente um facto”... “a existência de tantos homens, até no 
seio das mais cultas sociedades ainda positivamente brutos!” … “Sem sair do acanhado ambito da sua vila; sem 
indagar os habitos e ideias dos povos selvagens, nem sondar as revelações da arqueologia – o historiador deste 
género pode reconstruir a sucessão dos estados humanos, com os exemplos vivos e vizinhos.” J.P. Oliveira 
Martins, Elementos de Antropologia: História natural do homem, Guimarães e C.a Editores, 1954, Lisboa, p.204. 
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In Oliveira Martins this notion is deeply rooted: art taking hold of reality for the latter to better 
make its emergence in our mind and, in a Hegelian sense, connect with our ideas. In portraying some 
historical time, institution or figure what is relevant for Oliveira Martins is the drama and the life 
unfolding. The reader takes part by directing his thought from the actions, thoughts, tastes, habits and 
other multiformous constituents of a historical reality, which are but an approximation to the life of 
the individual or of a complex, to the position and relevance of this individuality or organization and 
the reflect it had in history, basically the idea of the said figure. In a second order of importance is 
literality or the positive hard facts; the idea that is associated with what is being exposed is more 
important. An excess of imagination is not condemned, but rather it is even encouraged if it does not 
collide with the said facts. 
Had Oliveira Martins thought of himself, he would have painted the vivid impersonation of a 
young man inspired by literature, discovering in art a means of ascension of the spirit to the absolute. 
The reflexive character could be seen in his gaze and as he walked one could already feel the interiority 
of an artist, admirer of great things, soon realizing the need for study as these do not come by easily. 
Even though of a middle-lower bourgeois origin, he has the notion since youth, emphasized by 
misfortunes, “that life for him has not been easy, or happy”51, it is plagued with injustices. He found in 
his beloved art a transgressive vehicle, and history, as the greater theater of tragedy, had shown him 
the movements of humanity and the real possibilities of enacting true freedom. From this insight an 
ingrained conviction in progress followed as well as a better awareness of the recent struggles of his 
countrymen. He unearths in them the true spirit of art, as he finds, also in them, such precept in 
principle: the ideal, giving logic to the monumental collective work of humanity.  
A more profound sense of life was born from which art emanates and from where everything 
begins, and after reaching the heights of such an idea, it never came out of his mind. Such a greatness 
of ideas he finds it in the masters; by trailing their path he returns to himself enriched with the strength 
and creativity to conceive and with the will to know, to learn and find himself again. From the slope of 
the mountain he begins speculating, devising ways to the resolution of such disparities, to bring unity 
to the chaos, think totality and find connections in the apparent separateness of appearance. 
This conjectural characterization was here a mere exercise, but even if it is not realistic in a 
strict sense, it still reflects the main lines of thought behind Oliveira Martins and does not contradict 
the facts. Such a “technique” helps with having a better understanding of persons, situations and 
                                                          
51 “A vida não tem sido para mim uma coisa fácil, nem alegre” Letter to Magalhães in Novembro of 1893, J.P. 
Oliveira Martins, Correspondência, Prefaciada e Anotada por Francisco D’Assis Oliveira Martins, António Maria 
Pereira livraria, Lisboa, 1926, p.237. 
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structures. The historical science is after all not a docimastic endeavor, merely based on sources and 
facts in a quest for purity, pertaining to be objective at the price of being filled with abstractions. 
The movement from philosophical speculation to a more detailed study and consideration of 
German philosophy seems like a natural development for someone with intellectual ambitions of 
theorizing and proposing changes in the society. Joaquim de Carvalho, however, suggests that Oliveira 
Martins’s Germanism came as a later extension from the influence of his close friend Antero de 
Quental, rather than as a previous course of self-reflection:  
“The historian owed the poet bibliographic annotations and translations from the German, 
even confessed in O Helenismo e Civilização Cristã, being licit to suspect that Antero was the one who 
lead him to Germanism”52.  
Making notice of Antero de Quental’s helping hand in the translation and explanation of some 
German texts to Oliveira Martins53, he leaves this suspicion vague enough for any suppositions. On 
further reading, his dislike of Oliveira Martins’s history of philosophy becomes apparent. He accuses 
him of lacking a proper critical study and understanding of the source texts. However, he does 
recognize after all that this was not his goal, but rather the more proximate task of a publicist, being 
his readings as such integrated in the context of his political activity54. This critique is a legitimate 
objection coming from an academic consideration, but his thesis on the development of Oliveira 
Martins’s Germanism is questionable. 
Before Antero de Quental was befriended with Oliveira Martins, we can already see traces of 
this Germanism in Oliveira Martins. Straight from his first published work, Febo Moniz, we can read 
that “in Germany there is a transformation underway from which perhaps a new era will begin, passing 
the focus, around which all forces of the confederation revolve, from orthodox Vienna to Philosophical 
Berlin.”55. We can see where the focus lies, even if referring to the process of national integration in 
Germany, he is conscious of Berlin as a philosophical center, where most of these federative ideas 
were being produced in an effort to unify Germany.  
                                                          
52 “o historiador deveu ao poeta indicações bibliográficas e traduções do Alemão, aliás publicamente 
confessadas no Helenismo e Civlização Cristã, sendo lícito suspeitar que foi Antero quem o conduziu ao 
germanismo” Antero de Quental, Cartas Inéditas de Antero de Quental a Oliveira Martins, publicação Francisco 
de Assis de Oliveira Martins com prefácio de Joaquim de Carvalho, Impressão da Universidade, Coimbra, 1931, 
p.IX. 
53 This also reinforces the motives behind the book inscription which is dedication to Antero de Quental 
accompanied by a Virgil poem that has a deeply prophetic connotation. 
54 See Joaquim de Carvalho, Evolução da historiografia em Portugal até fins do século XIX, Obra completa de 
Joaquim de Carvalho, Tomo II, Fundação calouste Gulbenkian, Lisboa, 1981, p.151. 
55 “na Alemanha opera-se uma transformação donde há-de porventura surgir o início duma era nova, passa o 
foco, em roda do qual giram todas as forças da confederação, de Viena ortodoxa para Berlim filósofa” J.P. 
Oliveira Martins, Febo Moniz, Prefácio de F. A. D’Oliveira Martins, Guimarães Editores, Lisboa, 1988, p.262. 
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The federalist ideal had a history in Portugal, starting at least with the municipalist ideas,which 
are related to federalism, of the liberals with their pinnacle in the figures of Mouzinho da Silveira and 
Alexandre Herculano. Oliveira Martins was in his youth a supporter of such a federalism and this is the 
main pillar behind Febo Moniz. To this effect he further exposes his ideas in a series of five newspaper 
articles which go by the heading Principio federativo e a sua aplicação à Península Ibérica in 1869.  
This topic was not strange to Teófilo Braga, at the time a correspondent of Oliveira Martins. 
Teófilo was the most vocal proponent of this federalism in the choir reverbarating the belief that 
Portugal’s decadence was part of a broader decadence of the Latin races. The Germanic races on the 
contrary with its federative constitutions were achieving success56. It is true that Oliveira Martins did 
not go so far in the beliefs of these doctrines, but he certainly shared some points of view with Téofilo 
Braga. It is no wonder then that this Germanism affirms itself, as these “federative principles” are 
precisely the most developped in Germany. 
This support of federalism is even more marked in a series of unsigned articles in the 
newspaper A Républica, founded and directed by Antero de Quental, Oliveira Martins, Batalha Reis, 
Manuel de Arriaga and António Enes57. In the newspaper n°3 we read how Bismarck, “born in a land 
[educated in] the highest philosophy, the most secure science, and the most profound literature” 
attempts to evangelize Germanism to the rest of the European nations58. While the article is an attack 
on German expansionism, the main idea exposed is the presentation of federalism as the natural 
political form of societies. 
The federalist project in Germany went through an original maturing process and its 
peculiarity, as opposed to other mainly political federalist theories, is the metaphysical fundament it 
has and without going as far back as to Kant, starting from Fichte and then the early romantics, we see 
the federalist ideas growing around the German national sentiment. As a result of the French invasions, 
patriotism combined with liberal views gained terrain. It finally became clear to Frederick William III 
that the present political organization could no longer bind his kingdom. A definitive turn was made 
possible through various liberal reformers who took power in the government of Frederick William III. 
Many were under the influence of Kant, including former students as in the case of Theodor von Schön. 
Although there was much resistance towards these reforms and only slow did they advance, while 
                                                          
56 See idem, ibidem, p.12. 
57 Catálogo Biblioteca Nacional, Volume 38, Lisboa, 1991, p.53. 
58 ”nascido num pais formado na mais alta filosofia e na mais segura ciência, na mais profunda literatura” A 
Républica, n°3. 
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along the way some of the more radical elements were set aside. Nevertheless, a confederation could 
be established in 181559.  
By the influence of such reformers Hegel would settle in Berlin, giving a new impulse to the 
ideas of the national unity of Germany. The idea of a German constitution was advanced by the 
reformers, but this promise was never fulfilled until at least 1848. However, within the possible limits, 
a package of administrative reforms, diplomatic negotiations to further integrate this confederation, 
later evolving into economic integration and the development of national economy theories, were 
some of the outcomes of such efforts. With the favourable environment, philosophy in Berlin 
triumphed under the auspices of Hegel. Cherished by this spirit of a concrete united Germany, we will 
see the building up to what would become the revolution of 184860. 
But the demands for a constitution were no longer along the lines of those set forth by Kant. 
Its failure had already been proven by the weakness of the confederation - even if not thoroughly 
implemented - which was partly inspired on Kant. Some liberal sections supporting the revolution were 
then closer to the Hegel’s critique of Kant and his cosmopolitan federalism, which he criticizes for its 
formalism, where we “have a form higher than that which constitutes its mere being”61. Praising its 
advances but also criticizing the defects of its crystallization62, a problem that ultimately comes to the 
Kantian question of what ought-to-be and what really is.  
After the split between the liberals and the working class, hope for more radical reforms was 
defeated, however, due to the uprising and subsequent heavy persecution, a wave of political refugees 
inundated Europe, helping to disseminate these German ideas of federalism. The persecution of the 
political opposition led, already in the beginning of the forties, to the forced immigration/expulsion of 
                                                          
59 See on this topic Walther Hubstach, Die Stein-Hardenbergschen Reformen, Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1989. 
Marion W. Gray, Prussia in Transition. Society and politics under the Stein Reform Ministry 1808, Philadelphia, 
1986. 
And also for a long term perspective structured under topics, the classic work of Reinhart Koselleck, Preußen 
zwischen Reform und Revolution. Allgemeines Landrecht, Verwaltung und soziale bewegung von 1791 bis 1848, 
dritte edition, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 1981. 
60 See Bakunine who draws a vivid image of such developments in one of his essays, worth a citation, however, 
due to its length I forward the reader to: Michael Bakunine, Statism and Anarchy, translated and edited by 
Marshalls S. Shatz, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.129-133. 
61 See G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, translated by T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, New York, 
1978[reprint of 1952], p.217 / “zum Gesetze seines Seins zu haben und, indem er das erfaßt, was er ist, eine 
höhere Gestalt als diese, die sein Sein ausmachte, zu sein.” G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des 
Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse: Mit Hegels eigenhändigen Notizen und den 
mündlichen Zusätzen, Werke, vol. 7, Suhrkamp, Baden-Baden, 1867, p.504. 
62 “it is only defective when it is crystallized, e.g. as a cosmopolitanism in opposition to the concrete life to the 
state.” idem, ibidem, p.134 / “nur dann mangelhaft, wenn es etwa als Kosmopolitismus sich dazu fixiert, dem 
konkreten Staatsleben gegenüberzustehen.“ idem, ibidem, p.361. 
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many intellectuals engaged in these struggles. At first supported and financed by the bourgeoisie, soon 
cleavages with the powers in place, made them back off from such businesses. 
Before this event, Hegel’s ideas had already been divulged to the French via Cousin, who gave 
a series of lectures on Hegel in France, however, having a weak understanding of Hegel and his ideas, 
he leaves them sadly amputated. The circulation of Hegelian ideas continued in France through 
Augusto Vera, for some time a protégée and most likely a former student of Cousin, while a federalism 
of Kantian-Hegelian inspiration would be advanced by Proudhon63. 
The development of these federalist theories on French soil, were consequently subsidiary of 
such happenings, from these developments certainly drunk Oliveira Martins, along with the awareness 
of the reforms which Germany was forced to do in response to the said revolution, especially in the 
decades of 1860 and 1870. News which must have arrived in Portugal and to Oliveira Martins who 
started studying the precedents of such ideas as part of his interest in politics. 
From the study of various philosophical traditions in connection with his political theory 
Oliveira Martins arrives at German philosophy and from here to Hegel, a Germanism that progressed 
by going through various author with a necessary passage through Hegel. The author of Teoria do 
Socialismo organizes Hegel in a Germanic philosophical school that belonged together, and as such 
Hegel is the heir of a succession of philosophical systems tracing back to Kant: 
“Sitting, however, on the sovereign human reason, finding in it the norm, the moral law, Kant 
opens the field in which German philosophy will walk. We will see how he does it; we will see how, 
while the Latin world through history and economy seals the discovery of the individual, Fichte, 
Schelling and Hegel ran in gigantic steps the field of the science of the human spirit, and constructed 
its philosophy.”64 
This totality becomes more evident when he further relates this German intellectual 
production with Europe and modern age in a triadic distribution: 
                                                          
63 See J.P. Proudhon, Du Principe Fédératif; et de la necessité de reconstituer le parti de la Révolution[1863], 
Paris, 1921. 
64 “Assentando, porem a soberana razão humana, encontrando dentro dela a norma, a lei moral, Kant abre o 
terreno que a filosofia germânica vai andar. Veremos como o faz; veremos como, enquanto o mundo latino 
pela história e pela economia selava a descoberta do indivíduo, Fichte, Schelling e Hegel percorriam a passos 
gigantescos o terreno da ciência do espírito humano, e construíam a sua filosofia.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Teoria 
do Socialismo, op. cit. p.76. 
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“The modern idea is the conclusion of a philosophical movement that starts in Spinoza and 
Leibniz, goes from Vico, through Kant, through Diderot, through Goethe, through Hegel in to 
Feuerbach, to Proudhon, to Michelet, to Herbert Spencer, to Vacherot etc…”65 
The first citation is identical to the conception of a German Idealism, widely accepted and 
methodologically relevant in the thematic at hand, as many of the Hegelian philosophical and historic 
conceptions could already be seen in an embryonic stage in authors such as Schlegel and Herder. The 
notion of progress in the perfectibility of reason, the unconscious, non-being and the power of the 
negative, the absolute as approximation, the notion of dialectics and the relativity of truth, these were 
already some of the ideas advanced by the romantics, Schlegel, Novalis and Solger among others.  
Herder’s idea of the progressive realization of reason in humanity by a process of self-
education where: 
“the natural state of man is the state of society” [and with the natural laws] “the first 
governments among human beings were also established” … “This is where the nature ended her 
foundation of society and left it for reason or the need of man to base higher edifices upon it.”66  
Such idea sounds in principle similar to what Hegel supplements us his Phenomenology of the 
Spirit by going through all the series of configurations of the human consciousness or “The detailed 
history of the education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of science”67 or even in this same 
modality of reason, one of the pivotal notions in the aforementioned work of Hegel, the interrelation 
and relativity of the slave equated to the master, appears to be sensitive to Herder when he speak of 
the degeneration of governments: 
“The good Mother could do nothing but teach them through reason, through historical 
tradition, or finally, through their own felling of pain and misery.” … “the slave, under the most 
                                                          
65 “A ideia moderna é a conclusão do movimento filosófico que a partir de Spinoza e Leibniz, vem por Vico, por 
Kant, por Diderot, por Goethe, por Hegel, parar em Feuerbach, em Proudhon, em Michelet, em Herbert 
Spencer, em Vacherot etc…” J. P. Oliveira Martins, Portugal e o Socialismo: Exame constitucional da sociedade 
portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo, prefácio de António Sérgio, Guimarães Editores, Lisboa, 
1990, p.78. 
66 See Johann Gottfried Herder, Another Philosophy of History and select Political Writings, translated with 
introduction and notes by Ioannis D. Everigenis and Daniel Pellerin, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 
2004, pp.121-122. 
67 See G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of the Spirit, translated by A. V. Miller with analysis of the text and 
foreword by J.N, Findlay, F.B.A, F.A.A.A.S, Oxford University Press, [New York], 1977, p.50. / “Die Reihe seiner 
Gestaltungen, welche das Bewußtsein aif diesem Wege durchläuft, ist vielmehr die ausführliche Gesichte der 
Bildung des Bewußtseins selbst zur Wissenschaft.“ G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke, vol. 3, 
op. cit. p.73. 
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oppressive despotism always share with his master in rapine, and is the despot not always the greatest 
slave ?”68 
A differentiation must however be made between each of these representatives of the 
German idealism, since they conflict in key points. To this effect Hegel was a harsh critic of the 
romantics, as in the case of dialectics, where he sees a dead end in the dialectics proposed by the 
romantics. A false infinite which does not produce any advances and is in fact a finite notion, a riddle 
that succumbs to a bad negative. This is according to Hegel: Das Böse viz. the evil par excellence. 
When Hegel in his Lectures on Aesthetics writes about the topic of dialectics, he speaks of 
Solger, the leading theorist behind the irony of the romantics and denounces this doctrine and to 
where it leads: 
“the dialectical moment of the idea, to the point which I call “infinite absolute negativity”, to 
the activity of the idea in so negating itself as infinite and universal as to become finitude and 
particularity, and in nevertheless cancelling this negation in turn and so re-establishing the universal 
and infinite in the finite and particular.”69 
Hegel recognizes this type of dialectic which goes by the name of irony in the romantics, a form 
of dialectic initiated by Socrates, which acquires in the romantics an ideal form from its original 
dialogical function. This irony of the romantics originates from Fichte’s subjective philosophy, negating 
any substantial truth except for the original I as the creator to which all the rest is to this Tathandlung 
viz. the pure activity of the I, a mere appearance: 
“This virtuosity of an ironical artistic life apprehends itself as a divine creative genius for which 
anything and everything is only an unsubstantial creature, to which the creator, knowing himself to be 
disengaged and free from everything is bound, because he is just able to destroy it as to create it.”70 
As one can see, naturally not the entire theme of Germanism is Hegelian. Hegel was the first 
to criticize a whole range of doctrines. But neither was Oliveira Martins a Hegelian per se, although he 
shared concepts of Hegelian extraction and followed percepts of his philosophy of history. This fact 
highlights the importance of the study of Hegel’s divulgation literature, in order to understand some 
                                                          
68 See Johann Gottfried Herder, Op. cit. p.126 
69 See G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics lectures on Fine Art, Vol I, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, pp.68-69 / “das 
dialektische Moment der Idee, auf den Punkt, den ich <<unendliche absolute Negativität>> nenne, auf die 
Tätigkeit der Idee, sich als das unendliche und Allgemeine zu negerien zur Endlichkeit und Besonderheit und 
diese Negation ebensosehr wieder aufzuheben und somit das Allgemeine und Unendliche im Endlichen und 
Besonderen wiederherzustellen.“ G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesung Über die Ästhetik, Werke, vol. 13, op. cit. pp.98-99. 
70 See idem, ibidem, p.66 / “Und nun erfaßst sich diese Virtuosität eines ironisch-künstlerischen Lebens al seine 
göttliche Genialität für welche alles und jedes nur ein wesenloses Geschöpf ist, an das der Freie Schöpfer, der 
von allem sich loss und ledig weiß, sich nicht bindet, indem er dasselbe vernichten wie schaffen kann.“ idem, 
ibidem, p.95 
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of the critiques he directs at Hegel and what idea of Hegel’s philosophy he had. Besides the fact that 
the then concurrent philosophical appropriations of Hegel, in a wide range of heterogeneous doctrines 
and in a diversity of areas, ranging from politics to religion, had a not at all uncommon corresponding 
partial misrepresentation of Hegel. 
By holding in this study that Oliveira Martins’s initial move towards Germanism and his 
subsequent approach to Hegel was the product of a self-reflective proneness,  it should be recognized, 
however, that Antero de Quental exerted great influence on him - and not only Antero de Quental - 
especially in what is related to Hegel. It is true that he did not meet Antero de Quental before 1870, 
but we know that in the circles he took part, Antero de Quental and the nonconformists of Coimbra 
were a topic of debate71. This is especially true for the Tertúlia da Farmácia Ultramarina, a bohemian 
salon where debates were held under the auspices of Sousa Martins, his old school friend and 
university colleague of his younger brother Guilherme Oliveira Martins, who was working on a family 
property belonging to an uncle72.  
Antero de Quental is remarkably elucidative in his writings with high sounding confessions of 
the intellectual sources of his generation, which helps us trace the formation of their conceptions 
about Hegel. In an autobiographical letter to Wilhem Storck he is very emphatic in declaring he was 
one of the main fathers of the Germanism flourishing in Coimbra at the time he studied there: 
“The reading of Faust from Goethe (in the French translation of Blaze de Bury) and the book 
of Rémusat about the new German philosophy exerted however on my spirit a deep and lasting 
impression: I was definitely conquered for Germanism; and, if from all the French, I preferred 
Proudhon and Michelet, it was no doubt because these two were the ones that felt [closer] to the spirit 
beyond the Rhein. I read then much Hegel, in the French translations of Vera ([as] only later did I learn 
German); I do know if I understood [him] well, neither would the independence of my spirit allow me 
to be his disciple, but it is certain that the great tendencies of such a synthesis seduced me. In any case 
Hegelianism was the starting point of my philosophical speculations, and I could say that it was inside 
it that my spiritual evolution took place.” 
(...) 
“How did I accommodate the cult of these doctrines of the apologist of the Prussian State, with 
the radicalism and socialism of Michelet, Quinet and Proudhon? Mysteries of the youthful 
incoherence” 
                                                          
71 See Guilherme d’Oliveira Martins, Oliveira Martins: uma Biografia, Prefácio de Eduardo Lourenço, Impressa 
Nacional Casa da Moeda, Lisboa, 1986, p.42. 
72 See idem, ibidem, pp.50-51. 
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(...) 
“This was the point of departure for the current Portuguese literary evolution” … “Hegelianism 
exploded in [the group of] Coimbra” 
(…) 
“there was a group in Portugal of 16 to 20 young man, who did not care about the Academy 
and the academics, who were no longer catholic or monarchic, who spoke of Goethe and Hegel like 
the old had spoken of Chateaubriand and Cousin; of Michelet and Proudhon, like [those] others of 
Guizot and Bastiat” 
 “The facts confirmed this impression: 10 or 12 of the first names of today’s literature all came 
(except 2 or 3) from [this] Coimbra school or from its influence. Germanism had set foot in Portugal. A 
new era for Portuguese thought was open.”73 
The content of this text is rich on different levels. To start with, the fact that he did not know 
German but learned it only later, which, according to our research, begun at least in a systematic form, 
when he travelled to America, since we know that “A German grammar made his delight” whilst being 
on the ship74.  
                                                          
73 “a leitura do Fausto de Goethe (na tradução francesa de Blaze de Bury) e o livro de Rémusat sobre a nova 
filosofia alemã exerceram todavia sobre o meu espírito uma impressão profunda e duradoura: fiquei 
definitivamente conquistado para o Germanismo; e, se entre os franceses, preferi a todos Proudhon e 
Michelet, foi sem dúvida por serem estes dois os que mais se ressentem do espírito de Além-Reno. Li depois 
muito de Hegel, nas traduções francesas de Vera (pois só mais tarde é que aprendi alemão). Não sei se o 
entendi bem, nem a independência do meu espírito me consentia ser discípulo: mas é certo que me seduziram 
as tendências grandiosas daquela estupenda síntese. Em todo o caso, o Hegelianismo foi o ponto de partida 
das minhas especulações filosóficas, e posso dizer que foi dentro dele que se deu a minha evolução 
intelectual.” 
(...) 
“Como acomodava eu este culto pelas doutrinas do apologista do Estado prussiano, com o radicalismo e o 
socialismo de Michelet, Quinet e Proudhon? Mistérios da incoerência da mocidade!” 
(…) 
“e foi o ponto de partida da atual evolução da literatura portuguesa” … “O Hegelianismo dos coimbrões fez 
explosão.” 
(…) 
“havia em Portugal um grupo de 16 a 20 rapazes, que não queriam saber da Academia nem dos Académicos, 
que já não eram católicos nem monárquicos, que falavam de Goethe e Hegel como os velhos tinham falado de 
Chateaubriand e de Cousin; e de Michelet e Proudhon, como os outros de Guizot e Bastiat” 
(..) 
“Os factos confirmaram esta impressão: os 10 ou 12 primeiros nomes da literatura de hoje saíram todos (salvo 
2 ou 3) da Escola Coimbrã ou da influência dela. O Germanismo tomara pé em Portugal. Abria-se uma nova era 
para o pensamento Português.” 14 of May of 1887 letter to Wihlelm Storck, Antero de Quental, Cartas, vol. 3, 
op. cit. pp.92-95. 
74 “uma gramática alemã fez as suas delicias”, João Gaspar Simões, Antero de Quental, Editorial presença, 
Lisboa, 1962, pp.45-46. 
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Carolina Michaelis however furnishes us a less favourable view of Antero de Quental’s 
knowledge of German:  
“I will speak in the first place of his relationship with our language. He could not speak it. He 
pronounced it slowly [and] with much effort. Neither did he write it. And even less could he understand 
the familiar language, quickly pronounced” … “Antero(which in any case spoke French very well, for 
his part he read English, Italian and Spanish and was not lost in Latim) was not afraid of his 
insufficiencies in German” … “what was very important for him, was to read, but to read from the 
Masters”75. 
She places the beginning of this learning of the German language as an autodidact in 1867. He 
certainly had in the beginning of 1870 already started reading in German as a letter to Oliveira Martins 
attests: “I have been studying German, and I understand it a little better”76. 
Another appointment is the recognition of the German ideas broad influence among his 
generation, of which Hegel was the dominant force. However, the sources of such Germanism appear 
to be French. It was through Augusto Vera that Antero de Quental had his initial contact with the 
philosophy of Hegel, inside of which his spiritual development took place. He also has doubts over his 
understanding of Hegel, as well as contradictory thoughts about Hegel which he identifies as the 
apologist of the Prussian state. In wake of such clues given by Antero de Quental the next section will 
look into the basis of such beliefs which leads us to the next section, the sources of this Germanism in 
Oliveira Martins. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
75 “Direi em primeiro lugar, das suas relações com a nossa língua. Não a falava. Pronunciava-a devagar e a 
custo. Nem a escrevia. E muito menos entendia a linguagem familiar, rapidamente enunciada” ... “Antero (que 
de resto falava muito bem o francês, pela sua parte lia inglês, italiano e espanhol e não era de modo algum 
hóspede em latim) não receava a sua insuficiência no manejo de alemão” … “O que lhe importava, e muito, era 
saber ler, mas ler os Mestres” Carolina de Michaelis, “Antero e a Alemanha” in Antero de Quental in 
Memoriam[edição Fac-Similada], Editorial Presença e Casa dos Açores, Lisboa, 1993, pp.391-394. 
76 “Tenho estudado alemão, e já entendo menos mal o que leio.” 28 [of Augusto of 1874] letter to Oliveira 
Martins, Antero de Quental, Cartas, vol. 2, op. cit. p.381 
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2.2 Sources 
In this section the sources from which this Germanism emanated will be traced and 
problematized. Because of the nature of such an inquiry, specific allusions to Oliveira Martins will be 
made only when pertinent, as the main objective is to have a general view, hopefully a not too 
impressionistic one, of the sources available to Oliveira Martins. Apart from the direct sources, sources 
indirectly coming from philosophical and political circles that integrated some Hegelian ideas should 
also be considered, such as those of socialism, positivism and eclecticism. Those who outline mainly 
critical elements, gave even more strength to the discussion on and interest in Hegel. These indirect 
sources are, however, for the most part, circumstantial and we will focus more on direct sources. 
Previously the formation of this Germanism was grounded on a youthful period of Oliveira 
Martins’s life, mostly pre 1870, and the generation he is associated with, where the sources and direct 
references to Hegel or German philosophy are still fragmentary. Still trying, however, to delineate 
possibilities and draw hypotheses based on the available information, the people and the intellectual 
circles he was related to in Portugal, considering, in addition, the general course of Europe’s history.  
This part will now occupy itself with Oliveira Martins’s texts globally, where the relation is more 
direct, inclusively with notes, quotations and bibliography references. This procedure will require a 
descending process to look into the sources, because first, in Oliveira Martins they are not the originals 
but translations, and second, the cultural environment and historical/political conjuncture, which is 
variable, has an influence on this reception. For example, he was first a follower of Proudhon but 
moved progressively towards another socialist camp, that of state socialism. Therefore, a different 
understanding of Hegel and his philosophical positioning is to be found in later mature works. 
How Hegel’s philosophy was understood and what were taken to be its practical implications 
are two sides that should be differentiated for methodological reasons. These are, on the one hand, 
the interpretations of his doctrine in terms of ontological and epistemological fundaments, involving 
technical aspects which pertain specifically to the Hegelian system; on the other hand, there is what 
comes to be the political side of Hegel. When taken to its limits, the political arena is seen as a reflection 
of this Hegelianism, or, according to some of his detractors precisely the opposite, which amounts to 
the argument of accepting the existent and then simply give the political appearances a cognitive form.  
However, these two sides are inter-related, because to think reality, as Hegel does, he 
accommodates it in forms of thought, expressing a rational understanding of this reality by building a 
structure which allows working on this same reality. The implications of uncovering undesired 
phantoms from a reality expurgated of contradiction, some of which are still incipient in its 
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phenomenal forms, question the rationale of such reality and what is in thought is for the subject no 
longer acceptable to remain so circumscribed. 
There was a very clear project since Hegel’s youth; he sought the renovation of the community, 
trapped in lifeless forms of existence, by looking at Greek classical culture. But instead of advocating 
going back to these early religious forms, he looked for the transitions; he looked at how it was possible 
that this lively element of Greek religion degenerated. This is where his sight will focus on and from 
this initial religious view he will build his speculative system on the pyre of dialectics, the kernel of the 
logic of change, realizing that opposing elements, instead of being consumed and taken to the last 
consequences, were in fact commonly hindered from development with a subsequent suspension of 
reason that reflects on the community. The relation between Hegel’s theory and the development of 
society, or in Hegel’s terms, the life of the community where reason builds itself up, is understandably 
enormous and the destructive power of such doctrine would not remain indifferent to those who 
perceived it. This relation is duly seen by numerous antagonists to the extent that the political 
outcomes are often regarded as the result of Hegelian philosophy, as an inspirer of Revolution, where 
developments in this area are mere Hegelian prerogatives deduced directly from his system and that 
these two sides are non-differentiable. 
In the analysis of the Hegelian sources of Oliveira Martins, such methodology helps us 
differentiate between the ideas in vogue. The intellectual radication of Oliveira Martins is not always 
clear, especially in his first books in which a bibliography is lacking, and where references and footnotes 
are, although when present very reveling, sparse. He ventures to take conceptions from different 
sources and puts them together in a synthesis, however, somewhat schematic, they become muddled 
and their provenience uncertain, although sometimes we are able to discern the line, or better yet, 
the branch from where they came from. 
Antero de Quental’s statement about Augusto Vera as a source for the reading of Hegel is also 
confirmed in Oliveira Martins. In the books in which a bibliography is given, we find the following 
translation of Hegel: Philosophie de la Religion, tr. Vera, Paris, 1876 (in Sistema dos Mitos Religiosos, 
1882) and a reference is also given to this same translation in a footnote of O Helenismo e Civilização 
Cristã77. Even if this translation is from 1876, it is legitimate to assume that Oliveira Martins had read 
other translations from Vera before, as these were the ones available at the time he wrote Teoria do 
Socialismo, in which Hegel and German philosophy are discussed at length. In his personal library the 
only translation by Vera to be found, besides the already mentioned Philosophie de la Religion, is the 
translation Philosophie de la Nature which apparently belonged to Antero de Quental. He also had an 
                                                          
77 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, O Helenismo e a Civilização Cristã, prefácio Dr. José Marinho, Guimarães Editores, 
Lisboa, 1985, p.327. 
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English translation of Hegel’s Lectures on Philosophy of History by J. Sibree with the edition date of 
1878, so only later would he have access to it78. Another possibility of getting familiar with Hegel is 
through second hand material: either from early Germanistic disseminators, although none is to be 
found in his personal library, such as Auguste Ott, Hegel et la Philosophie Allemande or Joseph Willm’s, 
Histoire de la Philosophie Allemande depuis Kant jusqu’à Hegel79, which were often culturally close to 
Germany, as in this case where both were Alsatians; besides Rémusat divulgation material about 
German philosophy which he certainly read. Or apart from these, Hegel could have come from socialist 
circles and from Proudhon. 
Yet another source are the liberals. However, these were mostly critical of Hegel. But they 
were surely present in Oliveira Martins’s considerations and the authors mentioned by him, such as 
Heinrich Ahrens and Emilé Lerminier, had direct contact with Hegel’s philosophy. They were, however, 
far from being Hegelian and even a political alignment in terms of liberalism in light of later 
developments is questionable. It is nevertheless almost certain that when Hegelianism first set foot in 
France, this critique came from a liberal standpoint. These interpretations of Hegel were the least 
dialectical and it seems Oliveira Martins had read both these views on Hegel, as well as those of 
Augusto Vera, naturally the translations but possibly also his interpretative books. 
Augusto Vera was a Neapolitan émigré, who seems to have arrived in France at around 1835. 
There is a wide variety of contradictory texts about Vera. Some even mention him as a student of 
Hegel80, others as a student of Cousin – which seems plausible – while the dates for his arrival in France, 
for the acquaintance with Hegel and him being a teacher in France vary. Although our goal is not so 
much concerned with Vera’s biography, but rather to have an insight into Hegel’s reception in France 
starting with Vera, it is more plausible that Raffaele Mariano, a student and close friend of Vera holds 
an upper hand in this matter81. 
According to Mariano, Augusto Vera got acquainted with Hegel through a German teacher. 
Vera gained a teaching position in Bern’s Hofwyl institute, but shortly after moved to a College in 
                                                          
78 See for all the mentioned translated works of Hegel in possession of Oliveira Martins, Paula Fernanda 
Martins, A Biblioteca de Oliveira Martins, op. cit. pp.203-204. 
79 See Michael Kelly “Hegel in France to 1940: a bibliographic essay” in Journal of European Studies, Vol XI, 
1981, p.31. 
80 See for instance Jean-Michel Rabaté. “The reception of Hegel and Heidegger in France: Alexandre Kojève, 
Jean Hyppolite, Maurice Merleau-Ponty” in Modern Europe Criticism and Theory: A critical guide, edited by 
Julian Wolfreys, Edinburgh University Paris, Edinburgh, 2006, p.204. 
81 See for his biographical essay on Augusto Vera: Rafael Mariano, Uomini e Idee, G. Barbéra Editore, Firenze, 
1905. p.227. 
See also for some other dates, an encyclopedia entry which says: Augusto Vera left Italy in 1827, travelled 
through France, arriving at Paris in 1828 and in here he would be invited to teach at Bern in 1831, but after a 
couple of months would be returning to Paris where he teaches philosophy. Dizionário Biografico degli scrittori 
contemporanei, dir. Angelo de Gubernatis, Col tipi dei sucessori Le Monnier, Firenze, 1879, p.1030. 
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Champel Genève as a teacher of French and Latin. It was in Genève that he met this Hegelian, who was 
a German teacher, but he did not stay long in Switzerland and shortly after, at around 1839, he 
returned to France where he had first studied Philosophy, since 1835, for two years at La Sorbonne 
University. Upon this return he reestablished contacts with people he had known and in a couple of 
days, as he took part in literary saloons of Paris sponsored by Louise Colet, he was in contact with 
Cousin. By the influence of Cousin he was able to teach in France, who, besides giving him a bachelor’s 
diploma, wrote a recommendation letter to the influential Pierre-Simon Ballanche: 
“M. Auguste Véra, who will present you this letter, is a young Italian who was strongly 
recommended by one of my friends, Romain, who occupies himself with fruits of the excavations of 
Sabine. I have initially welcomed M. Auguste Véra because of the recommendations he carried; but I 
was quick in welcoming him by himself. Now, I can recommend him myself, with all confidence, by his 
own merit, which I could appreciate, and for his personal qualities, which I was able to put to test. 
[Since] M. Auguste Véra occupies himself with philosophy, it is very natural that he wishes to be in 
contact with you. I consider myself fortunate for having this occasion offered to me in order to  get 
back to our old relations, which have only been suspended because of our different careers; you my 
dear friend, are devoted to the public career, me, I have remained in my obscure corner. All the 
[assistance] you can [give] to M. Auguste Verá, I will accept as a motive of recognition for myself.”82 
Augusto Vera will first teach at Collegio communal di Mont-De-Marsan in Landes. He was then 
promoted to Toulon (1840), later moving to Lille and finally Paris (1848) as a substitute professor. While 
in Toulon he wrote Philosophie Allemande – Doctrine de Hegel. During this period he pledged support 
and intervention in his favour to his benefactors for a teaching position in Paris saying “that I prefer 
any position in Paris rather than an advantageous position in the provinces; I consider, in fact my stay 
in Paris decisive for my future”83. But this request will not be taken in consideration, when the 
estrangement with Cousin grows. While provisionally staying in Paris he took part in an eximination 
                                                          
82 "M. Auguste Véra, qui vous présentera cette lettre, est un jeune Italien qui m'a été fort recommandé par un 
de mes  amis, Romain, qui s'occupe avec fruit de fouilles dans la Sabine.  J'ai d'abord accueilli M. Auguste Véra 
en raison de la recommandation dont il était porteur; mais je n'ai pas tardé à l'accueillir pour lui-même. 
Maintenant, je puis le recommander  moi-même, en toute confiance, pour son propre mérite, que j'ai pu 
apprécier, et pour ses qualités personnelles, que j'ai été dans le cas de mettre à l'épreuve. M. Auguste Véra 
s'occupant de philosophie, il était très naturel qu'il désirât être en rapport avec vous. Je m'estime heureux de 
l'occasion qui m'est offerte de me remettre dans nos anciens rapports, qui n'ont été suspendus que par la 
différence de nos carrières; vous, mon très cher ami, vous étant dévoué à la carrière publique, moi, étant resté 
dans mon coin obscur. Toute l'utilité dont vous pourrez être à M. Auguste Véra, je l'accepterai comme un motif 
de reconnaissance pour moi.” Victor Cousin, M. Victor Cousin, sa Vie et sa Correspondence, par J. Barthélemy-
Saint Hilaire, 3° vol, [s.n], Paris, 1895, pp.395-396. 
83 ”che preferirei una posizione qualunque a Parigi ad una posizione più vantagiosa in provincia; considero, 
infatti, il mio soggirono a Parigi decisivo per il mio avvenire” Charles Alunni “Per un dialogo franco-italiano in 
filosofia: l’italia come ‘terzo escluso’ dagli Annali franco-tedeschi” in Bioetica, globalizzazione ed ermeneutica: 
límpegno critic della filosofia nel mondo contemporaneo, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2003, p.210. 
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for a position in the university, but, according to Raffaele, this eximination turned out to be an abuse 
and the nomination did not follow by the influence of Victor Cousin, then adverse to Vera. Faced with 
the eclectic-spiritualist adversaries he had gained and no prospects of progress to an academic career, 
besides a romantic relation that failed to produce a marriage, Vera was left without any attachments 
to France, leading him to leave for Great-Britain.  
His countryman Giuseppe Ferrari, who took part in this same aggregation eximination of the 
University of Paris, had been suspended earlier as professor from the Strasbourg University in 1841, in 
what became known as “The Ferrari Case”84. In 1847 he had been recommended by Quinet for a 
supplement professor position at Collège de France and was accepted by the university but denied 
entry by the ministry of education. Here again in this aggregation he will not be accepted by the 
influence of Victor Cousin. Kelly in his study on Hegel’s reception in France mentions the endemic 
xenophobism in French universities at the time85. Augusto Vera may have been aware of this, and the 
fact that his name in Cousin’s recommendation letter goes by an adapted French version Auguste could 
be based on such grounds.  
Vera as a right Hegelian could not establish himself intellectually in France in an evident refusal 
- from the conservative group which at first had him under its wings - of the acceptability of such 
doctrine. In this adverse environment there was no Hegelian school in France, neither from the left  
and their revolutionary ideas, who tended to emphasize the progressive elements of Hegel’s 
philosophy; nor from the solidifying force of Hegel that tended to come from the right Hegelians and 
their orthodoxy, as Augusto Vera was unable to maintain his friendships. 
Vera was briefly under the influence of Victor Cousin, but he felt out of favour and the relations 
between him and Cousin were not cordial anymore at the outbreak of the 1848 revolution. There was 
a controversy between the Hegelian/Germanistic school and the spiritualist school of Cousin´s 
eclecticism; the latter was aligned with the catholic traditionalist reaction, on the aftermath of the 
revolution. He attacks both the elements of an orthodox catholic-religious affirmativeness and of a 
“popular philosophical metaphysics” in the philosophy of Cousin in which “the eclecticism …[is] a great 
sorcerer whose art consists in responding to everything without responding to anything”. This 
opposition to the then dominant French spiritualism further isolated him from French culture86.  
                                                          
84 See on this matter: Charles Pfister, “Un episode de l’histoire de la faculté des lettres de Strassbourg. L’affaire 
Ferrari” in Revue Internationale de l’enseignement, Volume 80, 1926, pp.334-355 
85 See Michael Kelly, Hegel in France to 1940: a bibliographic essay, op. cit. p.34 
86 “l´eclettismo…  è un grande stregone la cui arte consiste nel rispondere a tutto senza rispondere a niente” 
Charles Alunni, op. cit. p.213. 
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According to Charles Alunni this transformation into a marked Hegelianism took place in 1847. 
The initial protégée of Cousin was at first charged with the task of studying German philosophy and 
Hegel in particular, being in effect aligned with Victor Cousin. His treatment of Hegel was, like the one 
made at the hands of the Germanists earlier mentioned87, always cautious in pointing out the mistakes 
and by all means critical. His doctoral thesis Platonis, Aristotelis Et Hegelii de Medio Termino Doctrina 
(1845) points in this direction when it proposes a middle term that unites the finite and infinite, 
criticizing Hegel for a syllogistic distortion because it is impossible to arrive at reality with pure reason, 
the adequate knowledge of reality is that of existence. His first essay on the doctrine of Hegel (1843) 
revolves already on this same topic and goes in a similar direction. Therefore, Raffaele Mariano says 
precisely that his study of Hegel was still in its infancy, lacking a full understanding of Hegel. The move 
to Hegel was progressive in proportion to his distancing from Cousin, while an implicit critique of the 
psychology of Cousin could already be found in his doctoral dissertation88. 
After the 1848 events, Hegel was delegate to the famous toter Hund of Moses Mendelssohn89, 
and any possibile argument in defense of Hegel was ever more difficult. Augusto Vera was forced into 
an intellectual exile and since 1851 he lived in England until moving back to Italy in 1860, where he 
taught at the University of Napoli. During this period he published an immense number of Hegel 
translations in French. 
 Though a follower of Hegel, Augusto Vera was far from being progressive. In terms of a 
positioning in the Hegelian schools he would be an old or a right Hegelian, inclusively reproaching the 
young Hegelians in his Introduction a la philosophie de Hegel, where he states that “The young Hegelian 
school is nothing but an exaggeration of the philosophy of Hegel. In obedience to the habits of a false 
and superficial logic, it has pushed its principles to their extreme consequences”90. Furthermore 
affirming that “without doubt, the philosophy of Hegel is liberal and progressive, if we may use such 
an expression, and, on the other hand, the notion that Hegel has of things is not always in accordance 
with the one we ordinarily make use of”91. Thereafter he explains that liberalism is after all a pre-
                                                          
87 See page 42 of the present work. 
88 See Charles Alunni, op. cit. P.211 
89 See on this issue the accusation Mendelssohn drawn to Jacobi and his adversaries by saying that “people still 
always talk of Spinoza as if a dead dog” even though they constantly spoke of him / “Reden die Leute doch 
immer von Spinoza, wie von einem todten Hunde”, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi et Moses Mendelssohn, Die 
Hauptschriften zum Pantheismusstreit zwischen Jacobi und Mendelssohn, edited by H.Schulz, Reuter und 
Reichard, Berlin, 1916, p.88. 
90 “La jeune école hégélienne n’est que l’exagération de la philosophie de Hegel. En obéissant aux habitudes 
d’une logique fausse et superficielle, elle a poussé ses princpes à leurs conséquences extrêmes” Augusto Vera, 
Introduction à la philosophie de Hegel, [s.n], Paris, 1855, pp.16-17. 
91 “Sans doute, la philosophie de Hegel est libérale et progressiste, qu’on nous passe cette expression, et, d’un 
autre côté, la notion que Hegel se fait des choses n’est pas toujours d’accord avec celle qu’on s’en fait 
ordinairement” idem, ibidem p.17. 
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requisite for making philosophy. Progressive does not indeed mean what we generally take it to be, as 
paradoxically a couple of years later in Naples we see him involved in a polemic where he defends the 
death penalty.  This form of punishment was accepted by Hegel but only in the cases of murder and 
he would rather have it wither away. 
In this interpretive text of Hegel we can identify some early conceptions of Vera’s Hegel: The 
idea as the place where being and thought unite, with some clear platonic reverberations; being and 
ought-to-be closely associated, with this last one working towards the later, echoing Kant; God as 
impersonal and identified with reason, with the absolute, and man as made in his image. This last 
assertion will be further explored by Vera as it becomes apparent that one of his objectives is, to a 
certain extent, the reformation of Catholicism. Even in this introduction to Hegel we see him further 
expanding the idea of Man not just made on the image of God, but actually being God himself as its 
expression, otherwise God would be an empty shadow.92 One can see an attempt at harmonizing his 
understanding of Hegel with that of catholic faith. Besides, one of the main issues while he was in 
France was of a religious nature, and precisely there he started translating Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Religion. In the second edition of his introduction to the philosophy of Hegel we see it even more 
clearly, as the principle of unity is “not only on the Hegelian philosophy” but also “Christianity 
advances, none other than the same pretention. And on this point, Catholicism and Protestantism are 
in agreement, as they both admit and teach that the Christian religion is the absolute religion”93. They 
share the same principle in the dogma of trinity, therefore, we are told in the opening of the first 
chapter, that Hegel’s philosophy has at the same time a dogmatic and a historic character. In 
dogmatism Vera sees the unmovable principles of the Hegelian system, but for all it is worth Hegel had 
quite a different understanding of dogmatism as that which fixates, and there is a place for dogma in 
Hegel´s manner of philosophizing but only as a moment94. 
It is not surprising that Augusto Vera gave priority to Hegel’s logic and the systematic approach 
of Hegel. He elevated Hegel’s system to the statute of a fixed truth and as far as Hegel’s philosophy is 
concerned, logic is the easiest to crystalize. Only later would a different Hegel see the day of light in 
the French thought, focusing on other sides of Hegel with Hyppolite and the translation of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of the Spirit, leaving many to consider that Hegel’s system should be left behind, as 
                                                          
92 See idem, ibidem, pp.110-111 
93 “pas seulement que la philosophie hégélienne … le christianisme avance, ni plus ni moins, la même 
prétention. Et sur ce point, le catholicisme et le protestantisme sont d’accord; puisqu’ils admettent et 
enseignent tous les deux que la religion chrétienne est la religion absolue” Augusto Vera, Introduction a la 
philosophie de Hegel, Libraire Philosophique de Ladrange, 2nd ed., Paris, 1864, p.LXXXV. 
94 See Bernard Mabile, “Is Hegel Dogmatic?” in The Philosophical Forum, Volume 31, Issue 3-4, Fall-Winter 
2000, p.275-276 et 291. 
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for instance in Jacques D’Hondt where the system is a way of thinking and Hegel’s method should not 
be paralyzed by his system95. An idea which is already to be found in Hyppolite:  
“Although the implications of Hegel’s system are conservative, the advance of the dialectics is 
revolutionary, whatever Hegel’s intentions may have been”96.  
Much of the later interpretations of Hegel will be refusing the systemic approach, as most of 
these conceptions take the system as a straightjacket of dialectical thought. There are, however, still 
discordant voices such as that of Mabille who sees in Hegel’s system, an open system capable of 
receiving the other97, without this violence done to the things of which the phenomenologists accuse 
Hegel. Whom Hyppolite also refers to when he mentions “Contemporary thinkers” that “accept Hegel’s 
phenomenology but reject his ontology”98, but they do so, precisely to dismiss dialectics. These later 
developments extent further than the topic at hand, yet, the question of orthodoxy is not something 
strange to Augusto Vera. 
While teaching in Italy, Vera had to face a strong opposition from various students of Hegel, of 
which the most notable were Spaventa and Labriola. They were critical of Augusto Vera’s 
interpretations of Hegel, which in Labriola’s opinion did not bring anything new to the original thought 
of Hegel but were in fact detrimental to Hegel as “he is an orthodox Hegelian”99. In Labriola`s review 
of the Introduction to the Philosophy of History by Vera, he sees in the Vera´s mode of treatment an 
“edifying modus” or an attempt to build postulates of easy apprehension but little scientific value100. 
He does not focus so much on translation aspects but more on the way in which Hegel was being 
treated by Vera, and he is in fact quite shocked by Rosenkranz’s recommendation of Vera to those who 
were not able to read Hegel in German, based on his “intelligence for philosophical facts”101. 
                                                          
95 “The abandonment of the system …” / “Le delaissement du système …” Jacques D’Hondt, Hegel et 
L’Hégélianisme, Presse Universitaires de France, Troisième edition corrigée, Paris, 1991, pp.73-74 for the 
quote/reference and also p.101 for further exposition. 
96 See Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit, translated by Samuel 
Cherniak and John Heckman, Northwestern University Press, 1974, p.398. / “Si les consequences du système 
sont conservatrices, la marche de la dialectique est révolutionnaire quelle que soit par ailleurs l’aillers 
l’intention même de Hegel” Jean Hyppolite, Genese de la Phénoménologie de l’espirit de Hegel, Tome II, 
Editions Montaigne, 1946, p.386. 
97 See Bernard Mabille, “Is Hegel a Dogmatic?” in The philosophical forum, Volume XXXI, NOS 3-4, Fall-Winter 
2000, p.291 
98 See Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit, op. cit. p.205 / “nos 
contemporains” … “Ce’est l’ontologie hégélienne qu’ils refusent, non sa phénoménologie.” Jean Hyppolite, 
Genese de la Phénoménologie de l’espirit de Hegel, Tome I, op. cit. p.197. 
99 “er ein strenggläubiger Hegelianer ist“  Antonio Labriola, Richerce sul problema della libertá e altri scritti di 
filosofia e di pedagogia, a cura di Luigi dal Pane, Feltrineli Editore, Milano, 1962, pp.275. 
100 See Antonio Labriola, Richerce sul problema della libertá e altri scritti di filosofia e di pedagogia, op. cit. 
pp.275-276 
101 “Wer jetzt noch klagen sollte dass er Hegel in der deutschen  Sprache nicht zu verstehen vermöge, dam kann 
man nunmehr Vera’s Uebersetzung empfehlen. Diese muss er verstehen, versteht sich, wenn er den zur 
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When looking more directly to what relates to Vera’s translation, it is Benedetto Croce who 
will be one of his early critics articulating such concerns in his preface to the translation of Hegel’s 
encyclopedia102. Croce gives various examples with side by side phrases and one can draw his own 
conclusions, and Croce’s conclusion is the following: 
“So it seems to me that the translations of Vera, -  which have been and are the main, almost 
unique, meditators of the knowledge of Hegel and his works in the neolatin nations – are inferior to 
their reputation, and they should be kept and be used with suspicion even if benevolent.”103 
 These shortcomings were certainly noticed by the left Hegelians of the “school” of Spaventa, 
but they tended to be left on a second plan in face of many polemics that arouse between them, of 
which the differences between these Hegelian schools Barzelloti makes notice104. A more recent 
critique of Augusto Vera’s translation comes from Andre Doz who stresses interesting points such as 
the tendency, at the time, to favour elegance instead of exactitude and the difficulty to have a balance 
between a free and a good translation. 
This preference for elegance is stressed in expressions that lack the proper correspondent in 
French such as an sich, für sich, an und für sich, which have a particular conceptual significance in Hegel 
and when translated at the hands of Vera they lose some of their original meaning. This is most obvious 
in the translation of an und für sich as “absolute interiority”105 instead of the literal form “in and for 
itself”106. Vera leaves the original German term in parentheses, but Andre Doz warns that this 
translation may still lead to equivoques107. 
Another aspect of the problem of translating Hegel’s texts is the inexistence of a philosophical 
conceptual framework in the language they were being translated to. This is most evident in the 
translation of aufheben which has the double sense of eliminating and preserving. Augusto Vera 
translates it mainly as “suppress”108 with the participle form aufgehoben in being translated a couple 
                                                          
philosophischen Erkenntniss überhaupt nöthigen Verstand mitbringt“ Karl Rosenkranz, Hegels 
Naturphilosophie und die Bearbeitung derselben durch den italienischen Philosophen Augusto Véra, Georg Olms 
Verlag, Hildsheim, 1979[reprint][1869], p.9. 
102 See Benedetto Croce, Enciclopedia delle scienze filosofiche in compendio, tradotta da Benedetto Croce, 
Laterza & Figli, Roma, 1907. 
103 “Perciò a me sembra che le traduzioni del Vera, - che sono state e sono le principali, quasi uniche mediatrici 
per la conoscenza dell’opera di Hegel presso la nazioni neolatine, - siano inferiori alla loro fama, e debbano 
esse guardate e adoprate con diffidenza sia pure benevola” idem, ibidem, p.XX. 
104 See Barzellotti “No speculative movement” in From Kant to Croce: Modern Philosophy in Italia 1800-1950, 
edited and translated with an introduction by Brian Copenhaver and Rebecca Copenhaver, pp.86-88. 
105 intériorité absolue 
106 En et pour soi-même 
107 See Andre Doz, “Vera Traductuer et Interprete de Hegel in Annali dela scuola normale superiore di Pisa” in 
Classe di Lettere e Filosofia, Serie III, Vol, XVI, Pisa, 1986, p.1267. 
108 Supprimer 
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of times as “absorbed in”109, which Doz considers, combines both the positive and negative form. This 
is “a great inconvenience” because it uses two different words to translate one ambivalent German 
word110. It should be further pointed out that the word “suppress” with its negative connotation may 
lead to confusion, especially because Kant’s antinomies also promised to suppress contradictions. 
Besides, this will be the manner in which Oliveira Martins will understand the synthesis; the 
contradictions are suppressed in a higher term but subsist externally. While for Hegel the 
contradictions are thought in a process of change, in which contradictions are allowed to develop 
instead of being suppressed, the result is richer then the initial positive term and the contradictions 
are overcome. 
A few more concepts and their corresponding translation are analyzed, for instance: Begriff is 
translated as notion, like in the A.V Miller’s English translation of Hegel’s Logic, instead of concept. 
Wirklichkeit is translated as essential reality111, Unmittelbarkeit and Mittelbarkeit as immediacy and 
mediateness112 correspondingly. The conceptual analysis continues and some are seen as good 
translations, like the three previous examples, and others are seen as bad translations. From this 
second group I would pick out Bestimmtheit which Vera translated as determinateness113, which he 
finds by all means inappropriate. The objection to this translation stems probably from Heideggerian 
philosophy, where this concept is taken on as the condition of that which is capable of being 
determined, involving a talification (Beschaffenheit) which is then the actual state of a thing. This 
objection is further exposed in some of his other works, in which he makes clear his preference for the 
translation of Bestimmtheit as determinacy114: 
 “Bestimmung, Bestimmtheit: these words are rendered respectively as determination and 
determinacy. Literally the first has the active signification: the act of determining; the second the 
passive signification: the state of being determined” … “In Bestimmtheit, what stands out is the 
character of the delimited, distinct of something else, whether due to the character of the determined 
in general, or whether in respect of the same content that belongs to it due to the fact of being the 
determined he is”115 
                                                          
109 Absorbé en 
110 See Andre Doz, Op. cit. p.1267. 
111 reálité essentielle 
112 Immédiatité and médiatité 
113 déterminabilité 
114 déterminéité 
115 “Bestimmung, Bestimmheit: ces mots sont rendus respectivement par détermination et déterminéité. 
Littéralement le premier a la signification active: l’acte de déterminer; le second la signification: passive: l’état 
de ce que est déterminé.” … “Dans Bestimmtheit, ce qui ressort est le caractère du délimité, distinct d’autre 
chose; soit qu’il s’agisse du caractère du déterminé en général, soit qu’il s’agisse du contenu même qui lui 
revient du fait d’être le déterminé qu’il est.” Andre Doz, La logique de Hegel et les problemes traditionnels de 
l’ontologie, Libraire Philosophique, Paris, 2007, p.305. 
50 
 
Andre Doz also gives a general analysis of Vera’s Hegelianism and speaks of “certain points that 
facilitate the understanding of Hegelian thought which were quite well highlighted by Verá”116, and he 
eulogizes Vera for taking notice of the differences between logic and ontology. Where in Aristotle logic 
tends to be formal, in Hegel there is an ontological scope he gives to the syllogism. He also pays 
attention to Hegel’s systematization and its circular connectivity. But Doz cannot help recognizing that 
“the weaknesses of the Vera’s exposition are difficult to contest”117. 
In this last respect I would emphasize what he sees as the lack of clarity in the exposition of 
the concept of dialectics, in which he translates ander118 for contraire, which would fundamentally 
deform the idea of the other as not being indifferent. Being the negative of the positive, it also has the 
positive within itself. This particular piece of translation Doz refers to could not be found, but looking 
at the context it seems he is speaking about Vera’s interpretative Essay Introduction à la Philosophie 
de Hegel and not a particular translation and it seems the passage goes as follows “The dialectic is 
based on the co-existence of contraries, which is besides in a way how one represents 
contradiction”119. He clearly states that this happens in a translation; however, as pointed out earlier 
no occurrence of such translation could be found.  
In face of his not so rigorous translations, the choir of Vera’s critics multiplied throughout the 
years, both in Italy and France,  patented in Alexandre Koyré saying that he was a “more enthusiastic 
than competent”120 disciple as well as Georges Canguillhem who says “the old translation of Vera 
enjoys only a limited credit, it was at its worst”121. 
Cousin has often been said to be the introducer of Hegel in France, this seems to actually be 
the case, particularly because much of the interest for Hegel in France came from his earlier expositions 
of Hegel’s philosophy. It should not be forgotten that Cousin was considered sympathetic to the 
liberals and persona non grata in Germany. He was arrested by the Saxon police in Dresden on the 
suspicion of being a “subversive” by secret indications of the French police, and Hegel had to intervene 
in his favour by writing a letter to the Prussian interior ministry for him to be released. This event led 
                                                          
116 “certains points propres à faciliter l’intelligence de la pensée hégélienne on été assez heureusement 
soulignés par Véra” op. cit.p.1275 
117 “les faiblesses de l’exposé de Véra sont difficilement contestables” idem, ibidem, p.1276. 
118 other 
119 “La dialectique est donc fondée sur la coexistence des contraires, de quelque façon d’ailleurs qu’on se 
represente la contradiction” Augusto Vera, Introduction a la philosophie de Hegel, A Franck Editeur, Paris, 1855, 
p.145 
120 See Alexandre Koyré, Etudes d´Histoire de la Pensée Philosophique, Colin, Paris, 1961, p.206. 
121 See Georges Canguillhem, “Hegel en France” in Revue d’histoire et de philosophie religieuses, vol,27, 1948, 
p.284. 
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to a round of encounters between Cousin and Hegel which would probably involve philosophical 
discussions122. 
The teachings of Cousin about German philosophy started at least in the years of 1819-20 as 
result of his visits to Germany between 1817 and 1818. Hegel was one of his main influences, as well 
as Schelling, but in his last lectures their names were hardly mentioned, especially from 1829-30 
onward. He plagiarized what he was able to grasp and in the courses of 1828 Hegel was never 
mentioned but the public suspected that some thoughts he exposes come from Hegel, while Hegel 
himself was aware of this use of his philosophy by Cousin123. Karl Ludwig Michelet would later say that 
Hegel jokingly referred to Cousin in these terms “he has taken some fish from me but drowned them 
in his own sauce”124. 
Cousin would remain on good terms with Hegel for the remainder of his life, but, frankly 
speaking, he was never really close to Hegel. His interest was scattered to German philosophy and 
culture in general, which Hegel gives him credit for and thanks him for disseminatng German 
philosophical ideas in France, when Hegel exchanges letters with Cousin. The later criticism he makes 
of Hegel as obscure, a new scholasticism or its reimplementation, are some of the thesis advanced by 
Hegel’s detractors in his time, of which Cousin also had knowledge. The “philosopher of the Prussian 
State” was already an accusation that both the liberals and conservatives would throw at Hegel, 
because he did not support the particularisms of individual states and the liberties of the feudal 
system. Humboldt would be one of those accusing Hegel of scholasticism125. 
It is also important to notice that some of the students who took part in Cousin’s classes, 
particularly in the earlier years of 1819-20, would become interested in Hegel, a few even going as far 
as to actually study under him in Berlin. Some of them would be the later critics of Hegel as in the case 
of Eugéne Lerminier, who was cited by Oliveira Martins in his Teoria do Socialismo126. Hegel as the 
apologist of the Prussian state in France came mostly from these Liberals or ex-Liberals. The ones who 
had the advantage of actually having attended Hegel’s lectures in Berlin, were in this manner better 
prepared for a critique of Hegel from the point of view of a liberal-conservative nationalism. The 
sources of this current are scattered in Oliveira Martins and a proper examination requires a re-
visitation of these authors in a different light. 
                                                          
122 See Terry Pinkard for a detailed exposition of this incidente. Terry Pinkard, Hegel: A Biography, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2000, pp.524-528. 
123 See Jacques D’Hondt, “Hegel et Les Socialists” in La pensée: Revue du rationalism Moderne, n° 157, Juin 
1971, p.6. 
124 “er hat mir einige Fische entwendet, sie aber in seiner eigenen Sauce ertränkt“ Karl Ludwig Michelet, in Der 
Gedanken, Berlin, Mai, 1862, p.136. 
125 See Terry Pinkard, op. cit. pp.608-611. 
126 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Teoria do Socialismo, op. cit. p.48-49 
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The autobiographical letter of Antero de Quental states that “Chateubriand and Cousin” had 
been substituted by “Michelet and Proudhon”. But whether the philosophy emanating from Cousin 
remained is another question because even if only an indirect treatment of Hegel comes from Cousin, 
his former students would be going along that route and had knowledge of the source texts. These 
were certainly known to Oliveira Martins, as through them we have most of the critique surrounding 
Hegel. Of those who attended the lectures of Hegel in Berlin, Eugène Lermenier, a former liberal who 
turned conservative and was aligned with Guizot, will be one of those virulent critics of Hegel. 
Lermenier was one of the sources of Oliveira Martins; therefore, some of the critiques of Hegel in what 
relates to the state and to philosophy of right, has probably emanated from this liberal-conservative 
section. 
Lerminier is the first to recognize Cousin as the introducer of Hegel in France, but he says that 
he is the first to actually name him127, because Cousin does not return the glory of the ideas exposed 
to its rightful owner, which is Hegel, in an evident case of plagiarism128. Already from the decade 1830 
Lerminier would be denouncing Hegel’s illiberalism, particularly in his Philosophie du droit, which 
Oliveira Martins for sure has read and which is part of his personal library. There he is critical of Hegel’s 
“abstract reason that constitutes God, the world and history” and sets Hegel apart from his 
predecessors, with Kant as the philosopher of duty and Fichte of liberty. Hegel has made some original 
generalizations in history but his philosophizing has brought absolutism to philosophy, sacrificing life 
to his logical formulas and in this sense “the philosophy of Hegel is a continuous logical trinity”129, 
where Hegel “sacrifices everything to logic, [politics] is [from that] oppressed and he substitutes so to 
speak the movements of life for mechanical impulses..”130. This will be one of the earlier Oliveira 
Martins’s critiques, when he sees in Hegel the absolutism that reflects a Hegelian conception of reason 
above everything else131.  
But Oliveira Martins tends to emphasize the unity of the intellectual movement from Kant to 
Hegel, whereas Lerminier makes a marked differentiation of Hegel because “the party of Hermann, 
                                                          
127 “I have pronounced the name and made known some ideas, but returning the glory to him” / “j’ai prononcé 
le nom et fait connaître quelques idées, mais en lui en renvoyant la gloire“ E. Lerminier, Philosophie du droit, 
volume I, Paris, 1835, pp. XLVI-XLVII.  
128 See E. Lerminier, Lettres philosophiques adressées à un Berlinois, Paris, 1832, p.85. 
129 See Lerminier, “La philosophie de Hegel est une trinité logique continuelle” E. Lerminier, Philosophie du 
droit, volume II, op. cit. P.185. 
130 “sacrifie tout à la logique, en est opprimé, et substitue pour ainsi dire aux mouvements de la vie des ressorts 
mécaniques” idem, ibidem, pp.185. 
131 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Teoria do Socialismo, op. cit. p.80 
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Luther, Kant and Fichte detests dogmatism”132. However, he still relates each of those philosophers 
(Kant, Fichte, Hegel): 
“The philosophy of Kant, of which we have already drawn the sketch elsewhere, leads us to 
the idealism of Fichte that creates everything, God and the world. Schelling and Hegel then take away 
philosophy from this solitary monologue of the professor of Jena, trying to summarize in one same 
unity nature, history and thought. Hegel’s natural right especially offers us an admirable critical view 
of past history, but not a tendency towards the future. Its practical application has something of 
stagnant and illiberal”133 
Oliveira Martins prefers to take this sense of continuity, denoting however, on occasions, the 
abstractness of Hegel’s philosophy or even its political uses which Lerminier denounces. When asked 
about the significance of Hegel’s logic Lerminier answers: “What is Hegel’s point of departure? Pure 
abstraction. What is the apogee, and so to say his peroration? Pure abstraction.”134  With it then the 
absolute state is also justified as “with such a philosophy one constantly absolves power, one 
amnesties despotism, one gives patience to the evils of men”135 and in practice “through these 
formulas and his detours, he comes to make of the monarchy the personality itself of the state, in such 
a way that without a monarch there is no people, but simply a collection of individuals, a formless 
mass, but not a society”136 
Oliveira Martins too, although in the different historical context of his time, will be making this 
relation between Prussia and Hegel’s philosophy where the “the militar-historical-feudal traditions of 
the party of the cross” will be “allied to the transcendent doctrine of the absolute I of Hegel”137 and 
“the old feudal and military Prussia has found in Hegel an appropriation of the spirit of the 19th century 
                                                          
132 ”La partie de Hermann, de Luther, Kant et de Fichte, répugne à dogmtisme” E. Lerminier, Philosophie du 
droit, vol. 2, op. cit. p.200 
133 “La philosophie de Kant, dont nous avons déjà ailleurs tracé l’esquisse, nous conduira à l’idéalisme de Fichte 
qui crée tout, Dieu et le monde. Schelling et Hegel viennent ensuite arracher la philosophie à ce monologue 
solitaire du professeur d’Iéna, tentent de résumer dans une même unité la nature, l’histoire et la pensée; et 
surtout le droit naturel de Hegel nous offrira une vue critique admirable sur l’histoire du passé, mais pas de 
tendance vers l’avenir, mais l’application pratique quelque chose de stagnant et d’illibéral” E. Lerminier, 
Philosophie du droit, vol. 2, op. cit. P.25. 
134 “Quel est le point de départ de Hegel? l’abstraction pure. Quel sera son apogée, et pour ainsi dire sa 
péroraison? l’abstraction pure ” idem, ibidem, p.188. 
135 “avec une telle philosophie on absout constamment le pouvoir, on amnistie le despotisme, on prend 
patience sur les maux de l’homme” idem, ibidem, p.199. 
136 “A travers ces formules et ses détours, il arrive à faire de la monarchie le personnalité même de l’état, de 
telle sorte que sans monarque il n’y pas de peuple, mais simplement une collection d’individus, une masse 
informe, mais pas de société.” idem, ibidem, p.192 
137 “As tradições militares-histórico-feudais do partido da cruz aliadas à doutrina transcendente do eu absoluto 
de Hegel” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Teoria do Socialismo, Op. cit. p.150 
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to their ideal, it has used [the German confederation], and has won”138. The summary we have in 
Oliveira Martins of Hegel’s philosophy is mainly taken from the Philosophie du droit of Lerminier and 
this French tradition beginning with Lerminier will continue in posteriority.  
Besides these objections, Lerminier opposed also French to German philosophy and defends a 
non-adoption or the adoption of a modified version of these ideas by the French, with the national 
consciousness of France evoked as a justification for this denial: 
“The descendants of Descartes and Rousseau, can we accept the literal importation of the 
speculations and the phraseology of Kant and Hegel? Should not all the legitimate philosophical 
movement come from a national consciousness?”139 
The most representative follower of Lerninier’s request will be Émile Beaussire. After 1848, 
Hegelianism, if not a taboo, was remembered for negative reasons: for its obscurity, errors and 
radicalism. To such extent was this attack on Hegel that a planned doctoral thesis on Hegel by Hyppolite 
Taine, a student of Victor Cousin, was denied by the University in 1851140. In the decades of 1860 this 
policy eased up and we have a resurgence of Hegel, with Beaussire continuing this line of philosophical 
nationalization proposed by Lerminier, when he writes in 1865 Antécédents de l’Hégélianisme dans la 
Philosophie Française141. There, he proposes Dom Deschamps to pioneer a philosophy similar in 
contours to Hegel’s philosophy, before Hegel had developed his. In 1863 Emile Poitou also writes an 
article entitled Les disciples de France en Hegel142, where he says the most famous followers of Hegel 
then were Renan and Taine. These would become intellectual references for Oliveira Martins. Books 
of Beaussire or Poitou cannot be found in Oliveira Martins collection but most of those mentioned as 
disciplines of Hegel were the authors of many of the books Oliveira Martins had read, which, beside 
those already mentioned, also include Vacherot. 
Although these more or less liberally oriented men of letters profess a sort of Hegelianism, 
they will be nonetheless accepting the critiques of Hegel circulating in France, with some of this 
criticism also coming from Germany. The association of philosophical ideas with the political 
                                                          
138 “A velha Prussia feudal e military encontrou em Hegel uma apropriação do espirito do século XIX ao seu 
ideal, usou dela, e venceu” idem, ibidem, P.152. 
139 “Descendants de Descartes et de Rousseau, pouvons-nous accepter l’importation littérale des spéculations 
et de la phraséologie de Kant et de Hégel? Tout mouvement philosophique légitime ne doit-il pas sortir de la 
conscience nationale?” E. Lerminier, Philosophie du droit, vol II, Op. cit. p.260 
140 See Michael Kelly, Hegel in France to 1940: a bibliographic essay, Op. cit. p.31. 
See also Taine entry in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy where we are told the “projected work on Hegel 
was declared unacceptable by the University” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, New York, 
1998. 
141 See Emile Beaussire, Antécédents de l’Hégélianism dans la Philosophie Française, Germer Bailliére Libraire 
Editeur, Paris, 1865. 
142 See Eugéne Poitou “Les disciples de Hegel“ in Revue Nationale et étrangère politique, scientifique et 
littéraire, Paris, 1863. 
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circumstances brought about by a Prussian expansionist, is made clear for instance by Beaussire who 
says they are an evident result of Hegel’s philosophy. Like Lerminier he defends Kant and Fichte against 
Hegel, saying that the philosophy of Hegel is one of expansionism and war, whilst that of Kant is one 
of perpetual peace and understanding143. After 1870 the critique of Hegel will be going along these 
lines, mainly in three vectors, 1st the philosopher of Prussian expansion and restauration, 2nd the 
obscure dialectician proponing a panlogistic fatalism, 3rd the statist and curtailer of freedom. These 
critiques helped spreading some misconceptions about Hegel, but at the same time aroused interest 
in Hegel and made him a topic of debate. Oliveira Martins and Antero de Quental will be tributary to 
such developments. 
Another source for Hegel’s philosophy, which is reflected in Oliveira Martins, is Proudhon. His 
first contact with Hegel was very deficient. This becomes evident in his De la creation de l’ordre dans 
l’humanité, where Kant is seen as the initiator of a new dialectic about the law of the composition of 
concepts in which “Hegel generalized this ingenious idea. The world, the Universe-God, according to 
him, develops  itself in three consecutive moments, forming between them the terms and the period 
of eternal evolution, I, Non-I, Absolute”144. This mixing up of Hegel with Kant leads him to affirm that 
Hegel, like many other philosophical schools, adopted this fashionable trinity dogma. At that time he 
was in contact with the political émigrés coming from Germany, and this seems to be the source of 
such assertions. Many of them had quite heterogeneous beliefs, ranging from the materialism of 
Feuerbach to the idealism of Hegel with the pantheistic ideas of Moses Hess in between. In one way 
or another they occupied themselves with the trinity doctrine, but Proudhon was not really able to 
grasp the wealth of those ideas because he lacked the knowledge of the source texts. 
He took some of the easy assertions, probably flowing in the air at the time, trying to integrate 
them in his philosophy while at the same time making a superficial critique. This is quite evident when 
he speaks of Hegel’s common place assimilated ideas as in the case of “nature, when one embraces it 
as a whole, lends itself just as well to a quaternary classification as to a ternary classification, as it 
would probably lend itself to many others, if our intuition was more comprehensive; as a consequence, 
                                                          
143 See Andrea Bellantone, Hegel en France, Volume 2, Editions Hermann, 2011, Paris, pp.11-15. 
144 “Hegel généralisa cette idée ingénieuse. Le monde, l’Univers-Dieu, selon lui, se développe en trois moments 
consécutifs, formant entre eux les termes et la période de l’éternelle évolution, Moi, Non-Moi, Absolu“ P.J. 
Proudhon, De la création l‘ordre dans l’Humanité: ou, Principes d’organisation politique, Libraire Internationale, 
Paris, 1868, p.116. 
The first edition of the said work is somewhat different: 
“Hegel poussa cette idée ingénieuse à l’infini. Le monde, l’Universe-Dieu, selon lui, se développe en trois 
moments consecutifs, formant entr’eux les termes et le période de l’eternelle evolution Moi, Non-Moi, 
Absolu.” P. J. Proudhon, De la création l‘ordre dans l’Humanité: ou, Principes d’organisation politique, [s.n], 
[Paris(?)] 1843, p.170. 
From now on this work will quote from this first edition 
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the progressive creation of Hegel reduces itself to the description of one point of view among 
thousands.”145 
It is true Hegel admitted that these geometric forms had a symbolism, as he states in his 1801 
thesis: “the square is the law of Nature, the triangle of the spirit”146. But he is also very empathic in his 
logic that such forms are only that: formal, abstract. The form of the rational is a triplicity, but “instead 
of a triplicity, the abstract form may be taken as a quadruplicity, in this way, the negative or the 
difference is counted as a duality” and on further reading it becomes clear that these are only formal 
designations which need proper development147. 
Proudhon’s proposition goes on from such a statement into supporting his claims of a serialist 
dialectics by saying that Hegel was imprisoned in a particular series. Taking part in the choir of 
sophistry, saying that Hegel “series” viz. Hegel dialectics, may well be a linguistic artifice, where the 
oppositions of the first and the second terms were not sharp enough, and the third term was not truly 
synthetized. In such effort Hegel has “anticipated the facts instead of waiting for them” by means of 
forcing his formulas. And such a method is not enough to give account for the details which his serial 
dialectics does148. 
This serial dialectics of Proudhon, however, is far from original. It actually comes from Fourier, 
and Oliveira Martins is aware of this Fourierist provenience of Proudhon’s series149. The novelty is that 
he develops it in a scientific way, free from what he criticizes as fantasies. Fourier’s series were based 
on “the instinct” that “conducts him to the serialization of the ideas” but he lacked knowledge of the 
series as he did not deepen the rules on this dialectic150. Fourier acquired the knowledge of the series 
from the point of view of an unreflective intuition, having in his work a number of unscientific 
formulations, because he was unable to distinguish between truth and error. 
What is notable in Proudhon, and much to his credit, is how he managed to take possession of 
Fourier series and redress it in a metaphysical jargon. Fourier was the first to denounce this 
                                                          
145 “la nature, quand on l’embrasse dans son ensemble, se prête aussi bien à une classification quaternaire qu’à 
une classification ternaire; qu’elle se prêterait probablement à beaucoup d’autres, si notre intuition était plus 
compréhensive; par conséquent, que la création évolutive de Hégel se réduit à la description d’un point de vue 
choisi entre mille.” idem, ibidem, p.171. 
146 See G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophical Dissertation on the Orbits of the Planets (1801), Preceded by the 12 Theses 
Defended on August 27, 1801, trans. Pierre Adler, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal I, 1987, pp.276. 
147 See G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, Op. cit. p.746 / “insofern nun jenes erste Negative schon der Zweite 
Terminus ist, so kann das als Drittes gezählt und statt der Triplizität die Abstrakte form als eine Quadruplizität 
genommen werden, das Negative oder der Unterschied ist auf diese Weise als eine Zweiheit gezählt.“ G.W.F. 
Hegel, Wissenchaft der Logik, Werke, vol. 6, op. cit. 564. 
148 See J.P. Proudhon, De la création l‘ordre dans l’Humanité: ou, Principes d’organisation politique, op. cit. 
p.171. 
149 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Teoria do Socialismo, op. cit. p.317. 
150 “l’instinct de Fourier” … “le conduisait à la sériation des idées” P. J. Proudhon, op. cit. p.259. 
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metaphysics and in the building up of his theories, such principles were dismissed and he thoroughly 
fought against these influences. It is no wonder that he saw most of the intellectuals of his age with 
scorn and considered Kant “the protometaphysician of modern age”151. The theory of series elaborated 
in his Théorie de l’unite universelle is where Proudhon would get inspiration from152.  
The treatment of Fourier is out of the scope of this text, but there are some interesting points 
that should be made reference to. One point is that Karl Grün, a close associate of Proudhon, inclusively 
translating Proudhon’s Système des contradictions économiques ou Philosophie de la misère, also 
writes about Fourier series. The interest in French socialism by Grün, like by many other German 
political refugees, started in Germany and upon exile in France, the contact with Proudhon became 
constant. Grün considered Proudhon the Feuerbach of France, certainly because of his attacks on 
religion, a relation that Marx also makes in a letter from 1865153. The other point is: in what way did 
Fourierism and utopian socialism, in general, helped dismissing Hegel and the possibility of a left 
Hegelian school in France? Jacques D´Hondt has written an interesting article on how socialists came 
under the influence of Hegelianism154, especially those who belonged to the movement initiated by 
Saint-Simon, of which isolationism, syncretism and later dismemberment were detrimental to a 
broader dissemination of Hegel. 
The primary figures that brought knowledge of Hegel to France and particularly to saint-
simonians were Eugène Rodrigues, Gustave d’Eichtahal, Jules Lechevalier and for a short time also 
Eugéne Lerminier. The interest in French socialism among German intellectuals was so notable that 
Lechevalier would give conferences about it in Germany155. If any socialism could be assigned to 
German nationals it would be to those known as the young Hegelians, and in this sense the interest 
was mutual: the French were interested in German philosophy and the Germans in French socialism. 
The four thinkers mentioned earlier were, according to René Derré, associated with Hegel or were 
themselves young Hegelians156 who brought some of their conceptions to the French socialist 
movement. The Katheder socialists, later admired by Oliveira Martins, were certainly of another 
generation and their ideas were quite different from those of these earlier socialists. If they had any 
impact in France, it was more on the level of a reformed liberalism, such as that of Francophone 
                                                          
151 “le protométaphysicien de l’école modern” Charles Fourier, Des Manuscrits, Libraire Phalanstérienne, Paris, 
1851, p.33. 
152 See Charles Fourier, Théorie de L’Unite Universelle, 4 Volumes, [Publiée par la société por la propagation et 
pour la realisation de la theorie de Fourier], Paris, 1841. 
153 See Marx and Engels Collected works, On Proudhon, vol. 20, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1985, p.26. / Karl 
Marx und Frederich Engels Werke, Über Proudhon, vol. 16, Dietz Verlag, 1962, Berlin. 
154 See Jacques D’Hondt, “Hegel et les socialistes” in op. cit. 
155 See idem, ibidem p.17. 
156 See Jean René Derré, chapter “Le saint simonism est-il jeune hégélien?” in Regards sur le Saint-Simonisme et 
les saint Simoniens, Presse Universitaire de Lyon, Lyon, 1986, pp.45-74. 
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Lavaleye, which Oliveira Martins thoroughly read. The Hegelianism of this earlier group, starting with 
Cousins’s eclecticism, evolved for the most part within socialist circles and circulated into different 
philosophical ideas. Many of those associated with it would then be moving close to Saint-Simonian 
socialism and even to Auguste Comte. It was D’Eichthal who gave long translated excerpts of Hegel’s 
philosophical works to Comte and these appear infact to be found in the positivist archive157. Hegel 
will have indeed a day in the positivist calendar corresponding to the 27 of October. 
The contact Oliveira Martins may have had with utopian socialism was marginal. He dismissed 
it, like Proudhon, as fantasies. But there was certainly an idea of Hegel in the French imaginary that, if 
not revolutionary himself, he was at least the instigator of revolutionary activities. On this account the 
Contess Valérie de Gasparin wrote the novel l’Hégélien, in which a young Hegelian, with the arrogance 
of a God fighting as a revolutionary, reenters Germany in 1849 to join his comrades in arms, but soon 
the news of his disappearance surf as if the time for revolutions was long gone158. The criticism of Hegel 
put forward by the socialists is fragmentary. In France, for instance, Pierre Leroux will dismiss Hegel 
for his religiosity and identified him as a pantheist, whereas some others will accept and integrate this 
pantheism159, particularly Saint-Simonists160. A complete criticism of Hegel by the socialists would be 
coming from Marx, Engels, Ruge and other Germans who were aware of the communist movement in 
France but they would follow Hegel on many points, for instance, against Schelling and other Hegel 
detractors, by which Leroux was in a way seduced in his critique of Hegel, a fact deplored by Marx161.  
When Oliveira Martins speaks in the context of German political developments and Hegel, he 
names Karl Marx as being part of these issues but does not develop any further on the topic: 
“What does it mean [when] Berlin elects [as] its representatives the enemies of the empire at 
the time [this empire] was acclaimed victorious in Paris? What does it mean the figure of Karl Marx, 
contemporaneous of Moltke? What does it mean Bebel in the parliament and Jacoby that the empire 
cannot punish? All these phenomena mean that next to France, and next to Spain, the Latins and the 
Germans start to glimpse the end of humanity in virtue of which they are solidary, and to comprehend 
socialism as the doctrine of liberty and equality.”162 
                                                          
157 See Mary Pickering, Auguste Comte: an intellectual biography, volume I, Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 1993, p.278. 
158 See Valérie de Gasparin, “L´Hégélien” in Les Horizons prochains, Paris, 1858, p.113-136. 
159 See Jacques D’Hondt, “Hegel et les socialistes” in Op. cit. pp.9-12. 
160 See idem, ibidem, pp.14-19. 
161 See idem, ibidem, p.9. 
162 “O que significa Berlim eleger seus representantes os inimigos do império na hora em que era aclamado 
vitorioso em Paris? Que significa a personalidade de Carlos Marx, contemporaneo de Moltke ? Que significa 
Bebel no parlamento e Jacoby que o império não pode castigar? Todos estes fenómenos significam ao lado dos 
da França, ao lado dos da Espanha, que latinos e germanos começam a entrever o fundo humano em virtude 
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Here, Karl Marx is part of that group of socialists but it seems that he was not aware of any 
Marx’s or Engels’s criticism, the only book of Marx that he had in his library is the response of Marx to 
Proudhon in his Misère de la philosophie163. It seems he had at some point The Capital of Karl Marx164, 
but judging by his adherence to Proudhon’s thesis at that time, Marx was not in his intellectual horizon, 
neither would his socialists ideas be later inclined in this direction. After 1848 Hegel is relegated to a 
dead dog, and most of the adherents of Kathedersozialismus would renegade any ideas close to 
dialectics. 
To what is due part to Oliveira Martins, he is more inclined towards the critique of Hegel from 
the liberal field, instead of a socialist one, while at the same time sharing most of Proudhon’s beliefs 
on Hegel. The little he read from Vera reinforced some of Proudhons’s theses, of an essentialist 
transcendental Hegel. The sources of Oliveira Martins in respect to Germany are mostly of French 
origin, a fact that he himself, in early (1870) recognizes: 
“In 1838 the introduction of the French spirit was direct, today the introduction of the German 
spirit is accomplised for the most part by means of a reflex produced in France. We know Germany 
through France. What comes to us, if not broken, comes perturbed by a transplantation in a strange 
country.”165 
This is the thesis defended by Álvaro Manuel Machado, in his essay O iberrismo e a França 
como cultura intermediária em Oliveira Martins where the Iberism of Teófilo Braga and Antero de 
Quental are seen as a product of the attraction for the German culture. But with France, as a culture 
of transition, this acquisition acquires different colors, giving it a “different personality” from that 
which it had in the original culture166. In some of Oliveira Martins’s assertions this idea is present and 
the exposition seems to support this thesis. But how much did Oliveira Martins owe to other cultures? 
To Spain and England? It is not a secret that he exchanged ideas with intellectuals from the other side 
of the border167, and many of the German translations he read were actually in English rather than in 
French. Going deep into this question would perhaps fill another couple of pages and prolong this 
                                                          
do qual são solidários, e a compreender o Socialismo como a doutrina da Liberdade e da Igualdade “ J.P. 
Oliveira Martins, Teoria do Socialismo, op. cit. p.152. 
163 See Paula Fernanda Martins, op. cit. p.253. 
164 See idem, ibidem, p.8. 
165 “Em 1838 a introdução do espirito francês era directa, hoje a introdução do espírito alemão efectua-se a 
máxima parte por via do reflexo produzido em França. Conhecemos a Alemanha através da França. O que nos 
chega vem, se não avariado, transtornado por uma transplatação em país estranho.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, 
Jornal, Guimarães & C. Editores, Lisboa, 1960, p.57. 
166 See Álvaro Manuel Machado “O Iberismo e a França como cultura intermediária em Oliveira Martins” in 
Revista da faculdade de ciencias sociais e humanas, n°2, Lisboa, 1988, pp.93-94. 
167 See for an overview on the Hegelianism in Spain: Manuel Pizan, Los Hegelianos en España, Cadernos para el 
Dialogo, Madrid, 1973. 
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section more than it should or even make it more limited than what it already is. For this reason this 
study circumscribes itself to the French sources, from where most of Hegel’s ideas reached Portugal. 
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2.3 How he integrated Hegel 
The significance of Oliveira Martins’s Germanism in light of Hegel becomes apparent by having 
a closer look at the general lines of this integration of Hegel. The positive acquisition Oliveira Martins 
sees in Hegel, as emanating from German philosophy, is the metaphysical speculation in which Hegel 
is the closing chapter. In Teoria do Socialismo the relationship between each representative of the 
German idealism is so evident that the absolute I as the destruction of individual subjectivity, which for 
Oliveira Martins is a negative outcome, is evoked by Oliveira Martins interchangeably when speaking 
both of Fichte and of Hegel. The difference is that Hegel was able to combine, with the help of 
Schelling’s absolute system, the individual and the collective in absolute identity. But the individual still 
lacks value without the universality of the spirit, through “the State” which “is the present God”. 
Therefore the individual is subsumed in the state, still carrying the abstractness first seen in Fichte, but 
further enriched by the relationship put in evidence through their identity. 
 For him the solution to the problem is a synthesis of the Latin and Germanic characters, the 
Latin character tends to accentuate multiplicity and the individual as the basis of society and has 
therefore a transitory fundament, whereas the Germanic character tends to accentuate the unity and 
the metaphysical notion of the spirit as having an eternal fundament. The Latin world is “slave of the 
flesh”168, only capable of unifying itself by a common conception of natural liberty, and the 
contractualist theories express this attempt of holding together the liberty of all against all. Whereas 
the Germanic world disengaging from nature, putting reason outside the first, falls into the arms of 
“fantastic speculation” which “determines the transcendent absolute”, leaving us with an incomplete 
notion of totality. The Latin is a man of action, the Germanic is a man of contemplation, and, having 
shown their flaws, some kind of juncture is demanded. Such synthesis could only have come from 
France, where both Germanic and Latin characters come together. “It is demanded that we equally run 
away from the Germanism and from Latinism”169, France is this middle point between both worlds, and 
the solution is precisely in the middle term. Proudhon is, according to Oliveira Martins, the one that 
manages this synthesis. As a result he is the speaker for this middle term. 
Hegel is, so to say, the peak of this German metaphysical speculation, which has built for the 
first time a scientific metaphysical psychology able to rationalize society´s entirety. From early on, 
Oliveira Martins seems to endorse the view of society as an organism, because the unity present in 
society should not be a mere reunion of forces as in a mechanism but rather an organic whole. The 
earlier form can also constitute an organization but not an organic unity. He gives as an example, the 
                                                          
168 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Teoria do Socialismo, op. cit. p.78. 
169 “cumpre portanto fugir igualmente do germanismo e do latinismo” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Portugal e o 
Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo, op. cit. pp.95-
96. 
62 
 
Anglo-Saxon world, where these types of “federations are born from a reunion of individualities 
distancing themselves from the brotherhoods as we have seen them, expressing the sentiment of a 
superior solidarity. They are individualities that affirm themselves through communication, [while] the 
English charters breathe a completely different spirit. They are individualities that are opposed by 
antagonism, by egoism, the organization is an equilibrium not a harmony”170. The alterations of such 
types of federations will only be apparent because “there isn´t, like in the European movements, a 
Revolution. That is, a metaphysical alteration of the social organism”171, but such a mechanism as 
constituted in a political mechanism can later self-develop into an organic form because “The machine 
which serves the conservation of the body, also serves the conservation of the spirit: nature is one”172. 
Even though Martins gives Hegel a prominent place in metaphysics, he criticizes nonetheless 
his organicism for its holistic deviation which imprisons the particular in the whole, in what he thinks 
is “transcendent character common to all Germanic systems”173. This position derives from the 
conception he has of evolution as a law that has complete autonomy from the spirit and from nature. 
Yet, it is in the two and gives accordance and comprehension to both. One arrives at the moral law by 
this same evolution, and paradoxically we become the conscious of evolution from the moral 
conclusion of our era174. Yet again, when the moral law is admitted to live outside Man, in the spirit, in 
the state or in some other expression of the whole, the particular is eclipsed because it will rule it as 
an element of superior order. He prefers to see instead an entity above these two, the living organism, 
an immanent holism which embraces them.  
His organicism, however, is also close to the mysticism of the proponents of a natural religion, 
and it is not surprising that he adheres to a vitalism in order to explain social phenomenon:  
“Nations are in effect, collective beings, and their development is in everything analogous to 
the individual beings. Biology, or natural sciences, embraces also the history of the peoples. The organs 
of the social body present themselves first as a rudimentary sketch: the ensemble possess only the 
character of aggregation. As action and reaction of the diverse elements forces each one of them to 
define themselves, to specialize, a principle of common coordination emerges, a kind of social vital 
                                                          
170 “as federações que nascem desta reunião de individualidades distanciam-se da mesma: as hermandades 
como as vimos, exprimem o sentimento de uma solidariedade superior, são individualidades que se afirmam 
pela comunicação; as cartas inglesas respiram completamente outro espírito, são individualidades que se 
opõem pelo antagonismo, pelo egoísmo; a organização é um equilíbrio não uma harmonia” J.P. Oliveira 
Martins, Teoria do Socialismo, op. cit. p.157. 
171 “não há, como nos movimentos europeus, Revolução, isto é, alteração metafísica no organismo” idem, 
ibidem. p.163. 
172 “a máquina que serve à conservação do corpo, serve à do espírito: a natureza é una” idem, ibidem, p.164. 
173 See idem, ibidem, p.80. 
174 See idem, Ibidem, pp.3-4. 
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principle, from the primitive cellular aggregate emerges likewise also the organism.”175 
This biological approach was popular in Germany at that time, especially among the Katheder 
Socialists, who were admired by Oliveira Martins. The mystical tendencies were also partially inspired 
by Haeckel, who Oliveira Martins had read, with his proposal of uniting science and religious mysticism 
in a monist natural religion. These mystic-vitalistic tendencies had also been uncovered by Engels in 
Dühing176, as a representative of the Katheder socialists when he refers to the “social molecule” of 
Dühring. This vitalist explanation comes both from Haeckel and from a strain of psychology which 
adhered to a vital force, a spirit or energy in order to explain social phenomenon. 
This vitalist tendency in its earlier form, though, can be traced back to Jacobi and his philosophy 
of life, which inspires the modern forms. Fichte shelters some of these prepositions and like Jacobi he 
points to faith as holding the identity within ourselves, giving trust to our consciousness from which 
knowledge can arise. While both Jacobi and Fichte attempt to surpass the Kantian thing-in-itself and 
as a substitute they set out another element from without. This vital principle is something that comes 
from without the object proper. Hegel will be critical of such a position because “this subjective 
element is supposed to constitute the essential vitality and truth both in the exposition of one’s own 
intuition of the Universe and its [re]production in others” instead of the content of the object. On the 
basis of this subjectivism he will reject vitalism. For Fichte, this faith, by revealing facts to the 
consciousness, makes it aware of what is lacking in the knowing subject in ideality instead of 
experience. Hence “this idealism is the true inversion of the formal knowledge”177 but it still remains 
formal as knowledge absolutely opposed to empirical reality, the non-ego limiting the ego by the 
latter’s own act. The knowing is then set out by feelings and sensations, “the only way in which reality 
can occur”178. The positive achievement of Fichte is that he made the first attempt to elaborate a 
deduction of the categories of thought but only from a standpoint of consciousness179. 
One could say that Fichte’s merit, according to Hegel, is the first draft of a system, even if we 
                                                          
175 “As nações são com efeito, seres colectivos, e o seu desenvolvimento é em tudo análogo ao dos seres 
individuais. A biologia, ou as ciências da vida, abraça também a historia dos povos. Os orgãos do corpo social, 
apresentam-se, primeiro, como esboços rudimentares: e o conjunto possui apenas o carácter de agregação. À 
medida que a açcão e a reacção dos diversos elementos obriga cada um deles a definer-se e a especializar-se, 
vai aparecendo o princípio de coordenação comum, espécie de princípio vital social, assim também da primitiva 
agregação celular sai o organismo” Oliveira Martins, História da Civilização Ibérica, prefácio de Fidelino 
Figueiredo, Guimarães editores, Lisboa, 1994, pp.211-212. 
176 See Marx and Engels Collected works, Anti-Dühring, Volumes 25, Op. cit. p.90 / Marx und Engels Werke, 
Anti-Dühring, Volume 20, op. cit. p.67-68 
177 See G.W.F. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, translated by Walter Cerf and H.S Harris, State University Press, 
Albany, 1977, p.160 / “Diese Idealismus ist daher die wahrhafte Umkehrung des formalen Wissens” G.W.F. 
Hegel, Werke, vol. 2, Op. cit. p.401. 
178 See idem, ibidem, p.164 / “in dem Fichteschen Idealismus allein vorkommen kann“ idem, ibidem, p.406. 
179 See G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesung über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Werke, vol. 20, op. Cit. p.401. 
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cannot yet properly speak of a system; facing the difficulty that it proceeds from the part instead of the 
whole and is unable to transcend this partiality. For Hegel the way of conceiving a system is through 
the dialectical method, which brings us to the understanding of dialectics by Oliveira Martins. Fichte 
was the first that, following Kant, used this method in a systematic way. 
There is not always a direct reference to dialectics in Oliveira Martins. When he deals with the 
subject180, he uses the expression particularly while referring to Proudhon “the powerful dialectician.” 
It seems that when he speaks of dialectics he also understands it in the terms of Aristoteles, as a 
probabilistic knowledge and it is as such an argumentative enterprise. In this way, dialectics is the 
capacity to show one’s rational power and affirms his hypothesis, which given the circumstances could 
also be used as a polemical tool. Nevertheless dialectical categories are dealt with, such as the category 
of contradiction. Even the preconceived idea of dialectics, as synonym with triadic progression, a 
schematism which Hegel himself refuses, is treated by Oliveira Martins: 
“Behold there how the logical process of the Hegelian contradiction, by which we have been 
judging the economic problems, gives us in this case the solution to the problem, classifying the 
moments of the formation of the idea which are: thesis, the communism, or collective propriety, 
preached by Christianity and to a certain extent put in practice by the monarchies of divine right; 
antithesis, the individualism or the atomistic propriety; preached by the free-traders and to a certain 
extent realized by the representative monarchies. Absorbing in itself thesis and antithesis, Socialism 
comes to determine the exact place of the Individual and Property, of Society and Capital”181 
This formulation is more akin to Fichte, originating from his Wissenschaftlehre (1794):  
“Just as there can be no antithesis without synthesis, no synthesis without antithesis, so there 
can be neither a thesis – an absolute positioning whereby A(the self) is neither equated nor opposed 
to any other but is just absolutely posited. This, as applied to our system, is what gives strength and 
completeness to the whole, it must be a system, and it must be one, the opposites must be united, so 
long as opposition remains, until absolute unity is effected; a thing, indeed – as it appear in due course 
                                                          
180 See W. Kreutzer who notices this fact in his essay “Oliveira Martins e o pensamento Alemão na sua época”, 
but this correction should be made: Oliveira Martins uses in fact such vocabulary, but dialectic has a different 
meaning from that of Hegel, and the triad progression model is used throughout even if the common place 
vocabulary is mostly not used, this vocabulary still appears in other texts as is further made notice. “Oliveira 
Martins e o pensamento alemão da sua época” in op. cit. p.71-72. 
181 “Eis ai como o processo lógico da contradição hegeliana, pelo qual temos ido julgando os problemas 
económicos, nos dá neste caso ainda a solução para o problema, classificando os momentos da formação da 
ideia que são: tese, o comunismo, ou propriedade colectiva, pregado pelo cristianismo e até certo ponto posto 
em prática pelas monarquias de direito divino; antítese, o individualismo ou a propriedade atomística; pregado 
pelos livre-cambistas e até certo ponto realizada pelas monarquias representativas. Absorvendo em si a tese e 
a antítese, o Socialismo vem determinar o lugar exacto do Indivíduo e da Propriedade, da Sociedade e do 
Capital.” Oliveira Martins, Portugal e o Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua 
reorganização pelo socialismo, op. cit. pp.152-153. 
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– which could be brought about only by a completed approximation to infinity, which itself is 
impossible. – The necessity of opposing and uniting in the manner prescribed rests directly on the third 
principle; the necessity of combination in general, on the first, highest, absolutely unconditioned 
principle. The form of the system is based on the highest synthesis, that there should be a system at 
all, on the absolute thesis.”182. 
Hegel does not renegade this triadic progression, his method is in fact built on it, but he does 
not regard it merely as an external progression. It is simply a method of arriving at the truth, of positing 
the universal in the subject and then moving in an internal self-development until the need for 
externalization. The contradiction between concept and reality is in the subject transcended in its 
concrete moment, the negative of the negative “is this sublating of the contradiction, and it too, just 
like contradiction, is not an act of external reflection, for it is on the contrary the innermost, objective 
moment of the life of spirit by virtue of which a subject is a person, is free”183. It is a subjectiveness that 
conserves the object, it does not abstract from its internal relation with the object, but the triplicity of 
the dialectical method is only “the superficial, external side of cognition”184. This is where the critique 
of Kant begins, because he has taken the immediate simple universal, which to the other appears as 
the particular, or the subject passing on to the other; as an empty negativity, as progressing in the 
determinations of the understanding where identity is lost, so “it lacks the essential moment of 
negativity” and the summary of the critique goes as follows: 
“Formalism, it is true, has also seized hold of triplicity, attending to its empty schema; the 
shallow nonsense and the barrenness of the so-called construction of modern philosophy, that consists 
in nothing but fastening that schema everywhere for the sake of external order, with no concept or 
immanent determination, has rendered that form tedious and has given it a bad name. Yet the 
                                                          
182 See J.G. Fichte, The science of knowledge: with the first and second introductions, edited and translated by 
Peter Heath and John Lachs, Cambridge University press, 1991, pp.113-114. / “So wenig Antithesis ohne 
Synthesis, oder Synthesis ohne Antithesis möglich ist; eben so wenig sind beide möglich ohne Thesis: ohne ein 
Setzen schlechthin, durch welches ein A (das Ich)  keinem [/] andern gleich und keinem anderen 
entgegengesetz, sondern bloß schlechthin gesetzt wird. Auf unser System bezogen giebt diese dem Ganzen 
Haltbarkeit und Vollendung; es muß ein System und ein System seynm das Entgegengesetzt muß verbunden 
werden, so lange noch etwas Entgegengesetzt ist, bis die absolute Einheit hervorgebracht sey; welche freilich, 
wie sich zu seiner Zeit zeigen wird, nur durch eine geendete Annäherung zum Unendlichen hervorgebracht 
werden könnte, welche an sich unmöglich ist. – Die Notwendigkeit, auf die bestimmte Art entgegengesetzt, 
und zu verbinden, beruht unmittelbar auf dem dritten Grundsatzte: die Notwendigkeit, überhaupt zu 
verbinden, auf dem ersten, höchste Synthesis, daß überhaupt ein System seyn solle, auf die absolute Thesis.“ 
J.G. Fichte, Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, Gesamtausgage, Werke Band 2, Der Bayerischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaft, Herausgegeben von Reinhard Lauth und Hans Jacob unter Mitwirkung von 
Manfred Zahn, Friedrich Frommann Verlag, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1965, p.276. 
183 See G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, op. cit. pp.745-746. / “ist jenes Widerspruch ein Tun einer 
äußerlichen Reflexion, sondern das innerste, objektiviste Moment des Lebens und Geisttes, wodurch ein 
Subjekt, Person, Freies ist.” G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik II, Werke, Vol 6, op. cit. p.563. 
184 See idem, ibidem, p.746. / “ist zwar ganz nur die oberflächliche, äusserliche Seite der Weise des Erkeness“ 
idem, ibidem, p.564. 
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insipidity of this use cannot rob it of its inner worth, and the fact that the shape of reason was 
discovered, albeit without conceptual comprehension at first, is always to be highly valued”185  
For Hegel, the negation of the first term implies an identity, an identity as negation, with the 
second term, so that “the concept that has realized itself through its otherness and through sublating 
of this reality has rejoined itself and has restored its absolute reality, its simple self-reference. This 
result is therefore the truth”186 and there is in this result or the third term is both “immediacy and 
mediation” in unity, therefore, these forms of judgement alone are not capable of grasping it because 
their unity is a “self-mediating movement and activity” so that the concept that at first was in itself an 
immediate Universal has become concrete, in and for itself, and from this moment on the method 
expands into system instead of using the triad schema in particulars like Kant. 
The question that poses itself is how Oliveira Martins understood the dialectical method as set 
by Hegel, or how Oliveira Martins names it, the logical process of the contradiction. Although this 
understanding could have come from Hegel even if still embedded in the translation shortcomings 
pointed out earlier, he understands the logical process as it was set forth by Proudhon. This becomes 
evident when he further exposes his idea of the evolution and revolution as a movement of the 
contradiction between thesis and antithesis, the “to be or not to be, of the Hegelian contradiction” in 
accordance with the serial method of Proudhon, as established in his De la Crèation de l’Ordre dans 
l’Humanité. As pointed out in the previous section, contradictions are seen in serial units hierarchically 
organized, to which for Oliveira Martins such series boil down to: “Evolution and Revolution, thesis and 
antithesis when considerer externally, in a superior syntheses when considered in themselves. [They] 
both work, as the poles of an autonomous planet, of a series, of an independent molecule, the Society, 
composing another series”187. On an historical level, according to Proudhon “the glory of great men 
has always consisted in discovering the law of divisions, of groups, and of series”188 completing the 
                                                          
185 See idem, ibidem, p.747. / “Der Formalismus hat sich zwar der Triplizität gleichfalls bemäachtigt und sich na 
das leere Schema derselben gehalten, der seichte Unfug und das Kahle des modernen philosophischen 
sogenannten Konstruierens, das in nichts besteht, als jenes formelle Schema ohne Begriff und immanente 
Bestimmung überal anzuhängen und zu einen äußerlich Ordnen  zu gebrauchen, hat jene Form langweilig und 
übel berüchtigt gemacht. Durch die Schalheit dieses Gebrauchs aber kann sie an ihrem inneren Werte nocht 
verlieren, und es ist immer hoch zu schätzen, daß zunächst auch nur die unbegriffene Gestalt des Vernünftigen 
aufgefunden worden.“ idem, ibidem, p.565. 
186 See idem, ibidem, p.747. / “Der Begriff, der sich durch das Anderssein realisiert und durch Aufheben dieser 
Realität mit sich zusammengegangen [ist] und seine absolute Realität, seine einfache Beziehung auf sich 
hergestellt hat. Dies Resultat ist daher die Wahrheit.“ idem, ibidem, p.565. 
187 “Resumindo-se portanto ambas, Evolução e Revolução, tese e antitese quando consideradas exteriormente, 
numa síntese superior quando consideradas em si, servem ambas, como pólos de um planeta autónomo, de 
uma série; de uma molécula independente, a Sociedade, a compor outra série” Oliveira Martins, Portugal e o 
Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo, op. cit. pp.68. 
188 “la gloire des grands hommes a toujours consisté à découvrir la loi des divisions, des groups et des séries” 
P.J. Proudhon, De la création l‘ordre dans l’Humanité: ou, Principes d’organisation politique, op. cit. p.134. 
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series. 
In Oliveira Martins this serialist dialetics takes the form of an equilibrium, or rather a harmony 
because he is critic of the notion of equilibrium, and the “to be or not to be” turns out to be an apparent 
contradiction, merely a logical equivoque. In the manner of Kant we are looking for antinomies in order 
to get rid of them, by not thinking them in their contradictoriness, only positing them in the mind, 
unresolved. Precisely that which Hegel praised in Kant but at the same time criticize for its formalism 
and external mode of cognition. The serialist dialectics came as an extension from Proudhon but let’s 
see what this method consists of in Oliveira Martins. 
The basic unit of this dialectic is the series, while dialectic as a series itself, is the logical series 
governing the other series. A series may arise from other series when it gains independence from the 
movement that engendered it, the example given is the following: 
“A train goes down a ramp at great speed; the speed is the effect of the force of steam, which 
is the main cause. But in a given moment, the acquired speed, constitutes an independent force, as a 
series, and even though the train has changed the steam direction(Lechatelier machine), even though 
[it] breaks, it runs off, moves up ramps, runs in the plains, until, if it does not find in its fantastical ride 
an obstacle that would destroy him, stops. The speed that above was the effect has then become the 
cause (…) this is the case in the economical question of our days. It comes, it is truth, from an old moral 
vice, but it has acquired autonomy, it has constituted itself as an independent series”189 
 But each of these series are constituted by various terms, and the series has to pass through 
all the terms until a new series can begin, the basic terms are the logical terms which constitute the 
dialectical series. He organizes four main series as examples and they progress through their historical 
antecedents, as such the 18th century was philosophically atheist and materialist, then comes the 19th 
century as the antithesis, with deism and spiritualism reestablished. The modern idea, however, has 
both atheist and deist elements, god is venerated in the ideal, while this ideal is based on the human 
consciousness. The following series of the political, poetical and economical type have a similar 
progression, with the political progression mentioned before, of communism – liberalism – socialism 
suffering a slight change, or in a strict sense: only the political organization per se is considered. In this 
manner liberalism is substituted by nationalism and socialism is substituted by federalism. In the Poetic 
                                                          
189 “Um trem da caminho de ferro marcha a grande velocidade descendo uma rampa; a velocidade é o efeito da 
força do vapor que é a causa principal. Mas, num certo momento, a velocidade adquirida constitue-se como 
força independente, como série, e o trem, embora o câmbio de direcção do vapor(Aparelho Lechatelier), 
embora os freios, foge, desce, sobe rampas, corre no chão plano, até que, se não encontrou no meio da sua 
marcha fantástica um obstáculo que o destruísse, pára. A velocidade, que além era efeito torna-se causa (…) 
Pois este é o caso da questão ecónomica dos nossos dias. Vem, é verdade, de um vício moral antigo; mas 
adquiriu autonomia, constituiu-se independentemente como série” Portugal e o Socialismo: exame 
constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo, op. cit. pp.76-77. 
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series, the 18th century man was understood abstractly and nation had faded away. In the next century 
when man makes of passions and feelings an exact reality, he rediscovers nation through traditions and 
legends, making the idea of humanity disappear in the 19th century. The modern idea is a junction of 
both these classical and romantic elements, having at the same time this sentiment of reality, given by 
passion and feelings, and the Ideal as concretization of this reality. Finally economically the Idea was 
first expressed in the monarchies as protectionism, after 1789 capital and interest are set free and we 
pass to the exact opposite, free-trade, with the state abandoning the economic sphere. Nowadays we 
have the state circumscribed to its sphere of action, which is that of collective nature without at the 
same time intervening in the sphere of individual liberty. 
 This conception of series as the principle of motion in the laws of coordination of the organism, 
also has a biologists twist when he explains the organization/constitution of society:  
“But if the organ is a series of cells, free, autonomous between each other, in virtue of collective 
reason that gives it unity and totality; - but subordinated out of itself to the series of organs that 
constitute men, free, autonomous in itself, in virtue of collective reason that gives him unity and force; 
but subordinated out of itself to the series of men that constitute society, free, autonomous, real also 
in itself; - we find the key of this problem in the federative constitution, inside of which the natural 
series finds its real mold and the liberty of the Individual and the state is its guarantee”190. 
 The bulk of Hegel´s ideas in Oliveira Martins was under the influence of Proudhon, who had a 
very deficient contact with Hegel, recognized by himself in 1843: 
 “I got to know the Critique of Pure Reason only through mediocre analyses, and I had barely 
heard of Hegel, when [I was] preoccupied with trinitarian ideas, I constructed the system of which I will 
report the fundamental part. It was for me like a preparation for the serial theory, that under various 
names I kept pursuing, and of which I finally acquired intelligence the day when I, fatigued with the 
systems where I found myself somewhat imprisoned, formed the project, at wide, not to abandon but 
to merge  all the systems into each other. Then I understood, at once, the independence of the diverse 
orders of series and the impossibility of a universal science; the laws of the simple series, and the 
elements of the synthesis”191. 
                                                          
190 “Mas se o orgão é uma série de células, livre, autónoma em si, em virtude da razão colectiva que lhe dá 
unidade e todo; - mas subordinada fora de sí à série de orgãos que constitui o homem, livre, autónomo em sí, 
em virtude da razão colectiva que lhe dá unidade e força; mas subordinada fora de sí à série de homens que 
constituem a sociedade, livre, autónoma, real também em sí; - encontramos a chave d’este problema na 
constituição federativa, dentro do qual a série natural acha o seu molde real, a liberdade do Indíviduo a sua 
garantia, a liberdade do estado igualmente a sua.” idem, ibidem, pp.53-54. 
191 “Je ne connaissais la Critique de la raison pure que par de médiocres analyses, et j’avais à peine entendu 
parler de Hégel, lorsque, préoccupé d’idées trinitaires, je construisais le système dont je viens de rapporter la 
partie fondamentale. Ce fut pour moi comme une préparation à la théorie sérielle, que sous des noms divers je 
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 In a succession of letters to Schweizer in 1865 for an article on Proudhon, Marx will furnish us 
similar information, with Kant being “at the time, the only German philosopher whose work he had 
read, in translations”192 and in his earlier books the treatment of the antinomies are done in a Kantian 
style “leaving the impression that to him, has to Kant, the resolution of the antinomies is something 
‘beyond’ human understanding”193 Proudhon was at that time in contact with a group of German 
political émigrés which Marx was part of, as well as Ruge, Karl Grün, Bakunine etc… all of which had 
studied Hegel. From them he is given some insight of the Hegel, which he had at that time “barely 
heard of” as pointed out in De la création l‘ordre dans l’Humanité. Marx says that to a certain extent 
he was one of those who cherished Proudhon interest in Hegelian philosophy: 
“In the course of lengthy debates often lasting all night, I infected him very much to his 
detriment with Hegelianism, which, owing to his lack of German, he could not study properly. After my 
expulsion from Paris Herr Karl Grün continued what I had begun. As a teacher of German philosophy 
he also had the advantage over me that he himself understood nothing about it”194 
 The Philosophie de la misère ou Système des contradictions èconomiques contains the attempt 
at presenting the system of the economic categories dialectically. This was the Hegelian turn that Marx 
identifies in Proudhon, where Kant’s antinomies switched into the Hegelian contradictions were 
introduced as a means of development, still carrying the main features of Kant’s way of viewing 
contradiction. According to Marx, however, he never really “penetrated into the secret of scientific 
dialectics” still ingrained in pre-existent eternal ideas which severed his knowledge of political 
economy. Marx still recognizes in Proudhon “a natural inclination for dialectics” but he could never 
really grasped it in its scientific form viz: Hegelian dialectics. 
 The main difference between both dialectics, which will affect Proudhon and Oliveira Martins 
dialectics, is that serial dialectics views the contradiction as two poles, quite external to each other. 
This way of viewing the antinomies is similar to that of Kant, of which he has, according to Hegel, turned 
                                                          
ne cessais de poursuivre, et dont j’acquis enfin l’intelligence le jour où, fatigué de systèmes où je me trouvais 
comme emprisonné, je formai le projet, pour avoir le large, non d’abandonner mais de résoudre les uns dans 
les autres tous les systèmes. Alors je compris, d’un seul coup, l’indépendance des divers ordres de séries et 
l’impossibilité d’une science universelle; les lois de la série simple, et les éléments de la synthèse.” P.J. 
Proudhon, De la création l‘ordre dans l’Humanité: ou, Principes d’organisation politique, op. cit. P.240. 
192 See Marx and Engels Collected works, On Proudhon, vol. 20, op. cit. p.27. / “es war dies der einzige deutsche 
Philosoph, den er damals aus Übersetzungen kannte” Karl Marx und Frederich Engels Werke, Über Proudhon, 
vol. 16, Op. cit. p.26. 
193 See idem, ibidem, p.27. / “Läßt den starken Eindruck züruck, daß ihm, wie Kant, die Lösung der Antinomien 
für etwas gilt, das ‘jenseits‘ des mensclichen Verstandes fällt“ idem, ibidem, p.26. 
194 See idem, ibidem, p.28. / “Während langer, oft übernächtiger Debatten infiziert ich ihn zu seinem großen 
Schaden mit Hegelianismus, den er doch bei seiner Unkenntnis der deutschen Sprache nocht ordentlich 
studieren konnte. Was ich begann, setzte nach meiner Ausweisung aus Paris Herr Karl Grün fort. Der hate als 
Lehrer der deutschen Philosophie noch den Vorzug vor mir, daß er selbst nicht davon verstand.“ idem, ibidem, 
p.27. 
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these objective propositions into subjective maxims and uses “one or the other maxim as occasion 
demands, indeed, according to whether it deems them fitting to given objects” without accounting for 
their truth either in the object or in the subject as cognitive forms195. This is why Oliveira Martins says 
revolution does not imply a counter-revolution, revolution is taken by itself and reaction is a counter-
balance coming from the outside. When they are taken together in this external form, they have their 
resolution in a superior term that embraces both: reform. In an attempt to consider them in their unity, 
the oppositions remain but are cancelled by each side of the equation. In this manner for instance, the 
excesses of revolution would be seen as something to be counterbalanced by reaction, in such a way 
that both would have to reach a compromise, or there would be the risk of compromising the rational 
liberty. Instead of viewing the excesses of the revolution, as a reflex of the acceleration in the resolution 
of internal oppositions, of which reaction is in an antagonistic relation with revolution and the external 
oppositions are in fact internal to the content of the object. The problem to him only appears in the 
manifestation of the object rather than the object itself, in this manner they can live alongside each 
other as long as their manifestation is regulated by a higher term, the reform is the equation revolution-
reaction in harmony, or perfectly balanced. Through this external relation one of the terms is allowed 
to subsist without its corresponding other, revolution is allowed to exist without reaction, bourgeoisie 
without proletariat and so on.  
 For Kant too the contradictory nature was not part of the objects but it was rather in our 
apprehension or the thought forms of the manifestation of these objects and according to Hegel: Kant 
has shown “an excessive tenderness for the world to remove contradictions from it and then to transfer 
the contradictions to the spirit, to reason. Yet, worse than that is the fact that there, he lets them 
“remain unresolved”. However, in a way he praises such effort because for Hegel, only in the spirit they 
can have their resolution, as the world is unable to endure contradiction like the spirit. The world is 
made of contradictions and for this reason condemned to be an ever coming-to-be and ceasing-to-
be196. This is why dialectics acquires in Kant an external form, meaning that, he does not see the 
contradictions in the content, because the object itself can never be apprehended, they remain rather 
on a formal level. Fichte will attempt their resolution but still leaves it exterior to the content. The 
object in Hegel is conceptual as opposed to the non-conceptualism of Kant. The method exposed in 
the logic is the way by which the object is elevated to the concept. 
 To be fair, Hegel does not say Kantian transcendental dialectics is external, it is only so in 
relation to the content of its object, it still relates subjectively on a formal level to this object. The 
                                                          
195 See G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, Op. cit. p.655. / “welches auf gelegenliche Veranlassung die eine oder 
andere Maxime anwendet, je nachdem es sie für gegebene Objekte für passend hält“ G.W.F. Hegel, 
Wissenschaft der Logik II, Werke, Vol 6, Op. cit. p.443. 
196See G.W.F. Hegel, idem, ibidem, p.201. / G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik I, Werke, vol. 5, op. cit. p.276. 
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philosophy of Kant is one of “external reflection” in so far as it does not consider things-in-themselves 
and Hegel makes notice of Plato’s cognitive demand that objects should be considered in and for 
themselves, from which the determinate elements are immanent.  
 In Oliveira Martins there is no specific treatment of the epistemological processes at hand, but 
he is inclined to conceive the object in this way. Dialectics seems to follow this external way of 
comprehending its object, and the contradiction does not develop from the objects themselves but as 
a confrontation with something from without, while still occupying itself with the object what is 
immanent in it is left unnoticed. This is the case with the example shown earlier, when the 18th century 
would come into opposition with the 19th century and come into a synthesis, maintaining a selection 
of elements from both opposed terms. Instead of seeing the 18th century itself self-contradictory 
propelling the forms the 19th century acquired, or in other words that the 19th century was internally 
worked in the 18th century and then the modern Idea is this self-movement of the concept. 
Why would historical development not be seen as partially given in the previous term? The 
treatment of history in such a way is not absolute, many times he would pick on present given 
conditions and speculate on the possible developments of Portugal’s economy or political situation, 
but in general this is avoided when dealing with history. One possible reason for following this method 
of external reflection is because of Oliveira Martins’s defense of chance in history. This is a recurrent 
theme in Oliveira Martins that history has surprises and that destiny plays us tricks. The problem is not 
whether history is deterministic, as both in Hegel and Oliveira Martins that is not the case, but it has 
to do with foreseeing in something that which annuls it and for this reason determines its development. 
For Hegel this determination is only truly cognizable after the success but Oliveira Martins tends to pay 
notice to the improbable in history, even after the known facts. While given the circumstances he 
adheres to a fatality of history, he still recognizes that something could have been different. In nature, 
this is easily explained as it lies out of the moral freedom that man is capable of exerting, but it is much 
more difficult when it comes to man as Oliveira Martins follows the postulate of Vico that the world is 
the work of man.  
This self-producing system, however, very often slips from humanity’s control, giving place to 
distorted moral customs, which reflect on various human activities. The moral laws are deduced from 
the taking consciousness of the postulate mentioned before, of which an ideal follows, this ideal is 
what then governs subsequent development, but because this course can be set astray, the ideal or 
moral freedom is only and regulatory principle. Man arrives at the knowledge of the law in the following 
way: 
“Reflection exerting itself on the moral subject and on nature, will give, in virtue of successive 
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periods and deducing one from the other, the knowledge of the law”197 
The moral law is reached by being conscious of it, to be free is to have knowledge of the moral 
law. The truth of things and their subsequent development does not lie in things themselves but in this 
knowledge. 
The immanent dialect from the object is transferred onto the subject and the object loses its 
ontological foundational statute. The immanence comes from a principle from above, the moral law, 
not from the objects. Oliveira Martins will be critical of the transcendentalism of Kant in the process of 
universalization for its individual subjectivism, as for him the moral law in Kant proceeds from an 
individual phenomenon: reason. However, he still follows the same Kantian construction, but turns this 
individual subjective moral law into a collective subjectivism, that is, the moral law proceeds from 
human consciousness in the universal phenomenon of justice. The moral law in its universalizing 
process is no longer transcendent but becomes rather immanent to men, whereas before it needed 
another figure capable of operating this universalizing function, the transcendence in reason. 
Now for Oliveira Martins the principle of development like in Kant proceeds from a moral 
imperative. In this way, contradictions associated with things should be superseded not because of 
their contradictoriness but because they ought not to have them. A moral aspect rules over the object 
but leaves it untouched. The being is never grasped, thought is trapped in its own limits. Hegel in order 
to solve this problem points to a transcendence of these limits of thought, by identifying being with 
thought. Independent of the implications of Hegel’s solution, what comes forward from Oliveira 
Martins’s dialectics, is that the contradiction is on a subjective domain, changes are operated on a 
mental level as the problem is in our cognitive nature, the objective practice of men is only seen in 
subjectivized mental forms, the bottom line is: things are free from contradiction and as such tend to 
remain contemplatively observed.  
The call for changes and his actions as a social preacher are in nature theoretically oriented, as 
contradiction is above all a scandal to the moral consciousness, because this is what rules particular 
phenomena. The emphasis is towards the moral consciousness, which should be awaken and then 
phenomenal changes would follow. Hegel, even with all his idealism and the spiritualization of reality, 
emphasizes action as practice, or what he calls the practical idea, as a means to the realization of men’s 
ends198. To produce these changes according to our ends implies the recognition of what is, instead of 
blaming a subjective incapacity to reach these ends and take reality, the objective world, as non-
                                                          
197 “A reflexão exercendo-se sobre o indivíduo moral e sobre a natureza, dará, em virtude de períodos 
sucessivos e deduzindo-se uns dos outros, o conhecimento da lei” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Teoria do Socialismo, 
op. cit. P.38. 
198 See the Hegel chapters on Teleology and also “The idea of cognition”. G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, op. cit. 
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existent. This practice is objective in the sense that it is an external transition, it externalizes itself in 
the world and is thus an “external means against external actuality”199. For Oliveira Martins decisive 
action takes place on subjective structure, an internal principle to be comprehended or improved.   
As one can see, this dialectic is closer to Kant or Fichte than to Hegel. The serial dialectics of 
Proudhon even talks about the antinomies, vocabulary of Kant, when speaking of contradictions and 
unsurprisingly its main features are similar to Kant’s transcendental dialectics. The history of dialectics 
and the role of Kant in rediscovering dialectics is not ignored by Hegel, but dialectics has taken different 
shapes throughout time and is also three-folded. The three moments are elucidated when Hegel talks 
about Heraclitus, the first to give philosophy a speculative form, even if he gave it a form closer to a 
natural one and for this reason still belongs “to the ionic school of natural philosophers”. These 
moments are the following: 
“(a) the external dialectic, a reasoning which goes over and over again without reaching the 
soul of the thing; (b) immanent dialect of the object, but falling within the contemplation of the subject; 
(g) the objectivity of Heraclitus which takes itself as principle.”200 
Kant’s dialectic does not go past the second moment, the negative moment, from which an 
infinite follows but it is a “wrong or negative infinity”. The result is an infinite that only expresses the 
need of the elimination of the finite in an ought-to-be201. 
The dialectics of Oliveira Martins as originating from Proudhon, views the two moments of the 
dialectical movement as discrete elements. This will have different implications as for instance in terms 
of the principle of development, in how contradictions are overcome, the relation of universal and 
particular. But the preoccupation with these matters also brings confluences in a variety of issues. To 
be conscious of these differences is important, but what appears relevant is that this shows us how 
German idealism was also considered in the landmark of other cultures. Oliveira Martins knew 
Germany’s level of engagement in these metaphysical questions and for this reason he holds this 
culture in greet esteem. 
                                                          
199 See G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, Op. cit. P.732 / “äußerliches Mittel gegen die äußerliche Wirklichkeit 
richtet” G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, Werke, vol. 6, op cit. p.546. 
200 See G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of philosophy 1825-6 Volume I: Greek Philosophy, translated by E. 
S. Haldane, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., LTD, London, 1892, p.278-279. / “α) äußerliche Dialektik, 
Räsonieren, hin un her, nicht die Seele des Dinges selbst sich auflösend; β) immanente Dialektik des 
Gegenstandes, fallend aber in die Betrachung des Subjeckts; γ) Objektivität Heraklits, d.h die Dialektik selbst als 
Prinzip auffassen.” G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der PhilosophieI, Werke, vol. 18, op. cit. 
pp.319-320. 
201 See G.W.F. Hegel, Encyclopedia of philosophical sciences in Basic Outline Part I: Logic, edited and translated 
by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Cambridged University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p.149 / G.W.F. 
Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, Werke, vol. 8, Op. cit. p.199. 
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When looking at the points of contact between Hegel and Oliveira Martins, we can see that 
their thoughts are similarly structured, when dealing with certain problems. They share a number of 
concerns about the world and society, due to the affirmation of certain propositions in the way they 
think. The focus will be on these now. 
The first is the recognition of different levels of reality, hence they require an open system 
capable of apprehending these levels in their relationship, as they only gain their full significance when 
they enter in a relation with the whole. In this sense for instance in Hegel the mechanism is a reality by 
itself but it still does not suffice to express the whole range of reality, it lacks the specific qualities of 
this mechanism, given by physics202.  In organic physics a higher level of reality is thus expressed, with 
life comprehending both previous dimensions, increased in its autonomy and level of self-
determination. Oliveira Martins follows and identical way of organizing his series, the example given in 
the organization of the proletariat class, with its different moments in an ever more universal and at 
the same independent reality, is one of them: 
“a) Public charity, shelters, nursing houses, hospitals, shelters, etc… either maintained by the state or 
by private subscriptions; 
b) Private charity, domiciliary aid, with or without state subsidies, or simultaneously official and 
individual; 
c) Mutual aids, class pawn broking for lack of work, for diseases, for death; 
d) Economical funds, capitalization of economies put to interest; 
e) Cooperative societies, of consumption, of production and credit, capitalistic or mutualistic organized 
At this evolutive moment, the workers, comprehend the problem, because they reached a positive 
terrain, playing with scientific data. It is then that the worker’s society, organically constituted, presents 
itself in the realm of free-trade and economic competition with the 
f) Societies of corporative resistance and nationals (trade’s unions) for the organization of strikes, the 
effective mode of contesting the price of labor 
g) The international which is the universal trade’s union. 
The reality of this series, in itself, and in each of its terms is uncontestable. The moment of illusion with 
charity was gone fast, and if, like the moralists, we have to consider charity as a nobel human sentiment, 
                                                          
202 For a notion of physics see Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature which is quite different from contemporary 
understanding of physics or for a “summary” on this topic see Dieter Wandschneider, “Philosophy of Nature” in 
Bloomsbury Companion to Hegel, Edited by Allegra de Laurents and Jeffrey Edwards, Bloomsbury, London, 
2013, p.117. 
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as a publicist and economist, we are all to affirm that it is impotent, it is perverse, in regards with the 
problem of misery, socially considered.”203 
As we can see this series is made of fives moments which have their individual realities but at 
the same time are connected to one another, without following a strict triadic organization. The triadic 
progression, even if not absolute, is commonplace in Hegel, but the focal point is that it seeks to achieve 
an ultimate explanation that does not contain loose ends. One of the reasons why they all go under 
headings paired in three is that Hegel organized groups that could contain these moments together, 
sharing a common principle. In this manner the dialectical development given by Oliveira Martins could 
be for instance organized as follows: The public charity, individual charity and mutual aid would belong 
to the a level of social consciousness acquired by the proletariat, the economical fund and consumer 
cooperatives, would be the economical level and finally the trade unions and the International, the 
political level of the proletariat’s consciousness. The higher contains and develops all earlier moments, 
and some moments are more transitory than others, like the trade unions, which are still between an 
economic and political consciousness. 
As we can see the way by which they relate levels of reality is similar but Hegel tends to look 
for the universal instead of leaving them destitute in their particularity. The triadic organization is not 
only symbolic, as for him this is the shape of rationality, but intends to reach an end like the top of a 
pyramid, which in its triangularity the most external limits are the three determining factors in the 
triangle’s constitution. In Hegel’s universalizing quest we remain in the immanence of things, so they 
have a moment of particularity but only to return to themselves from its otherness, in a three-folded 
movement. So in a way this organization in triads is a demand of universality, when considering things 
                                                          
203 “a) Caridade pública, asilos, hospitais, albergues, etc, ou mantidos pelo Estado ou por subscrições 
particulares; 
b) Caridade privada, socorros domiciliários, com ou sem subsídio do Estado, ou simultaneamente oficiais e 
individuais; 
c) Soccorros mútuos, montepios de classe para a falta de trabalho, para as doenças, para a morte; 
d) Caixas económicas, capitalização das economias postas a juro; 
e) Sociedades cooperativas, de consumo, de producção e de crédito, ou capitalista ou mutualistamente 
organizadas. 
Neste momento evolutivo os operários compreendem a questão, porque chegaram ao terreno positivo, a jogar 
com os dados científicos. É então que a sociedade operária, constituída organicamente, se apresenta no campo 
do livre-câmbio e da concorrência económica com as 
f) Sociedades de resistência corporativas e nacionais (trade's unions) para a organização da greve, modo 
efectivo do debater livremente o preço do trabalho; 
(g) A Internacional que é a trade's union universal. 
A realidade desta série, em si, e em cada um dos seus termos é incontestável. O momento da illusão da 
caridade passou depressa; e se, como moralistas, temos de considerar a caridade como um nobre sentimento 
humano, como publicistas e economistas, somos todos a afirmar que ela é impotente, é perversa, perante o 
problema da miséria, socialmente considerado.” 
 J.P. Oliveira Martins, Portugal e o Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua 
reorganização pelo socialismo, op. cit. pp.110-111. 
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in and for themselves. 
The different levels of reality imply the acknowledgment of their relative truth. The absolute 
that we find in the whole dialectical movement, since this movement does not come to an end, is 
always relative, or what comes to be that the relative does not exclude the absolute. In his first book 
Teoria do Socialismo Oliveira Martins tends particularly to emphasize the absolute, in a way that 
evolution, especially of economy, is the “truth of the absolute cousciousness”204. One gets the feeling 
of a fatality in the laws of development when they are considered as “scientific truths”, producing a 
lack of dynamicity in his theory by separating the relative from the absolute. 
In Oliveira Martins’s correspondence we will find later what seems to be a different view on 
this matter when the topic of relative truths comes to be debated with Henrique de Barros Gomes: 
“Socialism, my friend, is the most objective conception, or the most critical, of the nature of 
man and society, and in this sense it is the truth, not an absolute truth that can be defined subjectively 
for the individual, but a relative and scientific one”205 
Since there exist relative truths, the problem that poses itself is how we coordinate them, not 
as a junction of parts, but in a structured whole. This is when Oliveira Martins, following Antero de 
Quental, already from early on points to a moral principle as the source of coordination. The figure of 
the universal is a subjectivized principle that leaves the object outside of it. This universal is a complex 
that encompasses within it the various moments of this moral principle, as well as the different forms 
it can acquire. 
The highest form of the universal is in Hegel also subjective, but it is a subjectivity that has got 
hold of the object. The individualized moments of the universal have some truth in themselves, they 
contain the notion of totality and in a way they are also a complex. The absolute, or the structured 
whole as universal, is then a complex of complexes. 
To capture totality in the different levels of reality is the struggle which Oliveira Martins and 
Hegel waged, while at the same time coordinating the relative moments, attending at their complexity. 
Their solutions were, however, quite different. 
They share the same problem of considering the universal. But it appears as if Oliveira Martins 
wants to keep in this totality the same type of relations the particular as with itself, as the critique of 
                                                          
204 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Teoria do Socialismo, op. cit. p.282. 
205 “O socialismo, meu amigo, é a concepção mais objectiva, ou mais critica, da natureza do homem e da 
sociedade, e n’este sentido é a verdade, não uma verdade absoluta que se define subjectivamente para o 
indivíuo, mas sim uma relativa e realista ou científica” July of 1886 letter to Henrique de Barros Gomes, J.P. 
Oliveira Martins, Correspondência, op. cit. p.90-91. 
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Hegel stems from the subject not having the same type of individualized relations when integrated in 
the whole. He proceeds in proposing a societies’ collective with individualized relations, because 
through the state the subject is no longer in an individual relation, his dialectic presents us a collective 
that preserves the individual forms of relation. 
This solution is not without problems and they become apparent in the years that followed. 
This initial position is partially inspired by Proudhon, as this kind of individualized relations is a criterion 
Proudhon adopts. He will later drop Proudhon and grow closer to German thought, but it remains to 
be seen whether he considered the relations of the whole with the parts in a Hegelian way or if he 
abandons the consideration of the whole all together. 
What comes forward is that with time, the French culture is no longer this higher synthesis of 
the German and Latin characters. The German culture acquires a higher value than what comes from 
France, in this second moment French culture becomes just a culture of transition as earlier 
formulated. And to this effect already in the 1875 text Povos Peninsulares e Civilizacão Moderna, we 
see him moving in this direction when he says: 
“Next to Germany, hero of the vague and mystical thought, advanced sentinel that reveals to 
the world the first lights that uncertain blink in the distance horizon, we are the heroes of action and 
love, of haughty independence and ardent heart. Between us and [Germany], France, the less original 
and less strong, has its historical role of mediation”206 
The absolute in the mystical thought of the Germans, independent and absolutely free, seems 
then something that has had its practical realization in the Latin world. Oliveira Martins will, however, 
later operate a separation of the absolute, as something to do with metaphysics, from phenomena, 
being therefore not applicable to the sciences of phenomena.207 This absolute is first revealed by 
religion but with modern times and with Hegel the absolute “acts on a purely rational sphere”208, 
leaving room for the sciences of particular phenomenon, free of this interference of the absolute, 
allowing in this way the gradual disappearance of superstition and the belief in miracles. But the 
absolute still has its function in unifying that which is given positively by traditional sciences, and after 
his attack on mysticism and the separation of the absolute from the partial, he appears to go back and 
                                                          
206 “Ao lado da Alemanha, herói do pensamento misterioso e vago, sentinela avançada que revela ao mundo as 
primeiras luzes que indecisas tremulam no horizonte longínquo, somos nós os hérois da acção e do amor, da 
independência altiva e do coração ardente. Entre nós e ela, a França, menos original e menos forte, tem o seu 
papel histórico de medianeira” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Os Povos Peninsulares e Civilizacão moderna, Páginas 
desconhecidas, Introdução, coordenação e notas de Lopes d’Oliveira, Seara Nova, Lisboa, 1948, p.74. 
207 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, O Helenismo e Civilização Cristã, op. cit. p.2. 
208 See idem, ibidem p.75. 
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defends the absolute as having the power to reveal hidden secrets or the rationale of things209.  
In this conception of the absolute, the whole, as a phenomenon of the mind, still acts externally 
in the unification of the parts. Their individual forms of relation, in the consideration of the whole, 
subsist. This conception with regards to the state, has the consequences of considering the state as the 
structure capable of maintaining these individual forms of relation. Carlos Mauricio notes that to the 
problem of “the antinomy between collective will and individual consciousness, the solution was found 
by Martins in Hegel and state socialism”210. However, for Hegel the state had above all the function of 
bringing particular interests to the level of general interests as Marx makes notice of211. While for 
Oliveira Martins, the function he attributes to the state is more inclined towards the protection of 
individuals or a harmony between the parts as a collective, instead of integrating the parts in universal 
relations. The proposals of Oliveira Martins and those of Hegel are naturally similar because they 
consider bureaucracy, the state, and social policy fundamental to achieve their goals, but they come 
from different assumptions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
209 See Oliveira Martins unpublished letter to Jaime Batalha Reis, gently provided to me by Prof. Dr. Sergio 
Campos Matos, BNP, 5° box, document n°98. 
210 “a antinómia entre vontade colectiva e a consciência individual. A solução encontrou-a Martins em Hegel e 
no socialismo de Estado.” Carlos Mauricio, A invenção de Oliveira Martins: Politica, historiogrfia e identidade 
nacional no Portugal Contemporâneo (1867-1960), Temas Portugueses, Imprensa Nacional - Casa da Moeda, 
Lisboa, 2005, p.240. 
211 “The ‘general interest’ can maintain itself against the particular interest as ‘something particular’ only so 
long as the particular itself against the general is ‘something general’.” Marx and Engels Collected Works, On 
Proudhon, vol. 20, Op. cit. P.46. / “das ‘allgemeine interesse’ kann sich dam Besondern gegenüber nur al sein 
‘Besonderes’ halten, solange sich das Besondere dem Allgemeinen gegenüber al sein ‘Allgemeines’ halt” Karl 
Marx und Frederich Engels Werke, Über Proudhon, vol. 1, op. cit. p.248. 
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3. Social and Political Thought 
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3.1 The Socialist movement 
 
During the 19th century the socialist project had many different appearances, each brand of 
socialism mutually influenced one another and as a whole, it has even penetrated in the political 
considerations of the most vehement adversaries. Socialism as a movement is perhaps best clearly 
delineated by Karl Marx, who defined different types of socialism and showed how widely spread the 
socialist ideas were. He summarized their insufficiencies and proposed his scientific socialism as the 
socialism capable of providing the emancipation of humanity. Oliveira Martins too is well aware of the 
different types of socialism which cannot be univocally classified but for him share a common concern: 
the moral problem of the 19th century expressed in the realm of politics212. 
The Portuguese liberal revolution and subsequent revolts were part of a series of social 
struggles that ran across Europe, in which some socialist elements could already be found, but could 
not be yet unequivocally classified as being socialist213. In these partially opposed tendencies in the 
years that followed, Proudhon was the main theoretical source for many of the intellectuals in Portugal 
that took part or sympathized with the socialist cause. 
This is especially true for Oliveira Martins, as one can easily deduce from the previous chapter 
where Proudhon’s theoretical paternity is shown. But this also holds true in terms of more practical 
considerations. António Sérgio, who had an interest above all in the social thought of Oliveira Martins 
rather than his philosophical-theoretical work, says that “The  <<socialism>> of Martins is that of his 
master Proudhon”214. It is undoubtedly true that his first writings were under the influence of 
Proudhon, but his friend and intellectual partner Antero de Quental, was much more inclined to follow 
Proudhon’s line of thought than Oliveira Martins himself, who will progressively move away from 
Proudhon, while still maintaining his main tenets concerning the nature of classes and the social 
revolution.  He modifies some of Proudhon’s propositions about the means to achieve this, recognizing 
the role of the state as auxiliary to this goal, abandoning the federalism of Proudhonian inspiration. 
This fact is noticeable on the advertencies Antero de Quental makes to Oliveira Martins in his 
correspondence: 
                                                          
212 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Socialismo e Democracia, Politica e história, vol. 1, Guimarães editores, Lisboa, 
1957, pp.182-183. 
213 For a throughout exposition of this phenomenon, which was not here undertaken, the reader is redirected 
to António Pedro Mesquita study “O pensamento socialista em Portugal no século XIX” in Revista estudos 
filosóficos, n°3, 2009, pp.76-107. 
214 “o <<sociaismo>> do Martins é o do Proudhon seu mestre” António Sérgio, Sobre o Socialismo de Oliveira 
Martins, Ensaios VIII, Guimarães editores, Lisboa, 1958, p.201 
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“It is to be believed, that if Proudhon could have had opened in your ardent career a 
parenthesis consecrated to the serene and unconcerned study of history, it would have corrected 
much of what it had of rigid, absolute and one sided in your opinions. Long live history, but history as 
a means not as an end. That is my sentence!”215 
Antero de Quental refers to his partisanship positions in relation to history but such a critique 
can also be read in relation to him being a strict follower of Proudhon. The study of Proudhon can be 
traced back to the period of 1870-73 when they exchanged a considerable amount of correspondence 
about the conditions for socialism in Portugal. At that time Antero de Quental thought that what was 
to be done by the Portuguese socialists was fundamentally a job of critique, because the conditions 
for a true revolution were not met. Doing something else was going along the fantasies proposed by 
some fringes, in what could be seen both as a recognition of the relative underdevelopment of 
Portugal’s socio-economic structures, especially in term of its industry, but also as a critique of 
utopism216. 
The Casino Conferences (1871) were one of the practical results of this critical effort. It is at 
this particular point in time when they studied Hegel’s work as a theoretical reference for their social 
intervention. The question of “method” is inclusively discussed at length with Oliveira Martins in their 
correspondence217.  
The discussions between Antero de Quental and Oliveira Martins seem to reflect almost 
immediately in the works Oliveira Martins produced right after. The exposition of Proudhon’s serialism 
in the book Portugal e o Socialismo is a perfect example. On the 27 of December of 1872, just a couple 
of months before the book’s publication, we have a metaphysical consideration around the validity of 
Hegel’s method in relation to particular phenomenon, which Antero de Quental denied because this 
realm is for experimental rather than theoretical sciences218.  
There we see the serialism of Proudhon mentioned together with Hegel by Antero de Quental: 
                                                          
215 “É de crer que se Proudhon tivesse podido abrir na sua carreira ardente um parêntesis consagrado ao 
estudo sereno e despreocupado da história, teria corrigido muito o que havia de rígido, absoluto e one sided 
nas suas opiniões. Viva pois a história, mas a história como meio e não como fim. Tal é a minha sentença!“ 26 
of February 1877 letter from Antero de Quental to Oliveira Martins, Antero de Quental, Cartas, vol. 2, op. cit. 
p.15. 
216 See the letters where this is debated, idem, ibidem pp.15-16. 
217 See idem, ibidem, pp.162-165. 
218 This will also be Oliveira Martins’s initial preposition in O Helenismo e Civilização Cristã, op. cit. pp.1-5. 
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“after this let it be known, that my doctrine of evolution is in great measure the one of Hegel, 
to which I combine the idea of proudhonian series”219 
What is interesting to notice is that it sounds as if Oliveira Martins was not completely aware 
of Hegel’s method in relation to Proudhon’s serialism but became part of his own theories from these 
discussions with Antero de Quental. In Portugal e o Socialismo we will have the exposition of this idea 
of series combined with Hegel’s method.  
The Casino Conferences were already under such philosophical influences, mainly by the hands 
of Antero de Quental, where Proudhon and, judging by Antero de Quental’s correspondence, probably 
also Hegel were object of reflection by the organizers of the conferences220. But the concerns of those 
involved were not directly related to Hegel or philosophy but rather about historical, political and 
literary problems. The “canceled” conference of Jaime Batalha Reis about socialism was to be a critical 
analysis of Proudhon. 
In his 1872 book Teoria do Socialismo, Oliveira Martins professes this same spirit and, while 
reflecting on the division of labour and the organization of functions proposed by Proudhon, the series 
of Proudhon and some allusions to its origins are already mentioned, but no reference to dialectics or 
an exposition of Hegel’s method is to be found: 
“Function is what Fourier and Proudhon called series, and, [when] refered to the individual 
Langlous denonimates synthetic worker. The proeminent present example of the law of the division of 
work and of the series, of the parcelar and synthetic worker, of the producer and the man, 
economically active and juridically free, is agriculture. Each one of its operations is a series; the worker, 
is synthetic because he is capable of exercising the different functions successively. The work is divided 
because the operations are executed independently, isolated; it is federative because the product 
results from the reunion of these operations, autonomous in themselves. The function in work is 
therefore the reunion of specialities, composition and method. The synthesis in the worker is the 
aptitude in the exercise of successive and combined functions.”221 
                                                          
219 “depois d’isto fica V. sabendo que a minha doutrina da Evolução é em grande parte a de Hegel, com a qual 
combino a idea da série proudhoniana.” 26 December [1872], Cartas Inéditas de Antero de Quental a Oliveira 
Martins, op. cit. p.165. 
220 See Eça de Queiroz, Um Génio que era um Santo, Notas Contemporâneas, 3rd ed., edição <<Livros do 
Brasil>>, Lisboa, [s.d], p.268. 
221 “Função é o que Fourier e depois Proudhon chamaram série, e, referida ao individuo Langlois denomina 
trabalhador sintético. O exemplo actual mais prominente da lei da divisão do trabalho e da série, do 
trabalhador parcelário e sintético, do produtor e do homem, activo económicamente e jurídicamente livre, é a 
agricultura. Cada uma das suas operações é uma série; e o trabalhador é sintético porque é capaz do exercício 
das diferentes funções sucessivamente. O trabalho é divídido porque as operações se executam independente, 
isoladamente; é federado porque da reunião dessas operações, autónomas em sí, resulta o produto. A função 
no trabalho é portanto a reunião de especialidades, composição e método. A sintese no trabalhador é a 
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Later in Portugal e o Socialismo the dialectic of Hegel is made notice of but still very much 
taken on Proudhon’s terms, closer to Kant’s understanding of antinomies, instead of the Hegelian 
notion of dialectics, as seen earlier. But at any rate it exhibits an interest in Hegel, where our point is 
also to show that the inclusion of Hegel in this serial dialectics is likely to have come from Antero de 
Quental.  
The Proudhonism of Oliveira Martins should then be taken with a grain of salt. He was a 
genuine Proudhonian in this earlier period just like most of the socialists, but even then he still 
entertained a political solution that entailed the state as a determining factor in the organization of 
economy. He argues against free-trade and says that actually “the truth contradicts every day in 
science and in politics this doctrine, [of] the absolute non-intervention of the state in the acts of 
commerce and banking”222 and the accusation of the state disorganizing the economy “remains to be 
seen whether disorganizing is not correcting it”223. While earlier in this same text he had criticized the 
monarchy and its pauperist policies in what concerns the creation of wealth and national production, 
he still views the state as an equalizing force and an ally of socialism. 
Oliveira Martins has this tendency towards continuity and reform, where equality is a kind of 
fatality brought about naturally by the moral constitution of men. The pauperism in England and other 
northern rich protestant nations is different from that of southern monarchies which is more equal in 
the distribution of wealth but is in general poorer. He prefers this highness of spirit rather than, 
according to him, the more animal nature peculiar to the Anglo-saxons224, and these views will be 
maintained as is noticeable by the content of his last book on England. 
The deviation from equality is attributed to European colonialism, with its roots in the 
crusades, in which the character of some European nations (such as England and Netherlands) gave 
accent to a spirit of commercial enterprise. This idea of a development towards equality leads him to 
such generalizations as this: If Europe did not had the crusades we would have socialism already in 
Europa, but this advent brought us modern science225.  
                                                          
aptidão de exercício em funções sucessivas e combinadas.” J. P. Oliveira Martins, Teoria do Socialismo, op. cit. 
pp.317-318. 
222 “a verdade contradiz todos os dias na ciência e na política esta doutrina, na absoluta não intervenção do 
estado nos actos da vida comercial e bancária.” idem, ibidem p.247. 
223 “Cumpre saber porém se desorganiza-lo não será corrigi-lo” idem, ibidem, p.248. 
224 “between the meridional poverty and sobriety, and the wealth and misery of the north choose! I choose the 
first” / “entre a sobriedade e a pobreza meridional, e o luxo e a miséria do norte escolhei! Eu escolho as 
primeiras” idem, ibidem,. p.237. 
225 See idem, ibidem, p.249. 
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This is regress from the tendency of equality. The regression has on the one hand its origin in 
the inability of society to find a resolution to its problems, but it also has a justification in the 
universalization of less developed nations by lowering itself and bringing them on to this path. 
When he analyses the systems of production and finances of the state of Rome, the downfall 
is attributed to the development of a systematic capitalism on the fringes of the republic that reached 
the center of it, Rome, where a plebeian and populist communist tradition endured. The capitalism of 
the outer provinces fought its way into Rome and due to the democratic sentiment of the people gave 
rise to Caesarism. The nepotistic tendencies, which precluded the instability of the institutions of the 
Roman state, are something that derives from this capitalistic tendency, in which for example “the 
banks” were substituting the functions of the state, because the redistributive instruments of wealth 
were not able to thwart the tendency for the centralization of property.   
It is then according to Oliveira Martins that from this inequality the antithesis capitalism-
socialism first appears and the social organism is deviated from the normal course of equalization226. 
The resolution to this problem in Rome was found in a mixed aristocratic system when the republic 
evolved into an empire, anticipating a downfall. In all of these considerations Oliveira Martins always 
draws parallels to the contemporaneous social problems. 
“The ancient democracy was transformed into a Carthaginian alike society, an oligarchy of the 
rich, plowing the land with slaves, usurpating the best of public income, giving bread-charity to the 
hungry mob of the capital – a pure capitalism, like the one of Western Europe in the 19th century.”227 
While the caesaristic solution was similar to the one underway in Germany: 
“Was there not someone, without military satrap ambitions without follies of demagoges, 
lastimating so great evils searching for its remedies? There was. There was in the senate a party of 
reform, similar to the autocratic-socialists of the Germany of today. Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus 
The African (570-1625) was its Bismarck.”228 
The monarchies of the Middle Ages were the outcome of Rome’s failure and through them the 
tendency towards equality was again reestablished but enlarged, later re-centering itself again while 
                                                          
226 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, História da República Romana, vol. 1, 5th ed., Guimarães Editores, Lisboa, 1965, 
p.433. 
227 “A antiga democracia rural estava transformada numa sociedade como a cartaginesa: uma oligarquia de 
ricos lavrando a terra com escravos, usurpando o melhor dos rendimentos públicos, dando de esmola pão à 
plebe faminta da capital — um capitalismo puro, como o do ocidente europeu no XIX século.” idem, ibidem, 
p.440. 
228 “Não haveria quem, sem ambições de sátrapa militar, sem loucuras de demagogo, lastimasse tão grandes 
males buscando-lhes o remédio? Havia. Havia no Senado um partido de reforma, semelhante aos socialistas-
autocráticos da Alemanha de hoje. Públio Cornélio Cipião Emiliano Africano (570-625) era o seu Bismarck.” 
idem, ibidem, p.440. 
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moving to other parts of the world with the European maritime expansion. The problem that posed 
itself in the Roman republic was not completely resolved as it lacked the instruments to do so, because 
it had not yet acquired a universalist character which the regress of Middle Ages would be maturing, 
giving place to science and modern socialism.  
The socialism of Oliveira Martins and the circles he took part was closer to the libertarian 
socialism of Proudhon, which favoured small independent property owners. But why was Proudhon a 
theoretical reference to Oliveira Martins and his generation? 
Proudhons’ appeal to them is understandable as his political solutions had in mind for the most 
part the small bourgeoisie and its interests, of which this group was mainly composed of. The 
psychology of class is well reflected in the political theory and activities proposed by Proudhon. The 
underlying contradiction is how to maintain the basis of present society but eliminate the undesired 
effects, how to conserve and destroy the social order. He defends order and revolution at the same 
time. The balance in the end tilts towards conserving, because in the relations of property, the 
proprietaries, even if small, do not want to lose their possessions. The orderly transition is to avoid the 
risks, they are afraid of taking risks, to fail and be left in misery like the proletariat. 
Just because someone belongs to a certain class, this does not mean they will automatically 
support the interests and the ideas of the class they belong to. But the acceptance of certain ideas of 
class by one class or another is related to how they appeal to the interests of the class at hand. Solely 
appealing to the interests of class in explaining the ideas of these men is not only simplistic but 
incorrect. The idea  of classes, however, certainly plays a role in their thoughts, especially when they 
are speaking to the reader. 
This fact is noticeable if we look at the addressee of Proudhon’s Idée générale de la Révolution 
au dix-neuvième siècle which is actually the bourgeoisie. Even though the goal is revolution and the 
improvement of the working class, the leader of such a revolution should be the bourgeoisie. The 
proletariat is seen as the class that is uneducated and easily deceived, not the best fit for the 
advancement of freedom229. The ideas they propose meet for the most part the demands of the petit-
                                                          
229 “such is the ignorance in which it has been kept as to the true cause of its sufferings, that it is hardly since 
February that it has begun to stammer the word, credit” and later towards the end we are told that “it must be  
admitted that, although the laboring class, by its numerical preponderance, and by the irresistible pressure 
which it is able to exercise upon the decisions of an assembly, is quite capable, with the aid of a few 
enlightened citizens, of  bring about the first part of the revolutionary programme, social liquidation and the 
settlement of property and land; it is nevertheless, by the narrowness of its views and its inexperience in 
business, incapable of carrying on such large interests of commerce and great industry; and in consequence 
cannot attain its true destiny” J. P. Proudhon, General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century, 
translated by John Beverly Robinson, Dover Publications, New York, 2004, p.55 et 223 / “telle est l’ignorance oú  
elle a été entretenue sur la cause réelle de ses souffrances, que c’est à peine si, depuis février, elle commence à 
bégayer le mot de credit” …. “Il faut le reconnaître: si la classe travailleuse, par sa force numerique et par la 
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bourgeoisie. He defends the alliance between sections of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, but he 
still does not condemn the capitulation to the enemy, which has often happened as a way of advancing 
petit-bourgeois interests even if they show themselves partial. 
 The classes and their different interests, how the collective should be above the individual 
against abstract freedom, that is precisely Hegel’s idea and probably one of the main initial sources of 
disagreement between Hegel and Oliveira Martins who prefers to follow the individualistic tendencies 
of Proudhon. The critique of Hegel is related to the state, where according to Oliveira Martins, he is 
the supporter of an authoritarian bureaucracy. The bottom line lies in the collective having a greater 
importance than the individual, a truer reality, which Oliveira Martins denies. 
 From early on Oliveira Martins will follow Proudhon’s prerogatives. The social revolution 
demanded was one of reform. The structures of society were to be maintained. The individual is sacred 
and property is seen as the freedom of enjoyment of one’s individual sphere, without being bothered 
by others230. The problem is one of redistribution, in which equality could come about by the 
advancements of the moral law, setting itself against nature, which in reality makes man unequal231. 
To bring about equality in an orderly manner is a demand for everyone, even those who were not 
conscious of it. Mainly the workers and sections of the people whose moral development was not to 
the standards of culture. 
 Marx’ response to Proudhon deals precisely with this matter, when he speaks of the 
intellectuals who feel themselves as impartial, because they in a way value the bourgeois order. They 
feel at home in this “order” but at the same time they see its shortcomings and faults, of which Marx 
will be caustic about. Proudhon “in his heart of hearts he prides himself on his impartiality and on 
having found the correct balance, allegedly distinct from the happy medium. A petit bourgeois of this 
kind deifies contradiction, for contradiction is the very basis of his being”232. They wanted to maintain 
                                                          
pression irrésistible qu’elle peut exercer sur les décisions d’une assemblée, est parfaitement à même, avec le 
concours de quelques citoyens éclairés, de réaliser le primiére partie du programma révolutionaire, la 
liquidation sociale et la constitution de la propriété fonciére; elle est encore, par l’insuffisance de ses vues et 
son inexperience des affaires, incapable de gérer d’aussi grands intêrets que ceux du commerce et de la haute 
industrie, et conséquemment au-dessous de sa propre destinée”  P.J. Proudhon, Idée Générale de la Révolution 
au XIX-siécle, Garnier Frères Libraires, Paris, 1851, p.49 et p.257-258 
230 “We do not attack property, property is sacred, just like man who is [also] sacred, we attack crime” / “Nós 
não atacamos a propriedade, a propriedade é santa, como é santo o homem, atacamos sim o crime.” J. P. 
Oliveira Martins, Portugal e o Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua reorganização 
pelo socialismo, op. cit. p.196. 
231 See in this respect Norberto Cunha “Sobre a natureza humana e as suas desigualdades em Oliveira Martins” 
in Diacrítica, n°10, Dir. Vitor Manuel de Aguiar da Silva, Revista do Centro de Estudos Humanísticos, Braga, 
1999, p.260-336. 
232 See Marx and Engels Collected Works, letter to Annenkov, 28 December 1846, Vol 38, Op. cit. p.105. / “Im 
innersten seines Gewissens schmeichelt er sich, unparteiisch zu sein, das rechte Gleichgewicht gefunden zu 
haben, das den Ansprucht erhebt, etwas anderes zu sein als des rechte juste-milieu. Ein solcher Kleinbürger 
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their existence as an independent class but they were being completely taken out of circulation by the 
concentration of capital, with a subsequent proletarianization. They were the ones from the bourgeois 
class capable of seeing the impeding social revolution. 
 For these reasons they saw themselves as the ones who were most fit to do comprehensive 
reforms, they were so to say, the forefront of the “bourgeoisie order” aspirations of perpetuation in 
power. The ones who thought they were able to acquaint themselves with the new forms by which 
the revolution would have a “rational” realization. They are the theoreticians, or so to say the 
professors of the proletariat: 
“The mob and the fanatics, [in] preaching the vital-competition, obey animal instincts which 
announce their certain victory of [those] who have for themselves the numbers, therefore the 
strength. It is the task of the philosopher to set their path, direct them as much as possible in human 
matters.”233 
The socialist movement and the strikes are classified as part of this competition for wages, 
therefore, for him a greater part of the working class, especially the British working class, is indeed 
included in this group that defends the principles of competition embedded in capitalism. The idea of 
“plebes” is not completely coincident with the working class when he broadly defines it as those who 
defend competition. It also includes broad sections of the bourgeoisie and the capitalists. 
To this effect one finds in Oliveira Martins a paternalistic tendency and, although he denies the 
effectiveness of paternalist socialism, he still practices it to a great extent. The argument is that he 
does not find the workers capable of their own emancipation; he believes they need guidance, and 
takes this anarchism of the plebeians very low and in general mistrusts the proletariat. 
“The proletariat is the black wave of frantic ravenous people which put the future of civilization 
at risk, trusting it in incapable or greedy hands”234 whereas the actual problem is in the regime of 
competition where "the proletarian of today is the capitalist of tomorrow"235. This is when the men of 
ideas, the philosophers, enter the scene to guide the development of societies and where we find 
Proudhon, Lassalle, Hegel and so forth. 
                                                          
vergöttlicht den Widerspruch, weil der Widerspruch der Kern seines Wesens ist.“ Karls Marx und Friedrich 
Engels Werke, Brief an Pawel Wassiljewitsch Annenkow, Band 27, op. cit. p.462. 
233 “As plebes e os energúmenos, pregando a concorrência-vital, obedecem a instinctos animais que lhes 
anunciam a vitória certa de quem tem por sí o número, e portanto a força. Cumpre ao filósofo encaminha-la, 
dirigi-la tanto quanto é possível nas coisas humanas.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Política e Economia Nacional, 2nd 
ed., Guimarães Editores & Ca, Lisboa, 1954, p.101. 
234 “O proletariado é a onda negra de gente faminta e desvairada que põe em risco o futuro da civilização 
confiado a mãos ou inábeis ou ávidas” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Regime das Riquezas (elementos de crematística), 
5th ed., Guimarães Editores & Ca, Lisboa, 1955, p.223. 
235 “o proletário de ontem é o capitalista de amanhã” idem, ibidem, p.223. 
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 The presence of Hegel in this socialist thought, besides Oliveira Martins and Antero de Quental, 
also comes from Jose Fontana and the Socialist international. Although the anarchist tendency will 
have more influence in Portugal, Fontana still exchanged letters with Marx. He will also give lectures 
about Oliveira Martins’s Portugal e o Socialismo, where Hegel has more predominance, to groups of 
workers. Additionally Lassale gains some acceptance through Antero de Quental236, even though 
Proudhon will always be the main reference, where the thought of Hegel is more diluted. Other 
secondary figures will help to spread Proudhon’s ideas, such as Amorim Viana who made a critical 
synthesis of Proudhon’s Contradições Economicas (filosofia da miséria) or Eduardo Maia which was 
initial a Proudhonist and took part in the socialist movement. 
The Casino Conferences, as earlier mentioned, were the culmination of these activities, which 
were made famous more due to their censorship. This movement initiated by a group of intellectuals, 
although with some affiliations with the Socialist International, had no direct participation of the 
workers as advocated by the International. José Fontana was able to take some workers along with 
him to the conferences237, but they were for the most part frequented by intellectuals and members 
of the bourgeoisie. 
The relation of Hegel to revolutionary socialist theory is enormous and the circulation of these 
ideas also reached Portugal. They will more easily penetrate the literate sections of society which were 
for the most part bourgeois oriented and therefore tended for reformism. From Bakunine to Marx, 
passing through Proudhon and Lassalle they all integrated in different ways Hegelian philosophical 
prepositions. Traces of Hegel could then be found in various tendencies but Oliveira Martins, due to 
his more systematic theoretical writings, deals with the subject in further detail. 
The dialectic of Hegel with the metaphysical speculations around contradiction, later also the 
role of the state in society, will be integrated in his own socialist theory. In the economic studies he 
engages, the idea of economic contradictions and their resolution, inspired on Proudhon, will have an 
enduring presence, although we will later notice that those contradictions do not belong to economy 
but are the product of the moral vices, a preposition already advanced in Portugal e o Socialismo but 
only in his economic writings categorically affirmed. 
 In a study of Oliveira Martins’s socialism by Augusto Santos Silva, we find the assertion that in 
Oliveira Martins economy has fundamentally a financial aspect. Indeed in his Regime das Riquezas 
(elementos de crematística) this aspect of economy goes under the name of chrematistics and follows 
                                                          
236 “Fui durante uns 7 ou 8 anos uma espécie de pequeno Lassalle” 14 of May of 1887 letter to Wihlelm Storck, 
Cartas, vol. 3, op. cit. p.93. 
237 See João Gaspar Simões, op. cit. p.51. 
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Santos Silva’s description, while political economy is something that has to do with moral or religion 
and is to be separated from economy properly which is something instinctive238. 
The short-comings of Portugal in terms of industrial development is noticed by Oliveira 
Martins, who will say that capitalism in Portugal had taken the form of state capitalism, where the 
interests of a minority were defended in the highest levels of political power. He had experienced this 
fact first-hand when he worked in the railway construction and is well aware of the subsequent 
interests that arouse around the economic exploration of the rail services239. The industrial 
development of Portugal was heavily backed up by the state. Because, besides the lack of capital, the 
bourgeoisie was not willing to take the risks of investing capital with the prospects of losing it. Oliveira 
Martins had proposed in his Portugal e o Socialismo the taking of risks by the state but in practice what 
happened was that losses were nationalized and profits privatized240. 
Without going further into theoretical economic considerations, the success of any capitalist 
venture presupposes a demand for the things being produced, but Portugal with its marginal internal 
market was not capable of maintaining a competitive internal production, prices were being pressured 
by more industrialized nations. The state took the risks the bourgeoisie was not willing to take. 
 As a result the loans the state had to take, effectively gave immeasurable power to the bankers 
and economic policy was hostage to their interest. Oliveira Martins and the small bourgeoisie, the ones 
that were able to take loans, were upset at the high interest rates. They felt betrayed by the state, as 
their interests were not being defended by the state. The idea of free credit that is central to Proudhon 
and Oliveira Martins relates to this problem. Therefore, as many have noticed, the sources of Oliveira 
Martins are mainly reformist: 
 “If we looked at the bibliography consulted by our author, we would arrive for sure at the same 
conclusion as Flausino Torres: Oliveira Martins read preferably the reformists”241 
                                                          
238 “the analysis of character, presents us next to that instict, [the instinct of] equality which inspires religion 
and jurisprudence ” / “A análise do carácter apresenta-nos, ao lado desse instincto, o da igualdade que inspira 
o foro da religião, e o da jurisprudência” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Regime das Riquezas (elementos de crematística), 
op. cit. p.216.  
239 See for instance his multiple articles on this subject in the newspaper O Repórter, J.P. Oliveira Martins, O 
Repórter, Guimarães Editores, Lisboa, 1957, pp.56-66. 
240 “with no shame, they insinuate that the treasury should pay them for the losses of the company that had 
thrown itself fearless, and that it should even thank them for their patriotic dedication” / “Para o cúmulo do 
desplante, insinuaram que o Tesouro lhes deve pagar os prejuizos da empresa que se lançaram 
temeráriamente, e agradecer-lhes ainda por cima a sua dedicação patriótica.” J. P Oliveira Martins, A Província, 
vol. 1, Guimarães editores, Lisboa, 1958, p.180. 
241 “Se recenseássemos a bibliografia consultada pelo nosso autor, chegaríamos decerto à mesma conclusão de 
Flausino Torres: Oliveira Martins leu preferentemente os reformistas.” Augusto Santos Silva, Oliveira Martins e 
o Socialismo, Afrontamento, Braga, 1979, p.91. 
90 
 
 To this effect even Proudhon loses importance and the spirit of compromise, although already 
present in Proudhon, is completely accepted by Oliveira Martins and Proudhon is renegaded: 
"The individual liberty in the communes of Karl Marx and Proudhon would be incomparably 
less than those of the current nations”242 
It is then impossible to have work without capital, without profit, without this “normal form” 
of economic development, which is the instinct of the affirmation of personality. In this sense we 
advance towards equality but there is a natural inequality that cannot be eliminated, only educated. 
The strikes are precisely the contrary of this struggle for equality because man looks at money and not 
equality, or in other words it is a sub-product of the rich243. 
With time Oliveira Martins will abandon Proudhon’s type of socialism, with its individualistic 
premises and come close to Katheder socialism, having many points of contact with Proudhon, one of 
them being the notion that politics and power relations should be one left for specialists. Besides the 
moral premises, with the state ruled by the imperative of justice, were still those we have in 
Proudhon244. 
The direct involvement of Oliveira Martins in the socialist cause was marginal; he had a more 
active involvement within the government and the status quo, attempting to reform society from 
above. This is also in accordance with the preposition advanced by Angusto Santos Silva that Oliveira 
Martins’s involvement with the socialist cause was an ideal one, not directly involved in directing the 
movement but setting the ideas and lines of development245. As a point of interest it should be noted 
that Guilherme d’Oliveira Martins will produce a biography of Oliveira Martins with the title Oliveira 
Martins: Um combate de ideias (Oliveira Martins: A struggle of ideas). This spirit of reformism will still 
lead him into positions of power within the government, although the reforms he envisioned were 
mostly unsuccessful. 
The bureaucracy of the state becomes with time in Oliveira Martins the favoured means to 
reach this reform. He does not trust on the poor sections of society directly affected as “the products 
of capitalism”, but precisely those who have an affinity with the “order”, mitigated by some notion of 
impartiality. The monarchy is then seen by Oliveira Martins as capable of holding this balance, because 
the king is interested in an equilibrium and not in powerful individual interests who could contest the 
                                                          
242 “a liberdade individual nas comunas de Karl Marx e de Proudhon seria incomparávelmente menor do que é 
nas nações actuais." J.P. Oliveira Martins, Política e Economia Nacional, op. cit. p.93. 
243 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Regime de riquezas, Op. cit. pp.213-218. 
244 See Fernando Catroga who makes reference to this continuity in Oliveira Martins’s thought, Fernando 
Catroga, “O problema Político em Antero de Quental – Um confronto com Oliveira Martins –“ in Revista de 
História das Ideias, op. cit. pp.380-381. 
245 See Augusto Santos Silva, op. cit. pp.87-88. 
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national interests embodied in the monarch’s power246. From an individualistic kind of socialism he 
advances to a collectivistic one, but still on reformist lines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
246 See for instance his 5-10-1887 article in A Província: “with effect, this people, apathetic by temperament, 
melancholic by nature, pessimistic by spirit, mistreated by politic, without beliefs or hopes in anyone, embraces 
the monarchic tradition, and the good instinctive sense tells it that a solidarity of interests unites it with its 
kings” … “[We have] on the one hand, the strength that there is the throne, and on the other hand, the passive 
hope, the warm sympathy in the people. We desire above all, for the fortune of our land, a direct handshake 
between the king and the people” / “com efeito, este povo, apático por temperamento, melancólico por 
índole, pessimista por génio, maltratado pela política, sem crenças nem esperanças em quem quer que seja, 
abraça-se à tradição monárquica, e o bom senso instintivo diz-lhe que uma solidariedade de interesse o liga aos 
seus reis” … “de um lado, a força que há no trono, e do outro, a esperança passiva, a simpatia calorosa que há 
no povo, desejamos sobretudo, para a fortuna da nossa terra, um aperto de mão directo entre o rei o povo.” J. 
P. Oliveira Martins, A Província, vol. 5, op. cit. p.74 et 76. 
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3.2 Political Theoretician and Social Preacher 
The political theory of Oliveira Martins has changed since his early texts on socialism, there he 
said that it is not possible to “divide in two the life of humanity, a make room for monarchy and 
democracy inside the same economic way”247. The organic conception of society was at the center of 
his theoretical speculations; however, the finished product of these reflections had a long maturing 
process. In the 1878 booklet As Eleições we have the first draft of his organic political system of 
representation. The critiques of parliamentarism and of liberal democracy traditions are already 
present in this first book and they will become harsher with the degradation of the political life. 
 This initial positioning will be quite different from what he writes in 1887: “Nowadays the 
Monarchies are either democratic or they cannot be”248, the monarchy is no longer contrary to 
democracy but is in fact the only possible hodiernal way in which a monarchical system can be 
inscribed. The republican federalism of his youth is with time relegated in favour of a constitutional 
monarchy, which is more akin to the democracy he preconizes of estates and class representation 
rather than the tendentiously unilateral predominance of a class, or even worse, individualized 
interests. 
 The move will culminate with him joining the monarchical Partido Progressista (Progressive 
Party) in 1885, where together with the faction Vida Nova of this party, he advocates the 
democratization of monarchy through a series of reforms which run closely to the organic democracy 
he envisages in his 1878 booklet. The failure of this reformist group will lead him to the Caesarism he 
criticizes in his Teoria do Socialismo and identifies with Prussian politics, according to him inspired on 
Hegel’s philosophy. In the 1870s he will extend this critique to Fontes Pereira de Melo’s governments, 
identifying his government with the Caesarism of aristocratic interests, of cronyism and general 
corruption.  
 The idea of a democratic Caesarism emerges in the 1880s, where a temporary dictatorship was 
seen as the last resort to restore order in face of anarchic liberalism, in which the monarchic system 
would be reforming itself and advance popular democratic aspirations249. This idea of a benevolent 
dictatorship capable of imposing and perform the needed reforms, will also be shared by the group of 
intellectuals self-named os Vencidos da Vida (the defeated from life)250. This suspension of liberal 
                                                          
247 “dividir em duas a vida da humanidade, e fazer caber monarquia e democracia dentro do mesmo modo de 
ser económico!” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Teoria do Socialismo, op. cit. p.175. 
248 “Hoje em dia as monarquias ou hão-de ser democráticas, ou não podem ser” 5 de outubro 1887, J. P Oliveira 
Martins, A Província, vol. 5, op. cit. p.76 
249 See Jose Tengarrinha “Oliveira Martins: uma estratégia de Desenvolvimento para Portugal?” in Revista da 
Universidade de Coimbra, vol. 18, op. cit. pp.106-107. 
250 See Sérgio Campo Matos, “A ideia de ditadura no círculo dos vencidos da vida“ in Clio, Centro de História da 
Universidade de Lisboa, vol. 5, Lisboa, 2000, pp.73-91. 
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democracy is what Silva Cordeiro will denominate the Germanism in politics, tracing its origin to 
Oliveira Martins and his Caesaristic solution. 
One of problems we are faced with is that this Caesarism Oliveira Martins will be accused of, 
in his more youthful writings he will make this same accusation to Hegel, the Berlin philosopher of 
Prussian militarism251. Should this then be seen as a turn or an approximation to Hegel in terms of 
politics? Such a formulation is incomplete in the sense that, first in terms of politics and even on 
broader views about Hegel it remains to be seen whether they were the same as before, as his own 
views on politics had changed, increasingly favouring collective instead of individualistic premises. 
Second, because the freedom and liberties proposed by Hegel, although personified in the monarch, 
have their support in institutions and have their truth in the constitution of the state rather than in the 
monarch. While the critique of Hegel that Oliveira Martins first had contact with, comes from liberal 
fields that are against “the state apparatus” of Hegel, because it limits individual freedoms of liberal 
democracy.  
The political constitution Hegel envisaged should then be put in context with its historic 
moment, where the monarch is the prevailing political body of the state per se and direct democracy 
or elective monarchical systems were actually detrimental to real freedom(with the near examples of 
England and Poland). Democracy rested rather on other governmental institutions constitutionally 
established and bodies of civil society, like the corporations which were closer to the real individual, 
instead of the abstractly elected representatives of particularized interests. Hegel is very critical of the 
monarchical forms which had their epitome in Middle Ages252. Therefore, the monarchical principle he 
defends rests on the basis of some universal principles, which, although far from a liberal democracy, 
do not place an authority above the laws and the constitution. It is actually the constitution and the 
historical development of monarchy that make the monarch lawful. 
 Oliveira Martins relates the state authority imposed by the Prussian political system with its 
Caesaristic tendencies directly to Hegel as he had read him through Lerminier, Ahrens and other 
liberals. The Caesarism that such a system entails is not the solution for modern problems, as we are 
told that Ceasarism is only a transitory, phenomenal solution, not an organic one253. The understanding 
of the state’s role in Hegel and other political theorists he sees as following the same line, although 
initially negatively seen, will later find some acceptance, not only in terms of the state’s organizing 
function but also as the face of socialism, which through reform could implement a more democratic 
regime. 
                                                          
251 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Teoria do Socialismo, op. cit. p.150. 
252 See G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, op. cit. p.188. 
253 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Teoria do Socialismo, op. cit. p.276. 
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 In Oliveira Martins the idea of Caesarism relates to the furthering of the state’s power. This is 
also undoubtedly a theme close to Hegel and his critics, but the strong or even repressive state power 
associated with Prussian politics is not derivative of Hegel’s political theory. It is true that Hegel does 
not defend a liberal society of abstract freedom, but he also criticizes the rests of feudalism still present 
in Germany and the freedom of the estates with their reactionary traditional laws based on serfdom 
and dependence mechanisms of the Middle Ages. For this reason Hegel sides with the King, supporting 
the central power delineation of the main lines of political organization. This was on the whole a 
progressive political positioning given the conditions of Germany, the subsequent developments and 
the affirmation of a strong central government under Prussian leadership are something quite different 
from Hegel’s own political theory which allowed for a great degree of local autonomy.  
Hegel will in fact criticize the centralism of France where everything is “determined by this 
authority, and all these aspects [everything we have excluded from the necessary concept of political 
authority] are drawn into it even in their smallest ramifications. “254 a move that means “carping at all 
independent activity on the part of the citizens” where “the appointment of every village 
schoolmaster, the expenditure of every penny on a pane of glass in the village school or the parish 
council chamber, the appointment of every toll-clerk, bailiff, or village magistrate should be directly 
instigated and effected by the highest governmental authority”255 
The Prussian State with its reactionary and conservative features is something condemned by 
Hegel256, even if Oliveira Martins initially associates him with this development. However, a temporary 
dictatorship later becomes acceptable for Oliveira Martins in moments of crisis, precisely based on the 
example of Prussia, even though he is generally against Caesarist repression because it is unable to 
resolve the fundamental problems: 
 “Can this regime of compression and repression last? Nobody believes so. It would last and be 
efficient, if on the other side the protective laws, that, honors be made to the great chancellor, disciple 
of Hegel, Bluntschili and Schäffle, [which] he promotes tirelessly, could cure the disease; but there are 
two parallel origins for anarchism, one of which is the evident uneasiness of the working classes, 
curable without doubt by means of the socialist laws, the other is the democratic sentiment of 
rebellion, with origin in the individualist doctrines of which the protective laws do nothing else than 
exacerbate”257 
                                                          
254 See G.W.F. Hegel, Political Writings, translated by H.B Nisbet, edited by Laurance Dickey and H.B Nisbet, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p.21. 
255 See idem, ibidem, pp.22-23. 
256 See on this subject T.M. Knox, “Hegel and Prussianism” in Philosophy, vol. 15, no. 57 (Jan., 1940), pp. 51-63. 
257 “Poderá durar este regime de compressão e repressão? Ninguém o creia. Duraria e seria eficaz, se por outro 
lado as leis protectoras, que, honra seja feita ao grande chanceler, discípulo de Hegel, de Bluntschili e de 
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 But he still sees dictatorship as a means to solve social revolts by instituting a strong power 
that in a short period would be capable of curtailing liberalism, the origin of this anarchic democratic 
sentiment. 
A new reading of Hegel also affirms itself in the extract above, where Hegel’s political theory 
seems to be object of praise on these later texts, when Oliveira Martins is concerned with reform and 
makes an approximation to state socialism. It is, however, not clear if this praise originates from this 
acceptability of Caesarism in moments of crisis or from another understanding of Hegel, one in which 
the state does not have the restrictive and absolutist characters condemned earlier. 
 The association of Hegel with state socialism is commonplace among the liberals, who followed 
a path similar to Rudolf Haym’s condemnation of Hegel258. The support for this assertion could be 
looked for in the examples of Lassalle and the Bismarckian reforms259, but the main references of 
Oliveira Martins and the proponents of state socialism were actually limited in their Hegelianism, some 
even reasserting the liberal mantra of Haym, as in the case of Bluntschli, who, although often said to 
be a follower of Hegel, says: 
 “Even Hegel in his theory of Law (Rechtslehre) paid more regard to the historical formation of 
states than the earlier theorists of natural law. He supposed indeed that he found in the history of the 
world a dialectical process of reason. The “existing” appeared to him “rational”. His theory glorified 
especially the Prussian state, as it then existed, still absolute although governed in a spirit of public 
duty. He defended the power of the monarchy, and did not care for the advance of constitutional 
freedom. But he emphasised the moral significance of the State, and in opposition to the wretched 
idea that it was only a necessary evil, he praised it, as the highest and noblest realization of the idea of 
Right”260  
 The lack of a critical distance from the ideas in vogue leads him to a reading of Hegel, which 
besides having no direct support in Hegel’s philosophy also lacks historical justification, when it 
portrays him as an apologist of Prussian monarchy in its absolutist undertones.  
Bluntschli will adhere to the ideas of a Völkerpsychologie in order to explain the workings of 
the state, favouring empirical methods as opposed to the logical abstractions he sees in Hegel. To him 
                                                          
Schafle[sic], ele promove infatigávelmente, conseguissem curar a doença; mas no anarquismo há duas origens 
paralelas, uma das quais é o mal-estar evidente das classes operárias, curável sem dúvida por meio das leis 
socialistas, e a outra é o sintoma democrático de rebelião, originado nas doutrinas individualistas e que as leis 
protectors não fazem se não exarcebar.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Jornal, Op. cit. p.240. 
258 It is Haym who accuses Hegel of taking the real for the rational: “wirklich wird, was vernünftig ist, und das 
Wirkliche vernünftig wird“ Rudolf Haym, Hegel in seine Zeit: Vorlesung über Entstehung  und Entwickelung 
Wesen und Wert der Hegelsche Philosophie, Verlag von Rudolph Gaertner, Berlin, 1857, p.365. 
259 See Domenico Losurdo, Zwischen Hegel und Bismarck, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1993, p.307-309. 
260 See J.K. Bluntschli, The theory of State, Claredon Press, Oxford, 1892, p.73. 
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the state in Hegel is not the living organism, a personal being, like the adherents of this movement 
proposed; therefore the organic conception in Hegel is incomplete.  
Schäffle will also furnish us with a similar critique of a Hegelian panlogistic distortion of the 
social reality: 
 “It would be a great evil if the Platonic ideal state or a Fichtean closed commercial state could 
be imposed by the philosophers, if the social world of Hegel could be panlogistically constructed.“261 
The state as this individual organism would then constitute the moralizing element of society 
and it was to be used as an ideological tool to rally support for Bismarck’s reforms262. 
A letter from Henrique de Barros in 1886 attested to the fact that these were some of the 
theorists discussed by them, consisting on a whole mainly by advocates of state socialism, including 
Schäffle263, supporting the strengthening of the state’s role in economy and society in general. 
The state in Oliveira Martins always had a central role, but earlier the state was less affirmative 
and the individual occupied a greater part of his political views. Fernando Catroga speaks of a 
humanitarian universalism that characterized this earlier phase264, in which men shared a spiritual 
principle constant and identical in all human beings. In the last chapter of his Portugal e o Socialismo 
                                                          
261 “Es wäre ein großes Uebel, wenn der Platonische Idealstaat oder ein Fichtescher geschlossener Handelsstaat 
von den Philosophen oktroiyert, wenn die soziale Welt von einem Hegel panlogistisch konstruiert werden 
könnte” Albert Schäffle, Abriss der Soziologie, H. Laupp, Tübingen, 1906, p.74. 
262 See in this respect Engels preface to the German Edition of The poverty of Philosophy, where he speaks of 
Robertus economic theory, which could well apply to other catheder socialists who make “simply an 
application of morality to economics” where “The transition to Utopia is now made in the turn of a hand. The 
‘measures’, which ensure exchange of commodities according to labour value as the invariable rule, cause no 
difficulty. The other Utopians of this tendency, from Gray to Proudhon, rack their brains to invent social 
institutions which would achieve this aim. They attempt at least to solve the economic question in an economic 
way through the action of the owners themselves who exchange the commodities. For Rodbertus it is much 
easier. As a good Prussian he appeals to the state: a decree of the state authority orders the reform.” but as a 
conclusion the exploitation of wage labour remains as he “refers the whole matter to the decision of the 
bureaucracy, which determines from above the share of the worker in his own product and graciously permits 
him to have it.” Marx and Engels Collected Works, preface to the first German edition of The Poverty of 
Philosophy, vol. 26, op. cit. p.281 et 287 et 289. / “sie ist einfact eine Anwendung der Moral auf die Ökonomie“ 
... “Der Übergang zur Utopie ist nun im Handumdrehen gemacht. Die „Vorkehrungen“, die den 
Warenaustausch nach Arbeitswert als ausnahmslose Regel sicherstellen, machen keine Schwierigkeit. Die 
überigen Utopisten dieser Richtung, von Gray bis Proudhon, plagen sich damit ab, gesellschaftliche 
Einrichtingen auszuklügeln, die diesen Zweck verwirklichen sollen. Sie versuchen wenigstens, die ökonomische 
Frage auf ökonomischem Wege, durch Aktion der austauschenden Warenbesitzer selbst, zu lösen. Rodbertus 
hat es viel leichter. Als guter Preuße appelliert er an den Staat: Ein Dekret der Staatsgewalt befiehlt die 
Reform.“ ... “[in Rodbertus] die ganze Sache in das Befinden der Bürokratie legt, die dem Arbeiter seinem Anteil 
an seinem eigenen Produkt von oben herab bestimmt und in Gnaden zukommen läßt“ Marx und Engels Werke, 
Vorwort [zur ersten deutschen Ausgabe von Karl Marx‘ Schrift „Das Elend der Philosophie“], Volume 21, op. cit. 
p.178 et 181-182 et 185, 
263 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Correspondência, op. cit. p.92. 
264 See Fernando Catroga, “A historiografia de Oliveira Martins” in Revista da Universidade de Coimbra, vol. 18, 
op. cit. p.413. 
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we have a draft of these ideas, where the authority of the state was a federal contract between the 
state and the individual, as they become a united collective265.  
The socialism he proposed then was along the lines of a cooperativism between the state and 
the individual workers, which, with the help of the state, would expand individual liberty to every 
citizen and form a “universal assembly of the propriety owners”266. This idea of propriety and freedom 
is another common feature he shares with Hegel267. We have already in Teoria do Socialismo property 
as the “juridical affirmation of the moral individuality of men”268, but later the idea that property is the 
expansion of personality269, is ipsum verbum what Hegel furnishes us with in his Philosophy of Right270. 
We will see, however, from around the 1880s instead a concern around such liberty, in which 
liberty instead of being expanded should be tamed. We have rather an excess of individual liberty; the 
state should regain its authority as against individual liberty. 
Oliveira Martins starts speaking of the “restoration” of state authority and of a movement in 
Europe which moves in this direction271. The vocabulary used is meaningful and anticipates the later 
developments in support of monarchy, which besides its historic significance as with Portugal’s 
restoration of independence in 1640, also appeals to a stronger state control. However, this is 
obviously not meant as support of a return to absolutism but rather of a legitimate intervention and 
even direction of the state’s in economic affairs. 
This is a theoretical problem that comes down to the equation authority-liberty, which 
occupied Oliveira Martins’s meditations from early on. The problem of liberty, the individual and his 
relations in society always had in Oliveira Martins a measure, found in justice (or in equality), from 
                                                          
265 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Portugal e o Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua 
reorganização pelo socialismo, op. cit. pp.253-254. 
266 “a assembleia universal dos proprietários” idem, ibidem, p.255.  
267 “A afirmação da personalidade livre pela definição e segurança da propriedade” idem, ibidem, p.153. 
268 “Afirmação jurídica da individualidade moral do homem” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Teoria do Socialismo, op. cit. 
p.180. 
269 “The expansion of personality is the historical process of the formation of wealth” / “A expansão da 
personalidade é o processo histórico da formação da riqueza” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Regime das Riquezas 
(elementos de crematística), op. cit. p.202. 
270 See G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, op. cit. p.45. / G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des 
Rechts, Werke, vol. 7, op. cit. p.114-115. 
271 “The regulatory authority of the state, on circulation and work, so circumscribed and defined, is conserved; 
and if today, with a doctrinarian frenzy we have let it be obliterated, it appears all around Europe the 
symptomatic facts of a restoration each day more urgent to mitigate the orgies of capitalism and prevent the 
dire consequences of the misery of millions of men” / “A autoridade reguladora do Estado, na circulação e no 
trabalho, circunscrita sim e definida, conservou-se; e se hoje, com o desvairamento doutrinário a temos 
deixado obliterar, surgem por toda a Europa os factos sintomáticos de uma restauração cada dia mais urgente 
para mitigar as orgias do capitalismo e prevenir as consequências funestas da miséria de milhões de homens.” 
J.P. Oliveira Martins, Regime das Riquezas (elementos de crematística), op. cit. p.186. 
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which they balance their magnitude. But the balance tends to move towards authority as earlier 
mentioned because: 
“Jurists and economists conceived as antithesis liberty and authority, without being yet able 
to conceive that only in the social order, of which the criterion is equality, liberty can exist. The former 
was confused with independence and isolation and authority with tyranny and abuse”272 
Those who made “sentiments and pains” from these ideas, no longer had authority as a 
mediator between liberty and equality. A problem that affeced both the liberal and socialist doctrines 
in the radical forms they assumed: 
“Could there be an absolute norm, constant mould, on the whole variety? No, therefore it is 
equally chimerical the communist city and the city of individualism; they are equivalent abstractions. 
But it is a fact that, if we observe summarily the passage of time, we see in the economy of the peoples 
the same that is seen in jurisprudence, the separation of powers, delimitation of functions, the 
respective spheres of individual and state become distinguished”273 
The antithetical relation between liberty and authority is first said “to be resolved in a scientific 
synthesis” of a “philosophical movement” which accomplished “the fusing in one of the antithetical 
ideas – liberty-authority – by the comprehension of the common norm, [which is]one and the same in 
all humanity, [that is] Justice”274. But later the synthesis turns out not to be so easily accomplished, 
precisely because the two ideas are conceived as antithetical when in reality they are not, as liberty 
without authority is anarchy, which in fact the main problem of society a that time. For this reason we 
will hear him defending authority and condemning the excesses of liberty. 
  This is a theme that relates to Hegel and has been extended into our days and especially relates 
to Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between negative and positive liberty275, which indeed has its origins in 
Hegel where the negative liberty is the sphere of one’s own private life and positive liberty the sphere 
                                                          
272 “Juristas e economistas concebiam como antitese a liberdade e a autoridade, sem poderem conceber ainda 
que só na ordem social, cujo critério é a igualdade, pode existir liberdade. A esta confundiam-na com a 
independência e o isolamento, à autoridade com a tirania e o abuso” idem, ibidem, p.XII-XIII 
273 “Pode haver norma absoluta, molde constante, na variedade omnimoda? Não. Por isso são igualmente 
chimericas a cidade comunista e a cidade do individualismo: são abstracções equivalentes. Mas é facto que, se 
observamos sumáriamente o decorrer dos tempos, vemos na economia dos povos o mesmo que se vê na 
jurisprudência: separam-se os poderes, delimitam-se as funções, distinguem-se as esferas respectivas do 
Indivíduo e do Estado.” idem, ibidem, p.172. 
274 “Tal é a antítese determinada pelo movimento filosófico, que se resolve na síntese científica, pela qual a 
autoridade se humaniza no eu e, pela identidade da força e da matéria, do verbo e da carne, do espírito e da 
natureza, se torna uma verdade natural e moral; fundindo numa só as ideias antitéticas - liberdade-autoridade 
- pela compreensão da norma comum, uma e a mesma em toda a humanidade, a Justiça.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, 
Teoria do Socialismo, op. cit. p.9. 
275 See Isaiah Berlin, Liberty, edited by Henry Hardy with an essay on Berlin and his critics by Jan Jarry, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp.166-217. 
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of collective life276. Negative and positive liberty or freedom are directly related to Hegel’s concept of 
will, where they find their resolution. Negative freedom is the first moment of freedom or the moment 
of universality, where every limit is “dissolved” and is thus similar to Berlin’s concept of negative 
freedom277. The second moment is the transition to a defined object, or in other words, when my 
inner-freedom enters in a relation with something from outside278. The will is the unity of these two 
moments but an individual will is still not true freedom because in order to realize his freedom the 
subject needs an ethical community where it can express its subjectivity in a rational manner279. 
 Although this criticism of authority belongs to the first period of libertarian socialism, we still 
find him at that time, in an 1868 newspaper article, writing that “the authority is the sum of the parts 
of individual liberty sacrificed (necessarily) to the security of collective life”280. Authority is then a 
                                                          
276 See on this subject Miguel Saralegui, “The Hegelian origin of the Distinction between negative and positive 
freedom” in Hegel-Jahrbuch 2008, Hegels politische philosophie, Ersteil, edited by Andreas Arndt, Paul 
Cruysberghs, and Andrzej Pryleski, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 2008, pp.69-75. 
277 “The will contains α) the element of pure indeterminateness, or that pure reflection of the ego into itself 
which involves the dissipation of every restriction and every content either immediately presented by nature, 
by needs, desires, and impulses, or given and determined by any means whatever. This is the unrestricted 
infinity of absolute abstraction or universality, the pure thought of oneself” G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 
op. cit. p.21. / “Das Wille enthält α) das Element der Reinen Unbestimmtheit oder der reinen Reflexion des Ich 
in sich, in welcher jede Beschränkung, jeder durch die Natur, die Bedürfnisse, Begierden und Triebe 
unmittelbar vorhandene oder, wodurch es sei, gegebene und bestimmte Inhalt aufgelöst ist; die schrankenlose 
Unendlichkeit der absoluten Abstraktion oder Allgemeinheit, das reine Denken seiner selbst.” G.W.F. Hegel, 
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke, vol. 7, op. cit. p.49. 
278 “At the same time, the ego is also the transition from the undifferentiated indeterminacy to the 
differentiation, determination, and positing of a determinacy as a content and object. Now further this content 
may either be given by nature or engendered by the concept of the mind through this positing of itself as 
something determinate, the ego steps in principle into the determinate existence. This is the absolute moment, 
the finitude or particularization of the ego” idem, ibidem, p.22.  / “Ebenso ist Ich das Übergehen 
unterschiedsloser Unbestimmtheit zur Unterscheidung, Bestimmen und Setzen einer Bestimmtheit al seines 
Inhalts und Gegenstands. – Dieser Inhalt sei nun weiter als durch die Natur gegeben oder aus dem Begriffe des 
Geistes erzeugt. Durch dies Setzen seiner selbst als eines bestimmten tritt Ich in das Dasein überhaupt; - das 
absolute Moment der Endlichkeit oder Besonderung des Ich“ idem, ibidem, p.52. 
279 “The man in the street thinks he is free if it is open to him to act as he pleases, but this very arbitrariness 
implies that he is not free. When I will what is rational, then I am acting not as a particular individual but in 
accordance with the concept of ethics in general.” idem, ibidem, p.230. / “Der gewöhnliche Mensch glaubt frei 
zu sein, wenn ihm wilkürlich zu handeln erlaubt ist, aber gerade in der Willkür liegt daß er nicht frei ist. Wenn 
ich das Vernünftige will, so handle ich nicht als partikulares Individum, sondern nach den Begriffen dar 
Sittlichkeit überhaupt“ idem, ibidem, p.54. 
The criticism of Isaiah Berlin’s with regards to positive freedom has been object of critical evaluations and the 
meaning he attributes both to negative and positive freedom with regards to Hegel has been questioned in 
Paul Franco’s: Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom, Yale University Press, Connecticut, 1999, p.180-182 
Robert B. Pippin also addresses these problems and expands this criticism on to Popper and Russell, where the 
argument is that in the relation between subject and the object, the first term is reduced to the second term, 
which is precisely one of the initial criticisms of Oliveira Martins in relation to Hegel’s theory of state, to which 
the individual is lost or has no reality without the state. Robert B. Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, Rational 
Agency, Cambrige University Press, New York, 2008, p.26. 
280 “A autoridade é a soma de parcelas de liberdade individual sacrificadas (necessáriamente) à segurança da 
vida colectiva.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, A Democracia em Portugal, Politica e história, vol. 2, op. cit. p.2. 
100 
 
necessity for the common good and is not completely dismissed by him, even if the last expression of 
this liberty is “individualism and the federation, the autonomy of the cell and the gland”281. 
 In this text he laments the insufficiencies of the democratic advancement of liberty, but he still 
holds democracy as the basis of this advancement. The later development towards Caesarism thwarts 
these democratic sentiments, argues Silva Cordeiro, who accuses him of already having these anti-
democratic tendencies since his youth. But one must not forget that Silva Cordeiro is a liberal, little 
inclined to accept the state as a means to curtail the excess of liberalism as he in fact praises some of 
those advancements. Although the political filiation of Silva Cordeira is more complex because he is 
also critical of liberalism and defends a weak-protectionism, but still close to the lines of free-trade 
liberalism. He is thus critical of what he calls romantic liberalism, which imitated the liberal regimes of 
other countries and applied those models to Portugal, copying their laws without paying attention to 
the history and national character of Portugal which required an adaptation of those laws282. We see 
here and there some harsher phraseology on liberalism as for example when he speaks about 
Herculano: 
 “Maybe the great master, staying in the middle way of conversion, would dismiss liberalism, 
which has been in Portugal little less than a system of exploitation, instituted in favour of a dozen of 
politicians colluded with another dozen of bankers”283 
 From this excerpt it should be reinforced that the notion that liberalism had taken on this form 
is not because of liberalism itself but because of the way it was implemented in Portugal. However, 
judging by his conclusion, we have had some success in nationalizing this liberal regime, in which “this 
glory of Mouzinho is very solid, genuine like the best in history”284. But some skepticism remains as to 
whether we can take advantage of this, and as such he proposes educational reforms, in order to curb 
the root cause of crises, or in other words the moral crisis which is the substrate of all crises. His 
political positioning is thus typical of the mixed positions of the liberal-conservatives. 
 From the critique of liberalism he goes on to the critique of Oliveira Martins’s Caesarism: 
                                                          
281 See idem, ibidem, p.9. 
282 “The grafting of the liberal regime by legislators, statesmen and literates has been made by the love of art, 
copying french laws.” / “A enxertia do regime liberal fizeram-na legisladores, estadistas e literatos copiando leis 
francesas por amor da arte“ Joaquim António da Silva Cordeiro, A Crise em seus aspectos morais, op. cit. p.25. 
283 “talvez que o grande mestre, ficando a meio do caminho da conversão, mandasse bugiar o liberalismo que 
pouco mais tem sido, em Portugal, que um sistema de exploração, instituído a favor de uma dúzia de políticos 
conluiados com outra dúzia de banqueiros.” idem, ibidem, p.21. 
284 “Esta glória do Mouzinho é bem solida, genuína como as que melhor o são na história” idem, ibidem, p.210. 
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“If in Herculano we had the doctor of individual liberalism, we will see in Oliveira Martins, the 
theorist of Caesarism, as the only solution for the chaos of Portuguese society”285 
There is no direct mentioning of the presence of Hegel in Oliveira Martins. However, it is 
apparent that he takes Hegel for a metaphysician and mystic, far from modern German science286. But 
Silva Cordeiro still directly relates him to the German political tradition, particularly to Mommsen 
where Caesar is for him too, the ideal state man, reaffirming that again as an early tendency in Oliveira 
Martins: 
“So is the preoccupation no less visible in Oliveira Martins: it is this tendency itself that first 
appears outlined in the first works of his youth. The first book that he publishes is a historical novel 
about an episode of the <<loss of our independence in 1580>> with the title – Febo Moniz ou o último 
dos portugueses”287 
In what relates to Rome, Silva Cordeiro is very clear in condemning Catiline, Marius, Sulla and 
supporting Cicero instead288. The views of Hegel and Oliveira Martins on Rome shared some important 
features, especially in their support of the people’s party, represented by the Gracchus who Hegel 
holds as having “the higher sanction of the World-Spirit”289. Oliveira Martins also considers the 
Gracchus as those who have opened “the new wave of socialist revolutions in Rome”290. 
The main difference between Hegel and Oliveira Martins in this respect is the more 
conservative and prudent view of the plebeians on the part of Oliveira Martins, which he considers as 
those who had “lower instincts” and could not really win in their struggle against the patricians because 
“to win and to rule is impossible for those who know only how to rebel and revenge themselves”291. 
While allying themselves with different tyrants, they break the old distinctions but create new ones. 
The social problems remain until the need for a stronger figure arises, who would be capable of 
instituting authority and advance the cause of liberty, which is then put on the hands of Caesar. In 
                                                          
285 “Se em Herculano tivemos o doutor do liberalismo individualista, vamos agora ver em Oliveira Martins, o 
teórico do cesarismo, como a única solução possível ao caos da sociedade portuguesa” idem, ibidem, p.124 
286 See idem, ibidem, p.124. 
287 “Tal preocupação não é menos vísivel em Oliveira: é mesmo essa tendência a que primeiro nos aparece 
esboçada nas obras da sua mocidade. O primeiro livro que publica é um romance histórico sobre um episódio 
da <<perda da nossa autonomia em 1580>> com o título – Febo Moniz ou o último dos portugueses” idem, 
ibidem, p.128. 
288 See idem, ibidem, p.152. 
289 See G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, preface by Charles Hegel, Introduction by the translator J. 
Sibree, introduction to Dover Edition by C.J. Friedrich, Dover Publications inc, New York, 1956[reprint 2004], 
p.310. / ”hat die höhere Berechtigung des Weltgeistes” G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der 
Geschichte, Werke, vol. 12, op. cit. p.377. 
290 “a nova era das revoluções socialistas de Roma” J.P. Oliveira Martins, História da República Romana, op. cit. 
p.429. 
291 “Vencer e mandar é impossível a quem somente sabe insurgir-se e vingar-se” J.P. Oliveira Martins, História 
da República Romana, op. cit. p.413. 
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Hegel the focus is on the struggle of the plebeians for equality rather than this aspect set forward by 
Oliveira Martins, sharing however with Oliveira Martins the praise of Caesar who “judged by the great 
scope of history, did the Right, since he furnished a mediating element, and that kind of political bond 
which men’s conditions required”292 
 The reestablishment of authority grounded on democratic objectives is one of the arguments 
supporting Caesar’s power struggle. In Hegel we have an identical condemnation of the republic, 
where decisions lie on the sphere of private authority instead of popular authority293. This appeal for 
stability and security had a very clear audience in Oliveira Martins, as the sense of order was something 
praised above all by the middle class. 
 The second aspect that should be emphasized and which refers directly to his political activities 
is how Oliveira Martins is not merely a political theorist. He also speaks in a familiar tone to those who 
want to reform society, which with its basis on morality resembles the work of a preacher who tries to 
convince the other to join his creed on the grounds of his superior spiritual or moral percepts. The 
social problems occupy the center of his political theory, where such a social preaching is the closest 
we can find of a unity between his theory with practice. 
 The reform he preconizes has a more ready acceptance among the small bourgeoisie and this 
is also the case in Proudhon as he rightly notes: 
“Only in the field, illuminated with the almost defined perception of reality, Proudhon, the 
political prophet, preached reform since 1840; it was the small bourgeoisie to whom he spoke”294 
  Being such a prolific writer as Oliveira Martins was meant that he had a public. He, more than 
anyone, had a preoccupation over his readership, with very practical questions about those who could 
read him and their level of instruction295. The educated bourgeoisie sections of society were his 
                                                          
292 See G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of History, (Dover Edition), op. cit. p.312. / “Cäser hat weltgeschichtlich das 
Rechte getan, indem er die Vermittlung und die Art und Weise das Zusammenhalts, der notwendig war, 
hervorbrachte.” G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, vol.12, op. cit. p.379. 
293 “We see, especially from Cicero’s writings, how all public affairs were decided by the private authority of the 
more eminent citizens —by their power, their wealth; and what tumultuary proceedings marked all political 
transactions. In the republic, therefore, there was no longer any security; that could be looked for only in a 
single will.” idem, ibidem, p.379. / “Besonders aus Ciceros Schriften kommt man zu dieser Anschauung, wie alle 
öffentlichen Angelegenheiten durch die Privatautorität der Vornehmen, dur ihre Macht, ihren Reichtum 
entschieden wurden, wie alles tumultuarisch geschehen ist. In der Republik war somit kein Halt mehr, welcher 
nur noch im Willen eines einzigen Individuums konnte gefunden werden.” idem, ibidem, p.379. 
294 “Só em campo, iluminado com uma percepção quase definida da realidade, Proudhon, o profeta político, 
desde 1840 que pregava a Reforma; era à pequena burguesia a quem se dirigia” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Portugal 
e o Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo, op. cit. 
p.97. 
295 This is one of the reasons he starts his project Biblioteca das Ciências Sociais in order to raise the level of 
knowledge of his countrymen, or in other words, of his readers. 
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audience, as Augusto Santos Silva rightly notices, which besides the extract of Portugal e o sociaismo 
he quotes296, it is also clear in other multiple parts of this book that when he speaks directly to the 
public, he is in fact speaking to the middle classes297. 
 When the socialism of state gains acceptance then these sections of society by themselves 
were not enough for a government, even though he believed the initiation of ever more inclusive 
classes in the political process was a democratic demand. The men of state are then needed to educate 
them on the affairs of the state: 
 “Therefore in this and other cases it is to be seen that the voices of those interested are not 
enough to form the thought of government. The statesman is obliged to know more, to see better. 
More than once the industrialist does not know what he wants, and many more times what he should 
want, if as such the task of the government is protection – protection in general and I mean not the 
boogieman of customs – the obligation of the statesman is to teach, clarify, support, direct.”298 
                                                          
296 “When he summons directly the reader in Portgal e o socialismo (<<What dod I propose you?>>), it is the 
proprietor, the merchant, the industrial who is questioned, the have the function of narratee” / “Quando no 
Portugal e o socialismo interpela directamente o leitor (<<Que te proponho?>>), são o proprietário, o 
comerciante, o industrial, quem é interrogado, são eles que desempenham a função de narratário” Augusto 
Santos Silva, op. cit. p.72. 
297 “It cannot be the predominance of the manufactering classes, but the fertile concourse, of the workers and 
the peasents with the small bourgeoisie, shopkeepers, land growers, land renters, small agricultar owners, 
industrialists [also] with the cientific workers, doctors, law-makers, economists, matematics, architects, 
engineers, publicists, etc.” ” / “Não pode ser o predomínio das classes fabris, mas sim o concurso fértil, dos 
operários e dos camponeses com a pequena burguesia, logistas, foreiros, rendeiros, pequenos proprietários 
agrícolas, industriais, com os operários da ciência, médicos, legistas, economistas, matemáticos, arquitectos, 
engenheiros, publicistas, etc.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Portugal e o Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade 
Portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo, op. cit. p.101. 
“The individual propriety of land, however, is only compatible with a system that, mobilizing it, divids it in the 
maximal number of parcels, up to the ideal point by which each family (semi-propertied, semi-bourgeoisie) 
possess its share” / “A propriedade individual da terra, porém, só é compatível com um sistema que, 
mobilizando-a, a divida no máximo número de parcelas, até o ponto ideal de cada familia (semiproprietária, 
semiburguesa) possuir o seu quinhão.” idem, ibidem, pp.227. 
“So here is what I proposed to you propertied reader, [actually] what socialism proposes. If you accept it then 
the cause of progress will be won in the 19th century. If you reject it, if you oppose it, if you fight it, then 
tremble with the fearful insurrection of the hungry demagogy, tremble with confusion and ruin; think well what 
is most worth it, wether the sacrifice of some egotistic enjoyments that after all have no other use than to 
corrupt and sterilize you[bourgeoisie]! Or the retrocess of some centuries, the destruction of the great drama 
in which you were a glorious actor, and which fills modern history from the 9th century upon until the the 18th 
century.  ” / “Eis ai, leitor proprietário, o que o socialismo te prorõe. Se o aceitares a causa do progresso estará 
ganha no século XIX. Se o rejeitares, se te oposeres a ele, se o combateres, treme da insurreição temível da 
demagogia faminta, treme da confusão, da ruína; pensa bem qual valerá mais, se o sacrifício de uns gozos 
egoistas que afinal não servem mais do que para corromper-te esterlizar-te, burguesia! Ou um retrocesso de 
alguns séculos, a destruição do grande drama em que foste glorioso actor, e que enche a história moderna 
desde o século XII até o século XVIII.” idem, ibidem, pp.235-236. 
298 “Ora neste e noutros casos se vê como as vozes dos interesados não bastam para formar um pensamento 
de governo. O estadista é obrigado a saber mais, a vêr melhor. Mais de um vez o industrial não sabe o que 
quer, e muitas mais o que deve querer, ora se o papel do governo é protecção – proteçcão em geral e não 
agora o papão famoso das alfândegas – a obrigação do estadista é ensinar, esclarecer, amparar, dirigir.” J.P. 
Oliveira Martins, Política e Economia Nacional, op. cit. p.114. 
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 This conclusion is essentially picked up from the thought of the numerous theorists of state 
socialism he cites in the third chapter of the first part of his Economia e Política Nacional. The praise 
of Germany is then evident, but he does various revisions over the years, as it was noticed before, 
when he warns us that German ideas coming to us through French culture are “distorted”299. The 
enthusiasm for the French solutions, as coming from Proudhon, tends to fade away and Germany 
becomes so to say the great spiritual guide of humanity.  
He has a notion that German philosophy, and in our case the philosophy of Hegel, may have 
been suffering from this passage through France. In practice, the critiques of Hegel in France, besides 
the element of national rivalries, exist mainly due to a considerable number of implications the liberals 
could not accept. The liberal saw certain prerogatives in Hegel, which could be said to be progressive, 
as an interference of the state with individual liberty300. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
299 See page 59 of the present work. 
300 See Domenico Losurdo, Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns, translated from the Italian by Marela and 
Jon Morris, Duke University Press, London, 2004, pp.78-83. 
105 
 
3.3 The political program for Portugal 
 With the previous theoretical fundaments as presuppositions, Oliveira Martins will elaborate 
a political program for Portugal. This undertaking emanates from concerns over Portugal’s current 
social situation and democratic preoccupations for which he advocated improvements. Hegel also had 
identical political concerns about Germany and one could say, economically speaking, that the 
situation of Germany, at the start of the 19th century and of Portugal at the end of this same century, 
shared some similarities in its struggle for industrialization. But politically they had marked differences. 
The fragmentation of Germany was a problem that imposed itself on the political arena, making 
dialogue between various interlocutors a necessity. It is conceivable that the impositions of the new 
national realities which emerged in the modern world have led to the so called political realism which 
made the elites more willing to reform than those of Portugal.  
This will also become evident to Oliveira Martins who praises the German spirit of reform, an 
outcome which in a way he also envisaged for Portugal, but which is for him something unattainable 
for the “Latin race”, because this spirit of compromise is not in its temperament but rather one of 
radicalism. This is not the only reason, but it is one that refers to nature as an unavoidable problem, 
the sectarian or even fanatical positions unleash destructive powers and make revolution a necessity, 
while on the contrary “without [also] going out of tradition, Germanic Europe could solve its class 
problems and abolish the rests of feudalism”301. 
 The more direct object of our work is Hegel, however, in the political proposals of Oliveira 
Martins a nexus connecting them to Hegel is not completely devisable, everything in a way or another 
is always related, but some relations are more remote than others. This is the case here, Hegel will 
resonate on a theoretical level, but this is not always true in more practical terms and the reasons for 
that are understandable. The conditions of Germany and the historical period which Hegel lived in are 
different from the ones of Portugal, where parliamentary political institutions according to Anglo-
Saxon models were in place302, along with other specific problems pertaining to Portugal such as its 
debt crisis, regional differentiations peculiar to the country, besides its colonial territories make it a 
                                                          
301 “sem também sair da tradição, a Europa Germânica pôde resolver as questões de classe e abolir os restos do 
feudalismo” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Portugal Contemporâneo, reimpressão 9th ed., vol. 1,  Guimarães Editores, 
Lisboa, 1986, p.369. 
302 “A vice of the contemporary moral evolution of the latin peoples, combined with a system of interests 
created by the industry and modern commerce, produced an anglomania that has politically been called 
parliamentary monarchy and economically free-trade” / “Um vício da evolução moral contemporânea dos 
povos latinos, combinado com um sistema de interesses criado pela indústria e pelo comércio modernos, 
produziu a anglomania, que politicamente se foi chamando monarquia parlamentar e economicamente livre-
câmbio.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Socialismo e democracia, Política e História, vol. 1, Guimarães editores, Lisboa, 
1957, p.184. 
106 
 
particular case. Besides, the echoes of the French revolution still chimed high on German soil, whereas 
in Portugal the French invasions had different consequences and not such a lasting influence. 
The problems Oliveira Martins proposes to answer only secondarily relate to Hegel and 
Germany. This does not mean such an effort is entirely out of question, some parallels could still be 
drawn between Hegel and Oliveira Martins and more often than not, some of the issues raised by 
Oliveira Martins are of the same nature, but a more direct relation cannot be forced on the subject. 
Therefore, if we make a relation between both authors and their political discourses, it should be made 
with caution and should contextualize the ideas and historical moments those authors are integrated 
in.   
Oliveira Martins praises the German temperament and was interested in German political 
theorists (Bluntschli, Schäffle and other Katheder socialists) and as a result his political program 
contains many of the issues raised by them, in relation to the theory of state, which are in part heir to 
Hegel’s politico-juridical theory. In Oliveira Martins’s political program one should differentiate 
between practical measures in the sense of more immediate political outcomes and long term 
systematic reforms, which affect the political institutions as a whole.  
The second group of political reforms possesses more Hegelian undertones, with its 
preoccupations over the political evolution of Portugal towards liberalism and an increasingly 
individualist or atomistic conception of society. While in the first group of political measures he 
attempts to solve immediate problems, of which some are raised by the conception of society brought 
about by liberalism, with the overexposure of Portugal’s economy in the markets, worsening its chronic 
underdevelopment. These two types of political measures interpenetrate each other and are as such 
difficult to separate. However a differentiation helps our exposition and its comprehensive efforts. 
We can find the aggregate of Oliveira Martins’s political proposals for Portugal, as part of the 
first group of political reforms, in the bill he submits to the parliament in 1887. They are mainly 
economic and administrative reforms focused on agriculture and the social constitution of the 
countryside of Portugal. Although in his earlier books on socialism industry occupies a greater part of 
his concerns, here he seems to make notice of the fact that industry is still incipient and focuses on 
other structural and historical problems. The debate around Portugal’s industry was very much alive, 
running side by side with the question of the essential nature of Portuguese economy, which Oliveira 
Martins answers in the following terms in 1888: 
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“It has been said for a long time and has become a dogma that we are essentially an agricultural 
country. Admirable discovery when wheat cannot be cultivated and soon there will be no destiny for 
wine! There are no essentially countries of anything. Every nation is essentially everything.”303 
In his 1885 book Economia e Política Nacional Oliveira Martins deals with the Portuguese 
industry at length, but we can already notice in this book that the focus is more on the establishment 
of an industry and the failure of the Portuguese industry to develop rather than the present situation. 
Industry is not exclusive to modernity, according to him Portugal had its industry in the past, but it was 
destroyed by the “crimes” of liberalism304. Therefore, it is now necessary to reconstitute this 
industry305. The productive forces of Portugal have been crushed with agriculture as the “only 
exception” left out of this frenzy, but certainly also walks in this same direction306. It is as if he is trying 
to say that industrial development and agriculture are actually related in how each of them can be 
stimulated or hindered, the idea that industry “is an exotic plant” and that the protectionism of the 
state is too great of a price to be paid by the consumers is opposed by Oliveira Martins307. For him the 
productive forces of a country are solidary to one another.  
The lack of industrial enterprises is something which has not so much to do with industry itself 
but is a result of wider political decisions. Industry is subsidiary to agriculture and artisanship, 
therefore, if we let “the people economize, let them live, have them protected by the state like it 
protects the institutions of capitalism, and we will see multiplying the examples of the North of England 
industrial and coal Company, where the different cooperative societies are great share-holders”308. 
The industry that Portugal lacks is then something that develops out of agriculture and small 
                                                          
303 “Disse-se muito tempo e passou como dogma que eramos um pais essencialmente agrícola. Admirável 
descoberta quando se não pode cultivar trigo e dentro em pouco se não há-de saber que destino dar ao vinho! 
Não há paises essencialmente coisa nenhuma. Todas as nações são essencialmente tudo” J.P. Oliveira Martins, 
O Repórter, vol. 1, op. cit. p.175. 
304 “I understand also that portuguese liberalism is the accused of the crime of having abanoned all the 
historical portuguese industries to a miserable fate” / “entendo também que o liberalismo português é o reu 
do crime de ter abandonado a uma sorte miserável todas as industrias históricas portuguesas” J.P. Oliveira 
Martins, Política e Economia Nacional, op. cit. p.121. 
305 See idem, ibidem p.124. 
306 See idem, ibidem, p.17. 
307 “In our respect, it is said that we are essencially an agricultural [land], that we have no raw materials, no 
coal, no iron; that industry therefore is an exoctic plant among us, only susceptibel of aclimatation at the cost 
great sacrificies for the consumer” / “A nosso respeito, dizem que somos essencialmente agrícolas, que não 
temos matéria-prima, nem carvão, nem ferro; que a indústria portanto é uma planta exótica entre nós, apenas 
susceptível de aclimatação á custa de sacrifícios graves do consumidor” idem, ibidem, p.115 
308 “o povo economizar - permita-se-lhe viver, proteja-o o Estado como faz ás instituições do capitalismo, e 
veremos multiplicarem-se exemplos como o da North of England industrial and coal company, onde differentes 
sociedades cooperativas são grandes accionistas” idem, ibidem, p.100. 
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workshops - or should have developed – and this requires stimulation and protection instead of looking 
for massive enterprises and factories309. 
Already in 1881 when Oliveira Martins took part in an industrial inquiry sponsored by the 
government, this fact had become clear to him. The schism with Rodrigues de Freitas about what 
direction Portuguese industrial development should take, began shortly after and is related to Oliveira 
Martins’s conclusions with Rodrigues de Freitas against an excessive protectionism. Both Oliveira 
Martins and Rodrigues de Freitas are critical of the restrictive view of an agricultural Portugal, but at 
the same time they cannot help recognizing that agriculture still plays the major role in economy310. 
The difference between them is that Oliveira Martins tends to speak of the dehumanization of industry 
in detriment of the more artistic work of the artisan, or even the small industries where a more familiar 
environment is possible311. In terms of agriculture, Oliveira Martins is of the opinion that Portugal could 
only be said to be a modern nation when its agriculture becomes industrialized312, although a long 
development march should still be carried, especially in social terms, with the redistribution and 
organization of land. 
This is the case with the landed interests of great dimensions of the southern estates, leaving 
the region’s agricultural potential undeveloped with a substantial extension of land left unproductive, 
besides the impossibility of fixing people which leads to the desertification of these regions. 
We find those proposals in a bill submitted to parliament labeled “rural development bill”, 
which besides the projected legislation also contains a previous explanation due to the complexities of 
the proposed legislation. Oliveira Martins will later publish this same explanation and legislative 
proposals. The main proposal, even if not the most extensive, is the reuse of land that is uncultivated 
due to various factors, the most controversial would be the temporary expropriation of land declared 
as unproductive and where the land owner refused to work on his land313. The most original proposal 
                                                          
309 “How diferente would it be, if they, [this] professor doctors, [instead of having decided] from the top of 
their chairs that industry is big factories, that small industries are condemned, without remembering 
themselves that big factories are born out of small workshops and that more than one colossal metallurgy of 
today was the shop of the blacksmith of yesterday.” / “Como seria, porém, de outro modo, se eles, os 
professores doutorados, resolveram do alto das suas cadeiras que industria são grandes fabricas, que as 
pequenas indústrias estão condenadas; sem se lembrarem que as grandes fábricas nascem das pequenas 
oficinas e que mais de uma metalurgia colossal de hoje era ontem uma loja de ferreiro.” idem, ibidem, p.111. 
310 See Manuel Ferreira Rodrigues, “Rodrigues de Freitas e a Industria. Um confronto com Oliveira Martins” in 
Rodrigues de Freitas – A Obra e os Contextos. Actas de colóquio, CLC-FLUP, Porto, 1997, pp.67-68. 
311 See José M. Amado Mendes, “Oliveira Martins e a indústria” in Estudos Aveirenses, n°4, ISCIA, Aveiro, 1995, 
pp.26-28. 
312 “A nation does not deserve economically such a name[of developed nation], until it has not gotten out of an 
exclusive agricultural period to an industrial period” / “uma nação não merece económicamente tal nome, 
enquanto não consegue sair do período exclusivamente agrícola para o agrícola indústrial” J.P. Oliveira Martins, 
A província, vol. 2, op. cit. p.56. 
313 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Fomento Rural e Emigração, Guimarães Editores, Lisboa, 1994, p.106. 
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would probably be the internal colonization of this unproductive land by settlers, who could then make 
it productive, drafting laws for the organization of this emigration in terms of benefits given by the 
state, sanitation and distribution of water.  
The Portuguese emigration is probably one of his main concerns when he proposes this bill. In 
1885 Oliveira Martins had already written about this draining of “human cattle” fleeing abroad to Brazil 
and other countries in search of better opportunities314, and he will further expose this issue in a series 
of articles in the Jornal do Comércio newspaper315. The possibility of this migration to depopulated 
areas of Portugal had already been advanced by Severim de Faria in the 17th century and in the 
following century by Álvares da Silva, which Oliveira Martins pays tribute to in his more systematic 
proposal in that direction316. 
The first proposed legislative measure of this bill is actually the creation of a rural bank, 
bringing the centrality he attributes to credit in the development of socialism also to the development 
of rural life. Oliveira Martins had already studied the bank institutions of various countries in the late 
1870s when he proposed the reorganization of the bank of Portugal in order to adopt the modern 
financial operations. The potentialities of credit should be reinforced as a means to redistribute the 
riches and credit is “this flower that has ripen from the tree of wealth, this last and incomparable 
invention of men”317. But the distributive function can act inversely and deepen inequalities. The banks 
and their operations should then be regulated by the government and this is what he attempts here 
with the creation of this rural bank. 
The bill contains also various other measures which constitute the greater part of it, such as 
the watering systems and irrigation methods, bridges and navigation channels, regulations regarding 
fish ponds, the reforestation and conservation of designated areas, forest patrolling and legislation on 
hunting and fishing activities, and finally the indivisibility of land. This last proposal is also a relevant 
piece of legislation because for Oliveira Martins the causes for emigration are also related to the 
excessive division of land in the northern regions of Portugal, in which “the large estates are nefarious 
for the rural economy of a country, the excessive division and even more the fragmentation of strips 
of land belonging to the same owner, have become an equal evil”. Making this land less able to provide 
                                                          
314 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Política e Economia Nacional, op. cit. pp.160-176. 
315 See for instance J.P. Oliveira Martins, O jornal, op. cit. p.189. 
See also Sergio Campos Matos introduction to a series of articles where these problems are dealt with by 
Oliveira Martins: Sérgio Campos Matos, Portugal e o Brasil, Introdução e notas de Sérgio Campos Matos, 
fixação de texto de Bruno Eiras e Sérgio Campos Matos, Maia, 2005, pp.29-32. 
316 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Fomento Rural e Emigração, op. cit. p.39-40. 
317 “essa flor da árvore da riqueza desabrochada, essa última e incomparável invenção dos homens” J.P. 
Oliveira, Martins, Regime das Riquezas (elementos de crematística), op. cit. p.208. 
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dividends to its owners and the legislation in cause attempts to correct this problem by identifying the 
cases in which this land distribution is in conflict with the “social and economic utility”318. 
Oliveira Martins endeavors to bring about freedom detached from particular interests and 
although he is critical of an aristocratic dominance, he still trusts the universal aspect that is to be 
brought about by an highness of spirit, a patrician mindset that is able to raise against its own limits 
and class interests. Propriety as an element of freedom is to be enjoyed by everyone without 
distinction. Hegel also makes this freedom for everyone object of his meditations. Focusing on the 
religious aspect, Hegel speaks of the past state of Christendom: 
“divided into two classes, one which had appropriated the rights and administration of that 
freedom which was conferred on us all by Christ, while the other, reduced to servitude, was the 
property of [those who enjoyed] this same freedom”319.  
Although this struggle had a religious aspect, Hegel is quite clear in recognizing that it also had 
other fundaments, it was also a political and a class struggle where the basic issues still remain. The 
princes gave the ideological-religious freedom the people fought for, but the political dominance and 
the oppression at their hands remained, the political-economic freedom still lagged behind. Engels will 
also furnish a similar interpretation of these religious wars of the Middle Ages, suggesting that vested 
in religion, late Middle Ages is a period of intense class struggle320. The economic undertones of this 
religious revolt are also noticed by Oliveira Martins, who says they acquired this religious character 
because revolution “found society in the religious period”321. 
The bill proposed in parliament was cautious and the prospect of changes had a fundament on 
the national interest even if it had some democratic overtones. It was not a radical or a class based 
reform, but it was still a failure:  
                                                          
318 “the latifundia are nefarious to the rural economy of a country, the excessive division of land [however] and 
maybe even more the fragmentation of land pieces of the same owner, are an equal evil” … “social and 
economical utility” / “os latifúndios são nefastos para a economia rural de um país, a excessiva divisão e mais 
ainda talvez a fragmentação das courelas de um mesmo dono, se tornam um mal igualmente grave” … 
“utilidade  social e económica” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Fomento Rural e Emigração, op. cit. p.54 et 62. 
319 See G.W.F. Hegel, Political Writings, op. cit. p.187. 
320 “Even the so-called religious wars of the sixteenth century mainly concerned very positive material class 
interests; those wars were class wars, too, just as the later collisions in England and France” Marx and Engels 
Collected works, The Peasant War in Germany, vol. 10, op. cit. p.412. / “Auch in den sogenannten 
Religionskriegen des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts handelt es sich vor allem um sehr positive materielle 
Kalsseninteressen, und diese Kriege waren Klassenkämpfen, ebensogut wie die späteren inneren Kollisionen in 
England und Frankreich“ Karl Marx und Frederich Engels Werke, Der deutsche Bauernkrieg, vol. 7, op. cit. p.343. 
321 “encontrou a sociedade no período religioso” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Portugal e o Socialismo: exame 
constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo, op. cit. p.102. 
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“The chamber of deputies buried the project in the pages of “Diário da Corte” and… moved 
on”322 
The reforms collided with powerful interests that were against such a political direction. The 
political system and the parties facilitated the continued dominance of these elites, together with 
some sense of independence of spirit which isolated him, as well as a culture of meritocracy Oliveira 
Martins defended, that may not be completely capable of attesting the complexities of society and 
what this merit amounts to. In any case these tendencies led him to move away from democracy, 
doubting the possibilities of an inclusive political culture, as in the 1891 republican revolt in Porto 
where he accuses the implicated of anarchic and selfish self-interest and proposes the youth a third 
way of solving the Portuguese problems323. One that respects the “free institutions”, requiring the 
redemption of our mistakes through what is already in place, although the means to achieve this seem 
to come less and less from the elective and democratic institutions but rather from other forces 
capable of countering the vested interests. 
Since at least the beginning of 1880s the monarch as a possible counter-balance power is 
sketched out in his Portugal Contemporâneo. The monarchy could advance the democratic cause as it 
had historically done324. Tyrannies can “both exist in absolutism or in democracy, either in 
representative or arbitrary regimes”325 and for this reason the system of government was not vest with 
much importance. His understanding of democracy was based on his organic understanding of society 
rather than individual liberties. The monarchy as a force of moderation was also recognized by Hegel 
in his commentary On the English reform bill where the weak monarchy there in place “lacks the power 
which, in other states, has facilitated the transition, without convulsions, violence, and robbery, from 
earlier legislation based solely on positive right to one based on principles of real freedom”326.  
It is true that Hegel defends a hereditary constitutional monarchy in his Philosophy of Right, 
but the fundament is based on the historical development of Europe’s political institutions, which 
                                                          
322 “A câmara sepultou o projecto nas páginas do “Diário das Cortes” e passou adiante” Joel Serrão, <<Martins, 
Joaquim Pedro de Oliveira>>, Dicionário de História de Portugal, dir. Joel Serrão, vol. 2, Iniciativas Editoriais, 
Lisboa, 1965, p.963. 
323 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Fomento Rural e Emigração, op. cit. p.227. 
324 “In no part became the state so much of a defined thing as in old Rome and the modern latin monarchies 
created in its image, less corrupt with aristocratic ideas; and also nowhere else had, the state, republic, empire 
or monarchy, such a democratic character” / “Em parte nenhuma o Estado chegou a ser uma coisa mais 
definida do que na velha Roma e nas modernas monarquias latinas criadas à sua imagem, pouco eivadas de 
ideias aristocráticas; e em parte alguma, também, o estado, república, império ou monarquia, teve um carácter 
mais democrático.“ J.P. Oliveira Martins, Portugal Contemporâneo, vol. 2, op. cit. p.369. 
325 “A tirania, pois, que tanto pode existir nos absolutismos como nas democracias, tanto nos regimes 
representativos comos nos arbitrários” idem, ibidem, p.178. 
326 See G.W.F. Hegel, Political Writings, op. cit. p.269. 
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should be read in light of the conditions Germany was to be found327, not only based on the moderation 
argument but also on his perspective of profound reforms which run counter to particular interests. In 
his understanding such reforms are more efficient and less troublesome when they come from the 
centers of power. Efficient because a fully developed constitution does not depend on the monarch’s 
personal qualities and only a monarchy based on a rational system of institutions is capable of 
maintaining its independence, while elective systems, either republican or monarchical, are generally 
dependent on the support of powerful individual interests, it is the aristocracy who truly rules in such 
a system of government328.  
That is the case in England where the barons were the true historical power behind monarchy 
and where a political gentry formed itself around these particular interests. It is also more efficient 
because it changes the institutions rather than engaging in superficial and ideological cosmetics. It is 
finally less troublesome because it allows the peaceful transition from particular to universal interests, 
without revolution. This is his concern over England’s reform bill where radicals could endanger the 
system by looking for support in the people and inaugurate a revolution rather than a reform. 
Whether this would be a good or bad outcome is not so straight forward in Hegel as he is very 
critical of the English political system, but based on his support of the French Revolution, it seems it 
depends on the outcome such a revolution would bring about. It depends on whether the people 
would side with particular or general interests, but he seems to be sceptic about the people’s 
discernment and the political culture of this new class reaching power, he thus leaves this English 
precedent as “dangerous”.  
In his Lectures on Philosophy of History Hegel had already presented the king as a better 
candidate for the advancement of general freedom, as he had done in the past and still in the 
present329. In this way, it would be legitimate to suppose that he is more inclined towards this solution 
as safer than the one that was underway in England, which amounted to risks. However it also does 
not seem the king could gain the power to reform the aristocratic character of England’s political 
system. Hegel is not against revolution, as some reading may claim, but rather against fruitless efforts 
that fail to produce fundamental changes and tackle problems concretely. He favours prudent and 
                                                          
327 See on this subject Bernand Yack’s argument against the deduction of constitutional monarchy from some 
sort of logical principles, arguing rather that constitutional monarchy’s rational fundament was to be found 
historically. Bernard Yack, “The Rationality of Hegel's Concept of Monarchy” in The American Political Science 
Review, vol. 74, No. 3, 1980, pp.711-712. 
328 See in this respect Domenico Losurdo’s book: Freedom of the moderns, op. cit. pp.113-116. 
329 “So verdankt das Volk überall, auch in neueren Zeiten, dem Könige die Befreiung von der Unterdrückung der 
Aristokraten. In England besteht Aristokratie, weil die königliche Macht unbedeutend ist.“ G.W.F. Hegel, 
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 8-2, Auf Grund des aufbehaltenen 
handschriftchen Materials neu herausgegeben von Georg Lasson, Verlag von Felix Meiner, Leipzig, 1919, p.696.  
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slow reforms but does not deny the role of revolutions when they become necessary. Conservative 
traces attributed to Hegel should be searched elsewhere and Engels will indeed say: 
“Hegel himself, despite the fairly frequent outbursts of revolutionary wrath in his works, 
seemed on the whole to be more inclined to the conservative side”330 
This conservative side of Hegel which Engels speaks of is then an inclination, not something 
definitive. The closer appeal for reform rather than a more striking and active social engagement 
explains such a judgment on Hegel, besides of course his respect for institutions and on a whole 
acceptance of some of liberalism tenets of private property, even if possessing some notion of a 
collective well-being. 
As for Oliveira Martins, he will be most vocal in his support for a dictatorship in the second 
edition of Portugal Contemporâneo(1883), which with the political system in place would also entail 
the strengthening of the monarchy (under a new monarch) to support such a government. He 
encourages the making of “this ultimate experiment”331, later (particularly when a new monarch comes 
in power) running closer to the king and, according to some, proposes the aggrandizement of the king. 
He shares the conviction with Hegel that parlamentarism is dominated by an aristocracy, 
especially in relation to England and the earlier Roman senate332. When representation of the people 
becomes democratic then the parliament also becomes the center of this plebeian struggle between 
particular interests, which at first were outside of it. But because per essence “parliamentarism is 
aristocratic” the resulting government will evolve towards something diverse, that is, towards 
Caesarism333.  
The critique of bourgeois civil society in Hegel also implies the notion of particular interests or 
contradictory interests, still possessing the arbitrariness of the state of nature334. By dragging these 
                                                          
330 See Marx and Engels collected works, Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of classical German Philosophy, vol. 26, 
op. cit. p.363. / “Hegel selbst schien, trotz der ziemlich häufigen revolutionären Zornesausbrüche in seinen 
Werken, im ganzen mehr zu konservativen Seite zu niegen” Karl Marx und Frederich Engels Werke, Ludwig 
Feuerbach und der Ausgang der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie, vol. 21, op. cit. p.271. 
331 “Faça-se pois essa derradeira experiência“ J.P. Oliveira Martins, Portugal Contemporâneo, vol. 1, op. cit. 
p.21. 
332 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Crítica do parlamentarismo, Dispersos, op. cit. pp.70-72. 
333 “The parilamentarism is aristocratic. In so far as the representation of a people democratizes itself, the 
parilamentarism will be sucessed by a diverse type of government, the kind of which The United States and 
Germany propose as two species of rudiments” / “O Parlamentarismo é aristocrático. Desde que a 
representação de um povo se democratiza, ao parlamentarismo há-de suceder um tipo diverso de governo, 
tipo de que os Estados-unidos e a Alemanha propõem duas espécias de rudimentos.” idem, ibidem, p.72. 
334 See G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, op. cit. p.130. / Dem in der Idee enthaltenen objektiven Rechte der 
Besonderheit des Geistes, welches die von der Natur - dem Elemente der Ungleichheit - gesetzte Ungleichheit 
der Menschen in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft nicht nur nicht aufhebt, sondern aus dem Geiste produziert, sie 
zu einer Ungleichheit der Geschicklichkeit, des Vermögens und selbst der intellektuellen und moralischen 
Bildung erhebt, die Forderung der Gleichheit entgegen [zu] setzen, gehört dem leeren Verstände an, der dies 
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contradictions into the political institutions the bourgeois civil society “stands opposed to the Idea of 
ethical life”335. In Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, the civil society still has some representation in the 
legislative bodies, although not in its atomistic form336. The bourgeois civil society relation with the 
state is, however, on a whole critical, as for instance when he speaks of the sacrifice of particular 
interests to the sovereignty of the state: 
“An entirely distorted account of the demand for this sacrifice results from regarding the state 
as a mere civil society and from regarding its final end as only the security of individual life and 
property. This security cannot possibly be obtained by the sacrifice of what is to be secured.”337 
These long-term reforms proposed by Oliveira Martins are those which do not relate to 
particular rights or laws but to the institutions. We have seen that from the early social-economic 
theories he moves in the direction of a theory of the state in which the state takes part and organizes 
the social and economic elements. The organic political representation he envisages and the class 
instead of individual representation, were similar to the idea of corporate organization of estates 
[Stände] in Hegel. 
The tendency, however, is to move to more conservative positions similar to that of Lassale’s 
socialism. The modern sense of classes is something accepted by Hegel and he does not con-fuse them 
with estates which were merged together with the classes in earlier times338. Oliveira Martins on the 
contrary oscillates to the later version where the elimination of these estates is the root cause of 
modern problems339. He does not defend a return to these old social-political form but rather puts 
himself in a middle-point where “some flatter themselves for the return of old banquets, others defend 
                                                          
sein Abstraktum und sein Sollen für das Reelle und Vernünftige nimmt. G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der 
Philosophie des Rechts, Werke, vol. 7, op. cit. p.354. 
335 See idem, ibidem, p.186. / “Diese Ansicht” ... “geht von”...“einer Bestimmung [aus], die, wie längst 
betrachtet worden, in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft als erste gilt oder vielmehr sich nur geltend machen will, 
aber weder das Prinzip der Familie, noch weniger des Staats ist, überhaupt der Idee der Sittlichkeit 
entgegensteht.“ Idem, ibidem, p.453. 
336 See “This is all the more the case since the Idea of the state is precisely the supersession of the clash 
between right (i.e. empty abstract freedom) and welfare (i.e. the particular content which fills that void), and it 
is when states become concrete wholes that they first attain recognition.” idem, ibidem, p.214. / die Idee des 
Staats eben dies ist, daß in ihr der Gegensatz von dem Rechte als abstrakter Freiheit und vom erfüllenden 
besonderen Inhalte, dem Wohl, aufgehoben sei und die erste Anerkennung der Staaten (§ 331) auf sie als 
konkrete Ganze geht. idem, ibidem, p.50.1 
337 See idem, ibidem, p.209. / “Es gibt eine sehr schiefe Berechnung, wenn bei der Forderung dieser 
Aufopferung der Staat nur als bürgerliche Gesellschaft und als sein Endzweck nur die Sicherung des Lebens und 
Eigentums der Individuen betrachtet wird; denn diese Sicherheit wird nicht durch die Aufopferung dessen 
erreicht, was gesichert werden soll“ idem, ibidem, p.492 
338 See idem, ibidem, p.198. / idem, ibidem, p.474. 
339 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, As Eleições, Política e História, vol. 1, op. cit. pp.300-301. 
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the current debauchery even others expect future parties” … “what must be done? Renegade them 
all”340. 
That was what he wrote in his Eleições of 1878, but still on this same booklet he preconizes a 
partial recovery of the past: 
“Let’s hear, respect, and learn from the men of the past”341 
But again as mentioned earlier this has a counter-balance: 
“The old institutions will not come back because they are old: their forms can be reestablished, 
the spirit, however, will be diverse”342 
It is clear that Oliveira Martins had given up on revolution (even if reformist), but aligning 
himself with the conservative interests? This seems to be moving further away from the popular and 
democratic interests he had defended, or does it? In fact he thinks the poorer popular extracts are 
more naturally aligned with the conservatives and warns them against the dangers they pose343. From 
such a reading this would then imply an approximation to those popular sections. 
From this transition text As Eleições, we can already find the relation between the king and the 
people and a critique of those who preconize “a king which is not a king”344. The more open support 
for the king would only come in the 1889 with the new monarch. His conviction of the inability of the 
popular poor extracts of society to make a good government is expanded to the middle classes which 
he had earlier praised as the paladins of order and gradual reforms345. Although he initially criticizes 
aristocratic oriented governments (in line with Hegel), the plebeian values always excite a stronger 
despise. 
                                                          
340 “uns suspiram pela volta dos antigos banquetes, outros defendem as bambochatas actuais outros esperam 
Kermesses futuras” … “O que resta fazer ? Renegá-los a todos” idem, ibidem, p.299. 
341 “Ouçamos, respeitemos, e aprendamos com os homens do passado” idem, ibidem, p.300. 
342 “As antigas instituições não hão-de tornar por isso mesmo que são antigas: poderão restabelecer-lhes as 
formas, o espírito será outro e diverso.” idem, ibidem, p.300. 
343 “Remember this conservatives! If you arm against us the rural  plebeians, they will be ones on the next day 
who will desploy you, brutally,  animalistic, in order to raise upon the ruins of a society, the communism of 
primitive eras” / “Lembrai-vos disto, conservadores! Se armardes contra nós as plebes rurais, serão elas quem 
no dia seguinte ao da vitória vos espoliarão a vós, brutal, animalmente, para levantarem, sobre as ruínas de 
uma sociedade, o comunismo das eras primitivas” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Portugal e o Socialismo: exame 
constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo, op. cit. pp.90-91. 
344 “um rei que não é rei” idem, ibidem, p.297. 
345 “In all the latin countries that are artistic by temperament, the government of the middle class has been a 
fiasco. [The middle class] is less aesthetical susceptibel. Beauty [can only be found] either in the refinement 
obtained by selection and hereditary of the aristocracy, or in the manifestations of the simple people” / “Em 
todos os paises latinos que são artistas por temperamento, o governo da classe média fez fiasco. Ela é menos 
susceptível de estética. A beleza só encontra ou no requinte obtido por seleçcão e hereditariedade nas 
aristocracias, ou nas manifestações do povo simples.” Letter to Conde de Sabugosa, J.P. Oliveira Martins, 
Correspondência, op. cit. p.248. 
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As a result, the notion of a highness of spirit and moral socialism from his earlier texts moves 
closer to a more traditionalist view: 
“The heirs of the old heroic families are still the best of what Portugal has, for their pride, 
character and above all because of the sentiment inherited from portuguese history” … “we should 
appeal to the representatives of the aristocracy of race, that have a innate nobleness, a distinction and 
a moral superiority inaccessible to the bourgeoisie”346 
Although it should be noted that this apparent contradiction is still something inherited from 
his middle-class alignment where the tension between tradition and progress was already present. 
This later move should also be put in context with his political activity, where his reformist failures in 
the framework of parliamentary liberal democracy gave rise to ever growing pessimist views and a 
reading of Eduard von Hartmann, Schopenhauer or Nietzsche, where in these last two such aristocratic 
views come forward. These will also affect his theory of history and the historical narrative thematic 
as we will see in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
346 “Os herdeiros das velhas famílias heroicas são ainda o que Portugal tem de melhor, pelo brio, pelo carácter 
e sobretudo pelo sentimento herdado da vida histórica portuguesa” … “devíamos apelar para os 
representantes da aristocracia de raça, que têm uma nobreza ingénita, uma distinção e uma superioridade 
moral inacessíveis á burguesia” Letter to Conde de Sabugosa, J.P. Oliveira Martins, Correspondência, op. cit. 
p.247. 
117 
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4.1 The models in History 
The problem of models in history poses itself when we look at the different approaches and 
accommodations of history in various theories. This is particularly expressed in words such as: 
development, progress, revolution, tradition etc. These models can go under different headings, but 
what is common to them is that they are theoretical modalities and uses of history that look into the 
historicity of reality. Some of the models attempt to bridge what they understand is a gap between 
social and natural sciences, such as those of Carl Hempel covering model of explanation of history 
coming from the logical positivist/empiricist field. This issue was raised especially at the end of 
nineteenth century as an extension of the debate around the statute of the discipline of history and is 
closely related to Germany and the historicist models347. What would then be the mode by which 
Oliveira Martins viewed history? Did he also had a model? We are told by Fernando Catroga that with 
regards to this particular problem, Oliveira Martins denied history the complete quality of a science, 
history as a discipline is rather closer to art348. Sergio Campos Matos also touches upon this issue in his 
book Conscência Histórica e Nacionalismo when he looks at Oliveira Martins’s fiction - a genre he 
initially practiced - and history; drawing parallels between both349. 
The debate around history as art or science, however, is one that is more concerned with 
historiography. What is here proposed, however, is to look at history in the light of the consideration 
of history itself, not what its organization/compartmentalization is in thought, how it should be written 
or other methodological and literary considerations. In this respect, a simple example that touches 
upon this issue would be the common place ideas of history as: cyclical, prophetic, having world ages, 
linear, a living and decaying organism. Only then do we begin to speak of history as it unfolds and 
actually some of the views expressed by these words are present and even co-existent in different 
theoretical models, particular within that of Oliveira Martins.  
One of the critiques drawn to the notion of models is its schematics and aprioristic 
conceptions. Within this particularly Hegel will be critical of Kant’s rational apriorism and adopts an 
historical explanative mode or what comes to be the dialectical method350. But as we have seen earlier, 
Hegel is accused of this same theoretical dryness with his hypostatization of reason in ever present 
logical categories, synthetized in the well-known formula, albeit maybe not of Hegel’s own making, 
                                                          
347 See Beiser for a recent outlook on this topic. Frederick C. Beiser, The German historicist tradition, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, p.7-10.  
348 See Fernando Catroga, “A historiografia de Oliveira Martins: entre as artes e as ciencias” in Revista da 
Universidade de Coimbra, vol. 18, op. cit. p.399 et pp.404-410. 
349 See Sergio Campos Matos, Consciência historica e nacionalismo: Portugal, séculos XIX e XX, op. cit. pp.195-
214. 
350 See also Beiser who, although “cautious” about the dialectical method, shares this view, Frederick C. Beiser, 
The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1993, p.273. 
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that “what is rational is the real and what is real is the rational”351. This is the panlogist critique of a 
closed system with definitive logical categories and reality as readymade and emanating from this 
essential figure embodied in the domain of the logic or the syllogism which all reality is352. Besides this 
panlogistic critique, which it could be called the panlogism of the system, there are also other 
understandings of what Hegel’s panlogism consists of. Marx’s critique is a panlogism of impersonal 
reason, and the point is not whether or not everything is rational but if reason can subsist outside the 
“real” subject. In this panlogism, reason lends itself to humans and they become interpreters of reason 
in reality, or to be more rigorous, the philosopher does353.  
The panlogistic critique of Hegel should therefore be looked upon carefully or it should be even 
questioned whether such a consideration in this manner makes sense. It is not uncommon to simply 
take the logic of Hegel and attribute to it something which is not there when we are told that all that 
exists is the rational, or that existence is a mere deduction of logical categories. When Hegel speaks of 
reason in the world, he looks for a rational explanation of the world history, and this type of meditation 
is clearly out of the exclusive domain of logic. He attempts to have both the consideration of this history 
in terms of logic and in terms of its phenomenal appearance, conceptualizing historical or empirical 
data in logic categories. The forms by which reason or the idea reaches the world are: 
“The first and purest form distinctive to it through which the idea reveals itself is pure thought 
itself, and thus the idea is considered in terms of logic. Another form is the one in which the idea 
immerses itself, that of physical nature. Finally, the third form is that of spirit in general.”354 
The first form is the logical form and it “reveals itself” in the domain of pure thought, but 
instead of being some sort of foundation for other subsequent forms, it is, on the contrary, the most 
simple, because only when the idea realizes itself as spirit does it become actual/real. 
                                                          
351 See Rudolf Haym who takes Hegel in this sense, although quoting directly from Hegel he takes for 
real[wirklich] that which exists, while translators were more careful to translate wirklich as actuality or reality, 
which in Hegel does not constitute in effect all that exists. Rudolf Haym, Hegel in seine Zeit, op. cit. pp.390-391. 
Engel would later be giving this interpretation a more literal formulation in Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang 
der Klassischen deutschen Philosophie, different from Hegel sentence in his Philosophy of Right but closer to 
the sense it was attributed to it, by Haym and other liberals, that all that is real should be taken as is and 
accepted as rational, and goes as “All that is real is rational; and all that is rational is real." Marx and Engels 
Collected works, Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of classical German Philosophy, Vol. 26, op. cit. p.358. / “Alles 
was wirklich ist, ist vernünftig, und alles was venünftig ist, ist wirklich”.  Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels, Werke, 
vol. 21, op. cit. p.266. 
352 See for instance Clark Butler who pays close attention at this panlogistic interpretative tradition, as 
exemplified by Duboc’s, the owner of a hats factory, exchange of letters with Hegel. Butler proposes that 
Hegel’s non-panlogism is first made clear in a letter to Karl Daub and later in his philosophy of nature. G.W.F. 
Hegel, Hegel: the letters, translated by Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler, with commentary by Clark Butler, 
Indiana University Press, 1984, pp.540-541. 
353 See for this other panlogistic critique, Marx and Engels Collected Works, The poverty of Philosophy, vol. 6, 
op. cit. pp.162-166. / Marx und Engels Werke, Das Elend der Philosophie, vol. 4, op. cit. p.125-130. 
354 See G.W.F. Hegel, G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, op. cit. p.146. 
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The supposed apriorism comes from seeing in reality the development of a pre-existing ideal 
in the world, instead of seeing the rational which, as a universal of this world, self-develops immanently 
this same ideal in the rational community. Reason cannot have an existence by itself and this is quite 
clear in Hegel when he makes a distinction between existence [Existenz] and actuality [Wirklichkeit]. 
The actualization [Verwirklichung] needs precisely an outer existence [Existenz], once again it should 
be reminded that what is rational [vernünftig] is actual [wirklich], therefore reason is a union of essence 
[Wesen] and existence [Existenz] which is what constitutes actuality [Wirklichkeit]355. The a priori ideal 
complaint may be well grounded when Hegel makes the individual a predicate of this ideal, but it 
should also not be forgotten that what constitutes this ideal is to be found by the predicate or has in 
the proper subject its reality. 
According to Fernando Catroga, Oliveira Martins will not be immune to this same reminder by 
Alexandre Herculano who complains about Oliveira Martins’s apriorism. This complaint from 
Alexandre Herculano seems to be very early, as it looks like the letter Fernando Catroga refers to, 
speaks of an 1869 booklet from Oliveira Martins, leading therefore to the suspicion that it may be from 
around this date. In the letter we have more of a warning against synthesis when there is still so much 
to do on an analytical level. The a priori he criticizes is when a synthesis is done without a properly 
fundamented basis to support it. He still recognizes that “generalization, synthesis, are, in absolute, 
excellent things” but he finds them dangerous and an “abstruse synthetic and symbolic festooned with 
French nonsense”356, if done clumsily. Alexandre Herculano believes that these tendencies are French 
in their origin, Cousin perhaps? And confesses his mistrust of this type of generalization, which in his 
time of intellectual activity had already seen its dawn. 
 Sergio Campos Matos also alerts about Oliveira Martins’s tendency towards abstract 
conceptions emanating from this same apriorism, which is something that, according to him, has its 
roots in Hegel, Herder and many other German philosophers, besides Proudhon, Michelet and Renan 
who had the same German’s inclinations357. He suggests, however, that Alexandre Herculano’s advice 
will, in time, have an effect on Oliveira Martins, particularly on the historical voluntarist ideas 
advocated by him. The outmost respect he had for Herculano is shared by his whole generation. 
Therefore, the words echoed by his “master” certainly had an effect on him. This is evident in his 
                                                          
355 See G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, op. cit. p.466 / G.W.F. Hegel, Werke, Wissenschaft der Logik II, vol. 6, 
op. cit. p.186. 
356 “generalização, a síntese, são, em absoluto, coisas excelentes” … “abstruso sintético e simbólico 
engrinaldada de maravalhas francesas” Alexandre Herculano, Cartas, vol. 2, Bertrand, Lisboa, [s.d]., p.34 et 36. 
357 See Sérgio Campos Matos, Consciência histórica e nacionaismo: Portugal, séculos XIX e XX, Livros Horizonte, 
Lisboa, 2008, p.175 
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exchange of letters when he says that he “cries two times per day for the lack of our Master: Herculano 
was a man that warmed the heart and the intelligence.”358. 
When we look at historical theory and discourse in Oliveira Martins, many of the issues raised 
are comprehended in the historicist model. Therefore, this study will now occupy itself with the 
considerations posed by this model and how they relate to Oliveira Martins. However, like in the case 
of panlogism dealt with earlier, historicism also has different models and in this sense is a model of 
models. What they have in common is the affirmation of history as playing the major role in the 
existence, making and explanation of reality. Because of the multiple attributes and uses given to this 
word, it has been the focus of polemics. Andre Lalande said that it should be abandoned all together359, 
or more recently John Cannon shares the same opinion360. 
The use of this concept is indeed polysemous. It has been used in Christian religion’s biblical 
interpretation of historical events as the fulfillment of biblical prophecies, in law as the customs 
perpetuated by tradition, in economy as a reduction of this science to the history of economic activity, 
in politics with the figure of the nation understood as an individual in self-development. These are 
many of the negative meanings associated with this term. There is, however, also other positive 
meaning possible, which will mainly see in historicism the historicity which is present in reality and in 
each of these particular fields previously mentioned. Such views started to be the predominanting 
ones after the so called crisis of historicism and came to be associated with Dilthey, Heidegger, and 
more recently Koselleck.  
In respect to all the different historicist traditions, Carlo Antoni’s book Lo Storicismo has an 
introduction where he explores all these different meanings and goes on to develop the different types 
of historicism. He finds the historical-political use the most influential of them all and sees Germany as 
the birth place of modern historicism, which, although inspired by English and Italian political theorists, 
has at the same time departed from these. More recently in Italy it was used mainly politically in a 
battle between liberalism and fascism, with the accusations of historicism drawn against Croce and 
liberalism by the fascists. However, according to Antoni, German liberals and Meinecke in particular 
will also hold this same view of historicism, with nations as a product of a voluntary act and a moral 
construction, where in the liberal tradition: 
                                                          
358 “Duas vezes choro todos os dias a falta do nosso Mestre: Herculano era um homem que aquecia o coração e 
a inteligência” Letter to Bolhão Pato, J.P. Oliveira Martins, Correspondência, op. cit. p.22. 
359 See Lalande who refers to this same subject but uses the term historism instead of historicism and writes 
the following: “Terme equivoque,appliqué quelquefois aussi à l’hégélianisme en tant qu’opposé au 
naturalisme. (Eisler, V°,329.) à éviter comme la plupart des termes de ce genre, qui engenderent facilement des 
discussions verbales”, Andre Lalande, Vocabulaire Technique et critique de la philosophie, 15th ed., Presses 
Universitaires de France, Paris, 1985, p.417. 
360 See John Cannon, The Blackwell Dictionary of Historians, Blackwell, New York, 1988, p.192. 
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“Historicism is the break, operated by the German though, of the western jusnaturalistic 
tradition”361 
However, Meinecke sees the risks for modern nations brought about by cultural fragmentation 
and moral relativism of values, while his historicism had an operative function in such 
contradictoriness362, bringing his understanding of historicism closer to Croce363. 
The historicist model will also be present in the political ideas associated with socialism. For 
Oliveira Martins such a break from natural law is rather socialist than liberal in its genesis, but then 
again some of these liberals who propose historicist models claim to follow some kind of a socialist 
liberalism.  What is interesting in Antoni’s observations and which relates directly to Oliveira Martins 
and socialism, is his taking notice of a different reading that can be given to the socialist theory of 
historical materialism. Many reactionaries have justified a return to the golden age of free artisans, 
the roman guilds and its corporative organization, against the “factory spirit” of today, without 
forgetting that Niebuhr had actually traced the freedom to the old364. Oliveira Martins will be solidary 
to such views and by such impulses adopts a conservative socialism of the free worker. He is not against 
the spirit of modern age as compared to the old but still shares the conservative view of the role of 
property with regards to human freedom. 
More recently the questions raised by historicism and the reflection on its nature led to affirm 
that within itself, historicism contained the issues that came to be debated at the end of the 19th 
century, namely the problem of making history a science365. Historicity gained prevalence afterwards 
in detriment of historicism that was seen as overly relativizing, while historicity absolutizes relativity366, 
and this historicity thesis of conceptual history is not strange to Hegel who “traced and conceptualized 
this process as the result of prior history”367. Even more recently, especially from the 1960s on, we 
have a new wave of historicism which reinterprets the common understanding of historicism, with its 
roots in Ricoeur, Foucault, Habermas and others. Such consideration falls outside the historicist models 
that are contemporary to Oliveira Martins. However, they may still have some operative value such as 
                                                          
361 “lo storicismo è la rottura, operata dal pensiero Tedesco, della tradizione giusnaturalistica dell’Occidente” 
Carlo Antoni, Edizione Radio Italiana, [s.l], 1957, p.12. 
362 See for Meinecke theory of historicism. Friederich Meineckes, Die Entstehung des Historismus, Leibniz 
Verlag, München, 1943. 
363 See for the relation between Croce and Meineckes historicism, Robert A. Pois, “Two poles within 
historicism: Croce and Meinecke” in Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 31, issue 2, 1970. 
364 See Carlo Antoni, op. cit. pp.166-167. 
365 See Reinhart Koselleck, The practice of history, Stantford University Press, 2002, p.X-XI. 
366 See idem, ibidem, p.2. 
367 See idem, ibidem, p.185. 
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in the case of Ankersmit who organizes historicist conceptual interpretations in terms of content rather 
than chronologically. 
Frank Ankersmit organizes historicism into four fundamental conceptual meanings. The first is 
when one seeks in the past the nature of things. The second is the unique qualities embodied in each 
passage or phase of world history, which is close to what the word Zeitgeist expresses. The third follows 
up from the second and results in the condemnation of anachronism or the strange influence of 
something or someone to the uniqueness of each phase, the historian should thus look at the past in 
the spirit of this same past. The fourth is the discernment of patterns in the development of these 
phases of history and it also shows us how history comes together, hence this is the most dialectical, 
or speculative in a Hegelian sense, of the meanings of historicism368. 
From these different meanings attributed to historicism, Oliveira Martins can be said to 
partially integrate them all, although there seems to be a tension between a philosophical 
consideration of history and the one given by empirical sciences. He condemns the intolerant idealism 
which does not leave history free, precisely because of its tendency to try and absorb it, valuing on this 
account reality as empirically given by the senses, seeing in the ideal principles the disorganization of 
the knowledge of history and its laws. He goes on by saying: 
“Even when history could be said that it is itself the Man, even when, exaggerating the energy 
and individual action, we could suppose it independent and superior to the action of the conditions in 
which Man, the nations and the races appear in time on earth; not even circumscribed to the domain 
of human cousciousness sovereignly free of exterior actions, would it be licit to consider the laws of 
history to be those that preside the spirit, because the human individual is practically incapable of 
manifesting the pure ideal. Such a man would be god, and there could be no more than one of these 
men”369 
Here he does not deny history contains laws (even if later he will move closer in this direction), 
but it is just that these laws are of a different nature from those of the spirit. Even if he considers that 
the end of history is the manifestation of the spirit in its plenitude, he makes a division from what is 
the domain of natural sciences and that of spirit. The philosophy of history strictly speaking is the 
                                                          
368 See Frank Ankersmit, “Historicism” in Encyclopedia of Political Theory, Mark Bevir editor, Sage, California, 
2010, p.642. 
369 “Ainda quando a história se pudesse dizer que ela é o homem; ainda quando, exagerando a energia da 
acção individual, a supuséssemos independente ou superior à acção das condições em que os homens, as 
nações e as raças aparecem no tempo sobre a terra; nem mesmo circunscrita ao foro da consciência humana 
soberanamente livre das acções exteriores, seria lícito considerer leis da história as que presidem ao Espírito, 
porque o indíviduo humano é um ser incapaz de praticamente o manifestar puro e ideal. Um tal homem teria 
sido Deus, e não poderia haver mais de um homem assim.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, O Helenismo e Civiização 
Cristã, op. cit. p.3. 
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consideration of the ends of history and in this regard Oliveira Martins follows the great teleological 
traditions of a philosophical consideration of history starting with Leibniz. Under the influence of the 
Enlightenment, they are the starting point of philosophy of history, later gaining different counters 
with German historicism and other critics of the Enlightenment such as Vico. 
That is not all; he also considers that these laws are not absolute but can be redefined by 
natural elements not yet visible in history because they still remain unconscious, giving place to the 
fortuitous, however neither taking from “history the character of science, nor sending it to the domain 
of poetry”370. Therefore, history is only partially a science or it is not a pure science like logic. He will 
consequently settle his historiography from such prepositions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
370 “[tirar à biologia nem à] história o carácter de ciências, nem a lançá-las para o campo da poesia.” idem, 
ibidem, p.8. 
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4.2 Historiographic tradition 
The question of which historiographic tradition Oliveira Martins belongs to is for the most part 
a difficult one. The first that comes to mind is romanticism.  The difficulty comes from the task itself of 
classifying and restricting historians or philosophers to certain schools, when they are professed critics 
of many tenets advanced by these schools. This is the case with Hegel where some take him to be a 
romantic philosopher and in reality he was a strong critic of romantic philosophy and its account of 
history371. This does not invalidate the fact that much of the points discussed by Hegel and Oliveira 
Martins are part of the debate that surrounded romanticism. These were not topics restricted to the 
romantics but were broader intellectual debates relating to existing problems. 
 It is indeed easy to create all-embracing classificatory schemes and position a person here or 
there according to an analysis that gives priority to some points in detriment of others. Oliveira Martins 
like Michelet, for instance, favoured the history of the people over the individual, even if the role of 
the elites is fundamental. In any case this could hardly be said to entirely conform to the romantic 
ideas, where individual action and heroism is above the collective. However, one could still defend 
Oliveira Martins’s alignment with a kind of individual exceptionalism, when in light of a reversed hero 
theory he makes the hero collective and the individual embodies the collective interests of the 
people372. According to Hegel the individual can also be the representative of an age or even of a 
certain social class. 
 On the other hand, already in the beginnings of such romanticism, particularly in Fichte who 
was one of its main inspirers, the relation between the individual and the collective is a preoccupation: 
 “Only as each of these peoples, left to itself and according to its own particularity, develops 
and takes shape – and as every individual within that people, in accordance with this common 
particularity as well as his own particularity, develops and takes shape- is the appearance of divinity 
reflected in its proper mirror as it should be, and only someone who lacked any sense of lawfulness 
and divine order, or was obdurately hostile to such law and order, would dare to interfere in this higher 
law of the spiritual world.”373 
 The people should develop by itself, in their own essentiality. The collective is seen as an 
individuality of wholes which does not eliminate the individuality of individuals. In some embryonic 
                                                          
371 See for instance Gossman who puts Hegel in this category of romantic philosophers. Lionel Gossmann, 
Between history and literature, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990, pp.153-154. 
372 See for a study of Oliveira Martins’s Theory of Heroes, particularly pages 183-184. Sergio Campos Matos, 
Consciência Historica e Nacionalismo: Portugal, séculos XIX e XX, op. cit. pp.171-193. 
373 See J.G. Fichte, Addresses to the German Nation, translated with introduction and notes by Isaac 
Nakhimovksy, Béla Kapossy, and Keith Tribe, Hacket Piublishing Company inc., Indiana, 2013, pp.163-164. 
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form we can already find here the later collective individuality of the organicists and their social 
organism. 
 Nevertheless, romanticism can never be said to form a unified whole, as those who identified 
themselves as romantics shared heterogeneous ideas. What probably united them was their critique 
of enlightenment’s cold rationalism. In this particular matter of individuality, we can contrast 
Humboldt liberal individualism with the aforementioned Michelet or, without going as far as to the 
restauracionist romantics, we can mention Heine with his critical undertones against individualism, 
when he criticizes Hegel’s philosophy for its hyubris of a God-like individual vanity.  
 The question of whether Oliveira Martins can be considered a romantic can perhaps be best 
answered by one of his contemporaries and a source of inspiration, Ernest Renan, when he says “I was 
predestined to become what I am, a member of the romantic school, protesting against 
romanticism”374. Oliveira Martins will shelter his romantic-liberal predecessor’s social reformism, but 
will alter it and contest some of their thesis, particularly those on history, philosophy and politics. He 
rejects liberalism as an historical epitome, recognizing its advances, with the liberal revolutions 
marking “the passage of historical and absolutist formulas to revolutionary and individualist 
formulas”375, denouncing, however, the theories of naturalistic individualism which emanated from 
the liberal ideas and had found place in these new conditions. For such reasons he does not see himself 
as “politically liberal”376. 
 The thought of attributing to Oliveira Martins a historiographic school, which his works would 
be part of, is also denied by Oliveira Martins who, besides praising his isolationism, also considers that 
in Portugal there is no lasting tendency or tradition that survived. There could, however, still exist some 
partisanship or a feeble school, which could attach its ideas to a work of history. For this reason Oliveira 
Martins’s extols his Portugal Contemporâneo for being “a book of contemporary history strange to any 
school or parties” and “it is, concede me the vanity, a rare case”377. Therefore, he considers that in the 
work of the historian, the isolationism of an artist is beneficial and, by doing so, we can occupy 
ourselves with history and obey only reason, as an artist that obeys only aesthetics. The works of 
history are brought to light in the same way as works of art, but the independence of the writer of 
history enjoys another level of freedom, as he seems to think the “impassible thinker” is the one that 
is above any of the individual ideas, opinions, doctrines which are to be found in society. As a critic, 
                                                          
374 See Ernest Renan, Recollections of my Youth, [translated by Mynors Bright], Chapmann and Hall, London 
1897, p.65 
375 “a passagem das formulas históricas e absolutistas para as formulas revolucionárias e individualistas”, J.P. 
Oliveira Martins, Portugal Contemporâneo, vol. 1, op. cit. p.25 
376 See idem, ibidem, pp.18-19. 
377 “um livro de história contemporânea alheio a qualquer das escolas e partidos vivos, é, concendam-me esta 
vaidade, um caso raro” idem, ibidem, p. 23. 
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one must imagine to “find oneself before a dead or strange society, in order to freely judge it”. 
Otherwise to the “history that is cold, impassible as if dead and impersonal, the writer would substitute 
the particular life of his spirit, and instead of a realistic picture of a society, [he would] produce a 
subjective framework”378. 
In the writing up of such history, we have on the one hand, the style of the narrative and on 
the other hand, the theory to which the style is subordinate. The fact that this theoretical framework 
will have an inflow on the style of writing is subjacent in how Oliveira Martins thinks history should be 
written, namely as a drama. This is no doubt the way in which Hegel thinks history is best portrayed. 
The aesthetic models influenced by this idea are almost always purely Hegelian and they tended to 
come from France. Although the philosophy of Hegel could hardly be said to have formed a school in 
France, his aesthetic theory was probably the most enduring and pervading of all aspects of his 
philosophy. Besides, these were the first translated works of Hegel to the french language and where 
there was a genuine interest for the prepositions Hegel advances that prolonged itself through time. 
This is the case with Taine, where both his history and philosophy are deeply in debt to Hegel’s 
aesthetic theory, when he considers art as mode of knowledge and not simply a sensible or sentimental 
endeavor379. Some of the most known French historians will share a fragmentary Hegelianism, 
particularly with regards to this aesthetical aspect. That is the case with Renan, a close associate of 
Taine and they both will have an assiduous presence in Oliveira Martins’s historical reflections380. 
The style of historical narratives was object of a deep reflection on the part of Oliveira Martins, 
above all because at a given moment in time, he set himself the task of divulging to the bulk of his 
countrymen the modern ideas and the new ways of making history. This is most evident in his appendix 
to As Raças Humanas e a Civilização Primitiva where the artistic way of writing history is seen as the 
form by which he can reach the people, letting them know the history of their fatherland381. He set out 
to rise the general level of knowledge of his countrymen through art which he also believed, like Hegel, 
was endowed with such a quality. He then builds up his history along the lines of a popular reception 
of his work. But does it mean his history is a popular history, Just as we have a popular philosophy, 
which Hegel will at first follow but will later flagellate and where worldly affairs and the gross of men 
are its main preoccupation? This depends on the better definition of an ill-defined historiographic type, 
                                                          
378 “achar-se perante uma sociedade morta ou estranha, para livremente a poder julgar” … “A historia que é 
fria, impassível e como que morta por ser impessoal, substituiria o escritor a vida particular do seu espírito; e 
em vez da pintura realista de uma sociedade, produziria um quadro subjectivo.” idem, ibidem, p.23-24. 
379 See for a thorough look on this topic Hippolyte-Adolphe Taine, Philosophie de l’Art, Hermann co., Paris, 
1964.  
380 See G. Le Gentil, Oliveira Martins (Algumas fontes da sua obra), op. cit. pp.51-52. 
381 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, As Raças Humanas e a Civilização Primitiva, vol. 2, Guimarães Editores, Lisboa, 
1955, pp.265. 
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which Oliveira Martins himself never troubled himself to give. If we attain to tenets that have the public 
reception as guiding lines of this historiography production and the style it is to follow, then we could 
say that it is at least oriented towards the people. 
The debate around history as science or as art could then be seen in a new perspective, where 
art and history are not mutually exclusive. The errors or mistakes some may attribute to Oliveira 
Martins can hardly be said to be because of his “artistic way” of writing and, if they could, how do we 
make such differentiation? His revolt against the scientific attributions given to history has more to do 
with a tendency of his age to absolutize science in the relation between art and science, where the 
historians thought they would need an ultimate definition of their material in order to claim the 
independence of their discipline. Oliveira Martins, saving history from the interference of other fields 
of knowledge, mainly from the emerging social sciences with its empirical methods and also from 
philosophy with a tendency to absorb history in it, comes closer to the traditional scientific and natural 
disciplines as a source of historical knowledge.  
For Oliveira Martins it seems as if the method of history is a scientific one, but the praxis of 
such a method is an artistic one. One completes what the other cannot give, the synthesis of both 
elements is visible in his “psychological process” of making history, where he would be provided with 
empirical data but at the same time would imagine the things as they would have happened. It was a 
visceral construction of the past where the author would literally have a flow of emotions. With the 
latter manifesting themselves even physically, he would go to tears in face of the exercise of such a 
dramatic process as he lived the pains of the past. The drama would also manifest in figures that went 
down in history as sad equivoques and who were precisely disliked by certain doctrinarians as in the 
case of D. Miguel when he portrays him in Portugal Contemporâneo as a victim of history and a Prince 
to which he is “sympathetic in his infortune”382. 
The theoretical side of his historiography also shares preoccupations with the famous 
historiographic debates in Germany and France around the value of subjective and objective 
frameworks, which anticipated some of the leading problems that were later articulated with the 
problem of judging history on its terms.  These views as such are debatable and even earlier historians, 
as for example Ranke, emphasized such issues. However, can we be an “impassible critic” if this critique 
relies on modern elements of critique rather than in the existing conditions in the past like Hegel pays 
notice to? These concerns of a theoretical nature will have an effect on the style of narrative, as one 
will see something more or less coherent according to its capacity to accommodate, as a theoretical 
framework, the model one envisions. 
                                                          
382 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Portugal Contemporâneo, vol. 1, op. cit. p.17. 
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In terms of style but to some extent also of method, Oliveira Martins can be said to be part of 
the romantic tradition, a trend with many appearances and difficult to circumscribe. The topic of 
historiographic traditions or trends was one that Hegel also studied and attempted to classify in his 
Lectures on Philosophy of History, this study will dwell itself into this problem in the next section.  
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4.3 History as a whole 
The consideration of history as a whole is an heir of earlier philosophical concerns of the same 
nature, namely the relation between the whole and the parts. Hegel will probably be one of the first 
philosophers that looks at history in a systematic way with this notion of totality in mind. He has not 
only considered history as a whole but has also classified the different types of history and the practical 
implications of each of them, their methodologies, advocates and origins. The modern discipline of 
historiography is thus already to be found in Hegel’s way of viewing history, arranging history according 
to the criteria each of the history types possesses. These divisions and subdivisions of history are to be 
found in his Lectures on Philosophy of History, where we find the three main types of history to be 1. 
Original history; 2. Reflective history; 3. Philosophical world history. 
This section will look into Oliveira Martins in light of Hegel’s Lectures on Philosophy of History, 
a book which Oliveira Martins had in his personal library and which he in all likelihood carefully studied. 
How each type of history identified by Hegel is looked upon by Oliveira Martins and whether or not he 
also practiced any of those types of history will be one of the points to be explored. 
The first type, original history, is the writing of the events as they transpire, of which writers 
such as Herodotus and Thucydides are examples. These are writers who wrote the deeds which they 
experience first-hand; they participated in these events and belong “to the spirit of their age”383. They 
put into words as an intellectual representation that which they themselves experienced, leaving on 
second account the reports of others, which become subordinated or are even suppressed. Although 
this type of history can be said to constitute a source for other types of history, it should not be 
confused with sources in a broad sense because it still constitutes a historiographic type, unlike 
documents, fiction, poems and other sources which do not have the value of historiography. 
This type of history is not very extensive because it is in general restricted to some 
contemporary period in which the historian has lived, and, since the time he has lived and the deeds 
narrated are the same, this historian cannot raise above himself, instead of reflecting on history: “he 
stands and lives in the material itself”384. Therefore, in this respect Oliveira Martins can also be said to 
have made original history, but only in a narrower sense could some of his work be said to constitute 
original history. A greater part of it does not emanate from the echelons of power or from some major 
historical event, but is politically oriented for immediacy and for this reason resembles more the work 
                                                          
383 See G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of history, (Clarendon Press edition), Op. cit. p.133. / “dem Geiste derselben 
selbst zugehört [haben]” G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, vol. 12, op. cit. 
p.11.  
384 See idem, ibidem, p.134. / “Er wird also zunächst keine Reflexionen anzubringen haben, denn er lebt im 
Geiste der Sache“ G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, vol. 12, op. cit. p.546. 
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of a publicist, although Oliveira Martins’s Política e Economia Nacional monograph is something that 
is close to this original history in Hegel’s classification. 
Though Hegel seems to be quite restrictive on the non-reflectiveness of this history, in any 
case this history type is still made up of reflections. These are reflections the age and not truly the own 
reflection of the historian. In this history, only persons who have lived it can be part of this 
historiographic type, hence only generals and statesmen can truly be historians of original history. 
What is also interesting to note is that Hegel also takes into account the class which the historical 
individual represents. The class is the true substrate of the historical events that unfold. For the above 
reasons original historians are not common, but we can still find them in our age and some examples 
are the numerous memoirs which have been produced in France of which Cardinal de Retz is a good 
example. 
This historiographic type was highly valued by Oliveira Martins and plays a major role in his 
História de Portugal385. This type, like Hegel has defined it, is rare to find, but Oliveira Martins still read 
some original historians who took part in the events they themselves portrayed such as João Rocha 
Loureiro who testified the king’s flight to Brazil and wrote a number of memories on his political 
involvement in the liberal cause386. 
The second historiographic classification is reflexive history. This history goes beyond one’s 
own time and is subdivided into four different types of history which are: 1. Compiled history; 2. 
Pragmatic history; 3. Critical history; 4. Special or particular history. The common ground which has its 
place in this historiographic kind is its claim of universality, but not yet in concrete, or at least not 
concrete enough, to be constituent of another class. 
The most blatant example of compiled history is that of the chroniclers who did not live the 
said historical events they recorded but still wrote about them according to the spirit of their own age 
instead of the one portrayed in the event. The attempt to make the voices of those contemporaries 
heard falls in most cases short of its objective, so either way this historiography tends to be 
anachronistic because “the spirit of the time in which the historian writes is different from the spirit of 
the time that is to be described” or it tends to resort to generalities, of battles that could happen “at 
any time”, enumerating a significant quantity of data but leaving out their concrete details by reducing 
                                                          
385 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, História de Portugal, Edição Crítica, com introdução por Isabel de Faria e 
Albuquerque, Prefácio por Martim de Albuquerque, Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda, Lisboa, 1988, pp.320-
329. 
386 See João Bernardo da Rocha, Memórias a Dom João VI, édition et commentaire par George Boisvert, Centro 
Cultural Português, Paris, 1973. 
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them to abstract representations or generalities. The distastes for apologetic history of chroniclers are 
well known in Oliveira Martins, as well as among the Portuguese liberals387. 
The second type of reflexive history produces a present in the past as a means employed by 
the understanding in order to grasp this same past. This type of history makes the past ageless and 
turns out to be “a perpetual presence that sublates the past and renders the events contemporary”388. 
The occurrences of the past which are enlivening depend on the spirit of each author. In general, long 
procedural chains become the event, and therefore it is the universal that appears and not the 
particular. This historical narrative also draws lessons from history while it makes moral reflections and 
takes instructions from its study of history. From this tendency comes the praise of good examples in 
history. Hegel, however, criticizes the methods of moral history as an oversimplification that cannot 
account for a higher principle which occupies itself with the “fate of peoples and the overthrow of 
states”389. The critique he formulates in relation to this historiographic type is very similar to the one 
drawn against history in the debate of historicism that “History and experience teach that peoples 
generally have not learned from history”390. To support this assertion he also argues that “moral laws 
apply to simple interests and private circumstances, and these I do not need to learn from history”391. 
As a critique of this history he accepts the role of great figures but only as a means to lead the people 
away from the prevalence of memory in conditions that have changed, to this extent he says that 
“memory has no power in the new situation of the present”392 and warns against distortions brought 
about by this comparatist effort between past and present. 
Hegel ends his reflection on this history type by holding an interesting view on the relation 
between French and German historiography: 
                                                          
387 “The merit or demerit of books of this nature is known, and, to a certain extent, the value itself that they 
have, as literary works more or less of pure carat, come from the ideas at the time dominant about the art of 
writing” / “O mérito e demérito de livros desta natureza são conhecidos, e, até certo ponto, o próprio valor que 
têm, como obras literárias de mais ou menos puro quilate, provém de ideias ao tempo dominantes sobre a arte 
de escrever” J.P. Oliveira Martins, História de Portugal, op. cit. p.321. 
388 See G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of history, (Clarendon Press edition), op. cit. p.137 / “Dies hebt die 
Vergangenheit auf und macht die Begebenheit gegenwärtig“ G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie 
der Geschichte, Werke, vol. 12, op. cit. p.16. 
389 See idem, ibidem, p.138. / “so sind doch die Schicksale der Völker und Staaten deren Interessen, Zustände 
und Verwicklungen ein anderes Feld” G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, 
vol. 12, Op. cit. p.17. 
390 See idem, ibidem, p.138. / “Was die Erfahrung aber die Geschichte lehren, ist díeses, daß Völker und 
Regierungen nirmals etwas aus der Gesichte gelernt und nach Lehren, due aus derselben zu ziehen gewesen 
wären, gehandelt haben” G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, vol. 12, Op. 
cit. p.17. 
391 See idem, ibidem, p.138. 
392 See idem, ibidem, p.138. / “Erinnerung hat keine Kraft gegen die Lebendigkeit und Freiheit“ G.W.F. Hegel, 
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, vol. 12, Op. cit. p.17. 
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“We thus turn back to the simple proposition of merely narrating what happens with precision 
and truth. Precisely crafted description and narratives of this kind are of great merit; but for the most 
part they merely provide material for others. We Germans are satisfied with that and want to live in 
the past. The French by contrast generate descriptions themselves and seek to treat them with 
ingenuity; as a consequence they are to lesser extent thorough historians. They always see past in 
terms of the present.”393 
Hegel’s reflection on this type of history is possibly the most interesting of them all. Here, we 
have his reflection of the relation between past and future laid out in opposition to a historiographic 
tendency of oversimplification. He sees the past and its historical value in relation to the “situation”, 
“condition”, “circumstance” of the present. We can see a great degree of possibilities open for the 
future and where the crystallization in particular moments is avoided. In fact “the idea” and its 
interpretation of itself, (meaning: we interpreting the idea that we embody) is the true interest of 
history, because what is interesting is the concrete and detailed reflection of reality which can only be 
given by such an interpretation. The idea thinking itself, is not, as it may sound, the idea in abstract, in 
a kind of ethereal realm free from humanity’s intervention. The idea only has existence in humanity 
and as such humanity is the real being of the idea, therefore when Hegel speaks of “the idea” that 
thinks itself, he is in fact talking above all about humanity thinking itself. 
Some of Oliveira Martins’s reflections on history can be said to integrate this pragmatic history, 
such as the predominance he gives to moral examples, to great figures or the relation between past 
and future. In the first case the moral aspects of Oliveira Martins have already been stressed 
elsewhere, but in history this moralist attitude(it should be reiterate again) is still a main-vector as is 
made clear when he says: 
“History is above all a moral lesson: here is the conclusion that, in our opinion, comes out of 
all the eminent progresses that have lately been made in the domain of social sciences. Reality is the 
best master of costumes, critique the best compass of intelligence, for this reason history demands 
above all the direct observation of primordial sources, true picture of the feelings, loyal description of 
the events and, next to this the impassive coldness of the critic, to coordinate, compare, in an objective 
or impersonal mode the system of generating sentiments and positive acts”394 
                                                          
393 See idem, ibidem, p.139. / “beziehen die Vergangenheit auf den gegenwärtigen Zustand” G.W.F. Hegel, 
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, vol. 12, Op. cit. p.18. 
394 See Oliveira Martins “A história é sobretudo uma lição moral: eis a conclusão que, a nosso ver, sai de todos 
os eminentes progressos ultimamente realizados no foro das ciências sociais. A realidade é a melhor mestra 
dos costumes, a crítica a melhor bússola da inteligência: por isso a história exige sobretudo observação directa 
das fontes primordias, pintura verdadeira dos sentimentos, descrição fiel dos acontecimentos e, ao lado disto a 
frieza impassível do crítico, para coordenar, comparar, de um modo impessoal ou objectivo o sistema dos 
sentimentos geradores e dos acto positivos” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Historia de Portugal, op. cit. p.21. 
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In such a description the moral realm seems to be the basis on which a critique should be 
made, in light of a specific objective criterion given by intelligence. In this manner Oliveira Martins is 
not strictly a follower of the pragmatic historiographic tradition, as defined by Hegel, but is closer to 
the critical historiography in the vein of Niebuhr or Ranke. He pays attention to this moral aspect but 
does not place it above history, making observations elsewhere against the out of place judgements 
made on history395, even if at the same time he sees moral examples as a way or as an inspiration to 
emulate the good that has been done, but always on different conditions and of another workmanship. 
Hegel’s critical historiography critique, when specifically dealt with, is short. There is no doubt 
Hegel owed much to this historiographic school. He recognizes the developments it has brought and 
its force in Germany, but in any case, he will make mainly negative appreciations when evaluating it. 
This historiographic school proposes to fight, what they understand as, an a priori construction of 
history. Hegel seems to accuse them precisely of this same a priori history because they take the past 
according to mental constructions that are arbitrary and subjective396. The fierce critique goes as 
follows: 
“The so-called higher criticism has taken possession of history and has sought to supplant the 
more circumspect historiography; having abandoned the soil of history, it has made room for the most 
arbitrary representations, digressions, fantasies, and combinations. Attempts are made to bring these 
most arbitrary elements into history. This too is a way of bringing the present into the past. The present 
that is advanced in this way rests on subjective fancies that are all the more striking the less they have 
any basis.”397 
The way in which Hegel criticizes this way of making history seems to be along the lines of how 
Alexandre Herculano reproaches the synthesis that has somewhat a baseless grounding. This critical 
history that Hegel refers to also endeavors to make this synthetic exercise and for this reason Hegel 
will say that this is more like a history of the narratives of history and its subsequent evaluation rather 
than history itself. But do we have sufficient analytical material - this was Alexandre Herculano’s 
objection - to operate a synthesis of the history of the distant past? We probably do, but this is not the 
                                                          
395 See on this topic of anachronism and judgements in history, Sérgio Campos Matos, Consciência Histórica e 
Nacionalismo: Portugal, séculos XIX e XX, op. cit. pp.177-178. 
396 See for instance on this matter also Houlgate who pays notice to this same fact. Stephen Houlgate, A 
Companion to Hegel, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2011, p.345. 
397 See G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of history, (Clarendon Press edition), op. cit. p.139 / “Bei uns hat sich die 
sogenannte höhere Kritik wie der Philologie überhaupt, so auch der Gesichtsbücher bemächtigt. Diese höhere 
Kritik hat dann die Berechtigung abgeben sollen, allen möglichen unhistorischen Ausgeburten einer eitlen 
Einbildungskraft Eingang zu verschaffen. Dies ist die andre Weise, Gegenwart in der Geschichte zu gewinnen, 
indem man subjektive Einfälle an die Stelle geschichitlicher Datin Setzt – Einfälle, die für uns so vortrefflicher 
gelten, je kühner sie sind“ G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, vol. 12, op. 
cit. p.18-19. 
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point in Hegel’s work. His objection is with regards to making certain subjective criterion, supported 
by a factual critique of the present, the sole aspect worthy of historical value.  
A good example is the so called search for the facts and the critique of sources, which leave 
fundamental aspects of the imaginary of a people weakened in their historical consideration, just 
because they are considered, in light of the present historical sciences and critical analyses, to be false 
or misrepresented. This is how the present is drawn into the past as a measure of veracity and, 
although Hegel does not deny the merits of the critique of the past, he says such efforts cannot be 
considered historical in the strict sense because the history of a people is to a great extent constructed 
through their myths and under certain circumstances we can even learn more of a people from these 
myths. 
In this historiography type, Hegel too, follows the same path and praises the French works in 
this field of history because they do not claim to have “[supplanted] the more circumspect field of 
historiography” or, in other words, they recognize their accomplishments not as history per se but as 
referring to historical criticism. In this critical historiography, the Germans are no longer trapped in the 
past; they have, on the contrary, trapped the past in their present or in their own subjective fancies. 
This seems at first an approximation to the French pragmatic historiography, but it actually appears as 
if German critical historiography sees the past with a present in it, as if the past could accommodate 
elements of it, while the French pragmatic historiography sees the past in terms of the present, or the 
past with the ingenuity of a present that accepts the past’s claims. 
The last kind of reflective history, special or particular history, as such makes the transition 
from reflective history to philosophical history. This history, says Hegel, is partially abstract but is at 
the same time within a universal outlook as an “extract” of this universality, involving a particular 
aspect of it. Hegel affirms that this type of reflective history has gained prominence “owing to today’s 
culture”. In this way modern culture brings to mind aspects of our own culture and individualizes them 
under certain aspects such as art, science, government and so on. While at the same time the history 
of each of these aspects is viewed in relation with the whole, putting forward a universal principle. The 
definition of this historiographic type brings to mind similarities with Hegel’s own speculative 
philosophy, where the subject, the particular, is universalized or is brought into a relation with the 
universal. 
This branch of special history has been made particularly popular in the histories of law and 
government. He admires such efforts when they are made in relation to the entire history of a people 
and do not fall short on the reflection of external material, as he sees an internal nexus that unites 
history with the universal. However, Hegel seems to think that this internal nexus is more frequently 
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only “sought or touched upon in its external circumstances”398, and, probably because of this, the 
concrete it may have does not yet suffice to differentiate it enough to have it outside of reflective 
history. 
The treatment of history according to different aspects was also adopted by Oliveira Martins. 
The economical aspect of history was, for example, one of his particular interests and, as such, he has 
focused on economy in its different relations and expressions, with history as a whole in sight but 
under various considerations. He considered for instance economic phenomena in terms of western 
civilization, of Portugal, as a class oriented economy. He even considered economy in terms of specific 
economical aspects as in the case of chrematistic which, has a branch of it, he considered to be 
theoretical economics399. The admonishment of Hegel against external reflection could be in part 
raised against Oliveira Martins, as he often sees the stimulus coming from the outside instead of 
resulting from an internal maturing. This is the case with the “spirit of crusade” which for him 
remodeled in many ways Portuguese economy and on a greater scale that of Europe, as something 
alien to western civilization but coming from oriental elements that have found place in Christian faith. 
In the passage to the philosophical world history, what is brought in new is the concrete 
universal. Its point of view is now the spiritual principle of peoples and the history of this principle. This 
is the principle that guides the world, it is the guiding of individual souls and the idea is this spiritual 
principle of peoples. He then distinguishes two modes of considering the concept of world history. One 
is the totality that each particular spiritual principle is and secondly these same spiritual principles of 
the peoples as the totality of one world spirit. All the aspects and viewpoints of the history of a people 
are interrelated, he admits this is often stated, yet how everything is interrelated frequently fails to be 
explained. Even when such an interconnection is shown, it remains mostly superficial. What he 
criticizes is the level of precision which is lacking in most cases and the point he wants to make is how 
each aspect of the spiritual principle does not have a linear development, but develops, in fact, on 
different degrees. What Hegel says here is that an aspect can be highly developed, but still play a minor 
role as an aspect of the culture of a people, because it still remains on a lower degree.  
The position each aspect has in the spirit of a people can be grasped only spiritually, or in other 
words only through thought. It becomes subjacent again that this thought is not a transcendent 
principle as “we are the ones who grasp thought”400. Besides, this thought which is grasped by us is 
                                                          
398 See idem, ibidem, p.140. / “bloß in äußerlichen Verhältnissen gesucht wird” G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über 
die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, vol. 12, Op. cit. p.19. 
399 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Regime das Riquezas (elementos de crematística), op.cit. pp.1-3. 
400 See G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of History, (Clarendon Press edition), op. cit. p.141 
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also self-producing. The highest goal of the spirit is the thinking of itself and when it finally knows itself, 
the individual spirit demises and a different stage of world history emerges. 
The transition of the spirit to another principle in a different people is self-engendered, the 
world advances to its consummation inside the spiritual process of self-completeness until it consumes 
and transfigures itself into something anew. In Oliveira Martins the spirit of a people also thinks itself, 
and the completion of the knowledge of its spiritual principle would also imply its demise, but this 
demise, contrary to Hegel, is configured in a kind of crisis that leaves this spiritual principle helpless, 
ready to be conquered by external forces opposing it401. To Hegel the spiritual principle is rather 
elevated through itself and rises to a higher level of self-comprehension, imposing new tasks to itself 
in order to broaden its activity. The works of men in name of self-interest are not properly the aim of 
this spiritual activity, but still in each of these particular aims, if we are to look for some ultimate 
purpose, this can only be shown through a third category that stands between men and the world, 
that is reason which is in both. 
This end can also be looked at from a different aspect, such as that of religion and instead of 
the plan of reason we have the plan of God, but still under this construction God would assert himself 
in us and is not something unearthly that should be “kept at distance and conveyed to the far side 
(jenseits) of human things and knowledge”. Hegel advocates that we can know God, as he is in fact in 
our consciousness, otherwise every representation of God would be empty talk. The task of God or the 
task of reason has for its final aim what can be called God’s will or the idea, that is, the spiritualization 
of the world or to bring about the infinite to the finite402. In such a task, freedom is the way by which 
the idea brings itself forward, the realization of freedom is humanity’s end and to this effect history is 
the history of the advancement of freedom. 
The contemplation of the ends of history has a major place in Oliveira Martins’s thought and 
he thinks that the study of the aims of history belongs particularly to the department of philosophy of 
history, constituting as such his philosophical reading of history. In his philosophical world history, 
Hegel continues the idea of Kant’s universal history and the consideration of history as a whole, with 
the characterization of its main course and aims. Following the same basic procedure while thinking 
history, although quite different from Kant’s method, they propose a rational plan of the history that 
takes place in the world. Oliveira Martins will also engage in mediations of this kind in his book Tábuas 
de Cronologia e Geografia Histórica but precisely to show some doubts about the possibility of a 
philosophy of history in a universal sense. In the chapter Teoria da História Universal, which is part of 
                                                          
401 See on this topic Augusto Santos Silva, "Morte, mediação, história: uma viagem tanatográfica ao 
pensamento de Oliveira Martins" in Revista da História Económica e Social, 1984, 14, julho-dezembro, pp.1-40. 
402 See Philosophy of history, op. cit. pp.146-147. 
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the introduction of the above book, we are told that such a system is chimerical if it claims to be 
scientific as we cannot account for a greater part of human histories. This is when philosophy of history, 
as a method not limited by the scientific one, should make its appearance in the consideration of 
history, and his judgement on philosophy of history is that: 
“Proceeding in a different manner, [with the] use of metaphysical divination, and imposing its 
discoveries on reality, the philosophy of history, (always debatable as a philosophy) does not fall under 
the domain of this critique. It could ignore the histories of not only many, but all the peoples, and not 
even so would it be less true – in the degree and specie of truth compatible with the speculation of 
such nature”403 
The philosophical reading of history for Oliveira Martins is then something different from what 
Hegel drafts in his Lectures on Philosophy of History with his historical worlds. The separation between 
what is object of thought (of a metaphysical consideration of reality) from the positive knowledge of 
this reality, makes the philosophy of history into something that looks for laws or the great movements 
of civilizations. But when constituted as theories they do not apply to the phenomenal world because 
it cannot embrace its diversity. From this point on this study will move to what, for Oliveira Martins, 
constitutes philosophy of history, where the nexus of totality in history is to find its existence only in 
thought404. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
403 “Procedendo de outra forma, usando da adivinhação metafísica, e impondo a sua descoberta á realidade, a 
filosofia da história, (discutível sempre como filosofia) não cai porém sob o domínio desta crítica: poderia 
desconhecer as histórias não só de muitos, senão de todos os povos, e nem por isso seria menos verdadeira – 
daquele grau e daquela espécie de verdade compatível com a especulação de tal natureza” J.P. Oliveira 
Martins, Tábuas de Cronologia e Geografia Histórica, 1st ed., Lisboa, Livraria de António Maria Pereira, 1884, 
p.VIII. 
404 See on this same problem for instance Labriola who under different assumptions also hints at thought as 
that which brings unity to the separateness of historical moments, and also considers universal history as lying 
outside science. Antonio Labriola, Scritti filosofici e politici, Einaudi Editore, Torino, 1973, p.21-25. 
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4.4 Philosophy of History 
The philosophy of history that we uncover when appreciating Oliveira Martins’s writings goes 
beyond the universal history theory he advanced in 1884, based on “positive knowledge” and known 
history. In O Helenismo e Civilização Cristã we have perhaps the most complete form of this philosophy 
of history. An extract of this text along with some other relevant ones on this subject is reproduced by 
Pedro Calafate in a selection of texts of Oliveira Martins as part of the chapter philosophy of history405. 
But already before this important work of 1878, in an unpublished letter to Batalha Reis, probably from 
1874, his philosophy of history is synthetized in a couple of pages. 
In this letter we are told that the laws of evolution in history should be examined under two 
aspects. One is that of a natural and ethnological evolution, the other is the moral and philosophical 
evolution. In the first aspect we have that which is instinctive, constantly renovating itself, with the 
ascension of new races tending for civilization or higher stages of it. In the second aspect this natural 
instinct can already be said to be present in it, but spiritually structured, that is, in an unconscious 
form. Therefore, the moral evolution constitutes the knowledge of oneself and nature, and this object 
is constant and identical through time. 
These two aspects are almost completely separated, but they come together by relational 
structures and from the earlier example of natural instinct, this aspect is embraced in the spirit or in 
the so called moral philosophical aspect by the unconsciousness, as its co-relative. The two aspects, 
one coming from nature, the other coming from spirit, are not coincident but mirror each other and 
are accessible to one another through a third structure mediating between them. What then brings 
the “relation or affinity” between the two aspects, as a mediator, is metaphysics. This structure is said 
to be the essential basis of all that exists. Metaphysics for Oliveira Martins is the ideal, of which men 
are only an approximation, but he still says that this ideal “has only a logical reality”406, it does not have 
a concrete existence. 
The philosophy of history, which Oliveira Martins calls the philosophy of the moral history of 
humanity, consists in the transformation of “the instrument” by which man represents things viz. 
consciousness. The moral aspect gains again the preponderance it has in his dialectics. Oliveira Martins 
sees morality as the active and predominant element which suffers transformations through time in 
                                                          
405 See Pedro Calafate, Oliveira Martins, Verbo, Lisboa, 1991, pp.55-103. 
406 “Here it comes however, next to the notion of infinite on the one hand, and the natural laws of the animal 
transformation on the other hand, [the proof that] this Ideal only has a logical reality: lets not complicate this 
problem.” / “Aqui vem porém, a par, a noção de infinito de um lado, e as leis naturais de transformação animal 
do outro, provar-nos que esse Ideal tem uma realidade somente lógica: não compliquemos a questão.” Oliveira 
Martins unpublished letter to Jaime Batalha Reis, gently provided to me by Prof. Dr. Sergio Campos Matos, Op. 
cit. 
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the consciousness of man. In the old ways of making history, moral, doctrinarian, or the more recent 
consideration of external phenomenal aspects of epochs and the conditions of certain successes; all 
these ways have a gist of truth in them because they considered the moral character of history, they 
create models which look at the system of laws and the physical environment of society. They were, 
however, not yet history in the modern sense because what is really intimate and essential to history 
is the system of institutions and collective ideas; they are “for society what organs and sentiments are 
for the individual”407. Oliveira Martins proposes that history or at least a historical narrative also begins 
when these become its object. Like in Hegel, history only really begins when we have the first 
institutions which form the state and through them the moral aspect is objectivized in the ethical 
community.  
The institutions are first apprehended by man in a symbolic-mystical way, only later will these 
ideas be institutionalized and transformed into something else capable of really explaining them. The 
old institutions are to be reformed not demolished as if the past had no importance. Through this 
progressive conscious of the ideal, specific moments of it are not absolutized408. He follows Vico in the 
saying that man creates his own world, but for Oliveira Martins man is not completely conscious of it, 
nor should he be, otherwise it would not make sense to have this creation in the first place as it would 
be something static. He prefers the notion of civilizational types which progressively gain 
consciousness of their essence until the attainment of self-consciousness or the return onto its 
essence. Each of the civilization types have a “maximal and minimal limit inside of which it is licit for 
the individual to have conscious of creation”409. 
Early constructions of the past have for Oliveira Martins some truth in them and should not be 
completely abandoned; we should look within them for what is truthful410. This is where his idea of 
society as a collective being, an organism, comes forward. The reform of the institutions is thus not 
merely going back to regenerate the past neither is it the complete denial of that past but the 
                                                          
407 “para a sociedade como os órgãos e os sentimentos são para o individuo” J.P. Oliveira Martins, História de 
Portugal, op. cit. p.VII. 
408 “In conclusion then, we understand that the reform of the old aristocratic institutions was necessary. [But 
we do not applaud] the new law, that in overturning everything, as made of this contest the absolute measure 
of its capacity” / “Concluindo, pois, entendemos que era necessária a reforma das velhas instituições 
aristocráticas, sem aplaudirmos a lei nova que derrubando tudo, fez do concurso um metro absoluto e único da 
capacidade” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Portugal Contemporâneo, vol. 1, op. cit. p.370. 
409 “entre os limites máximo e minimo dentro dos quais é lícito ao indivíduo ter a consciência da criação” See 
Oliveira Martins unpublished letter to Jaime Batalha Reis, gently provied to me by Prof. Dr. Sergio Campos 
Matos, op. cit. 
410 “Such philosophy, of which the last signs of life we still hear, could not discover what sum of natural liberty 
and organic necessity existed in the old institutions, even if its representatives had no conscious of this.” / 
“Uma tal filosofia, cujos últimos estos de vida ainda ouvimos, não podia descobrir que soma de verdade natural 
e de necessidade orgânica havia nas instituições antigas, embora os seus representantes de isso não tivessem 
consciência.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Portugal Contemporâneo, vol. 1, op. cit. p.371. 
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progressive gaining consciousness of what in our own creation makes us human, civilized creatures 
and a being “susceptible of an educated consciousness”411 with society not as an aggregate of 
individuals but a living organism that grows from its own active principle and reflects on its own 
activity. 
Returning, however, back to the way in which mysticism acquires a scientific form, he sees in 
the Germanic spirit this mystical tendency, just as the two already mentioned sciences of the spirit had 
their foundation in antiquity, coming from this natural instinct, which in an ideal form is a religious 
mysticism. One is the science of the ideal, the other is the science of justice and morality. The Middle 
Ages is an epoch where these latter sciences seen as instincts, which led to the mystical thought, 
reinvent themselves and then found again a new positive existence. The polemic with Vilhena about 
the characterization of the Middle Ages is above all a debate around the philosophy of history.  
The passage where he speaks of the Germanic races as the carriers of this mysticism, which in 
itself carries the mysteries of development, tells us that:  
“The still barbarous Germanic Race, conceived spirit and nature by means of symbols and 
myths, it had solely the noncognitive faculties in exercise. 2° of the morbid delirium that took hold of 
the world when the antique spirit reached the most perfect form, compatible with its raw-material of 
sentiments, instincts etc… that characterize the meridional races and were formulated imaginatively 
in the Etruscan, Hellenic etc… symbolism and theogonies. The apparition of this delirium that strongly 
characterizes Middle Ages” 
(…) 
“after the education of the Germanic spirit began, that is with Renaissance, this is when all the 
mysticism of the new race could begin to be formulated rationally and to be combined, for this reason, 
with the rationalist conceptions of Antiquity. Our civilization concludes naturally and logically, when 
the instincts of the Germanic people acquire the degree of education corresponding to the Latins; then 
the mythic and symbolic creations of Middle Ages could be classified and explained, as it were, to a 
certain extent, those of primitive Italy and Greece. Europe would have given what it could for the work 
of conscious creation; and humanity would enter, through another crisis in another circle, in a new 
ricorso”412 
                                                          
411 “susceptível de consciência educada“ Oliveira Martins unpublished letter to Jaime Batalha Reis, op. cit. 
412 “A raça germânica, ainda barbara concebia ainda o espírito e a natureza por meio de símbolos e de mitos: 
tinha unicamente as faculdades incognitivas em exercício. 2° do delírio mórbido que se apoderou do mundo 
quando o espírito antigo atingio a forma mais perfeita compatível com a sua matéria-prima de sentimentos, de 
instinctos etc que caracterizam as raças meridionais e se formularam imaginatvamente no simbolismo e nas 
teogonias etruscas, helénicas etc… A aparição desse delírio que caracteriza fortemente a idade-média” 
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The Germanic races are in a lower level in comparison to the Latin races, but at the same time 
he gives to them the mission of being the commanding force of the future and, as in Hegel, the 
Germanic world is the modern spirit of the world. If we take away this racist jargon, what he sees as 
the source of development is the unconscious force of man, the “fantasy”, “delirium”, “morbid”, 
“madness” but at the same time the “genius”, “prophetic” force. When man acquires a conscious form 
of this delirium then the future, in a way, has its answers in the past, in this mystical thought that 
characterizes the Middle Ages. To recover from these prodigious thoughts in a rational form, is the role 
of the German spirit. What stands out in this interpretation and strikes us as interesting to be noted is 
the critique various strands of socialism are subjected to, viewing them as fantasies and insanities that 
should be dismissed, but here he sees these fantasies, in a religious form, as something to be valued. 
In this respect, for instance, the scientific socialism of Marx also considers, in some ways, utopian 
socialism as valuable and a source of inspiration. But can it be said that Oliveira Martins completely 
dismisses those strands of socialism?  
If we attend at his Teoria do Socialismo there he considers the imagination of “idealist systems” 
in general, as the ideal that expresses the imagination of society and points to the realization of men’s 
ends. Even if not capable of refounding society, they set at least the lines by which this refoundation 
lives413. He proceeds in giving little importance to these and denounces their “vulgar knowledge” 
although the ideal they express is something to be appropriated. He has a similar discourse about the 
international socialist movement in the last pages of his letter to Batalha Reis, where socialism 
together with French spiritualism may give place to some new revealed truth of metaphysics.  He does 
not dismiss the “socialist fantasies” completely but this is the tendency and already in his Portugal e o 
Socialismo (1873), we have a distinction between mystical socialism, which he says was expelled from 
the International in the Hague congress, and the socialism he identifies as communism where the 
individual person is absorbed in an abstract collective414. He will later identify the second one, on the 
                                                          
(…) 
“Depois de começada a edução do espirito germânico, isto é com a Renascença, é que todo o misticismo da 
nova raça pôde começar a formular-se racionalmente e a combinar-se, por isso, com as concepções racionais 
da Antiguidade. A Nossa civilizaçao conclui naturalmente e logicamente, quando os instinctos dos povos 
germânicos tiverem adquirido o grau de edução correspondente aos latinos; então as creações míticas e 
simbólicos da Idade-Média terão sido classificadas e explicadas, como o foram, até certo ponto, as da Itália e 
Grécia primitiva. A Europa terá dado o que pôde dar para a obra da criação consciente; e a humanidade 
entrará, por outra crise se noutro círculo, um novo ricorso.” Oliveira Martins unpublished letter to Jaime 
Batalha Reis, op. cit. 
413 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Teoria do Socialismo, op. cit. p.270. 
414 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Portugal e o Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua 
reorganização pelo socialismo, op. cit. p.71. 
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contrary, as a utopian mechanicism or as a Darwinian individualism of competition415, as opposed to 
the moralizing socialism of the state. 
The underlining point is that this unconscious force that points out the way of development, 
also subsists in society and not merely in the ideal. It has, in fact, a natural existence and generally 
expresses itself in religious forms. Therefore, it constitutes a natural mysticism and the Middle Ages 
were rich in this regard. “This is why the Middle Ages [was] mediately a progressive epoch, but 
immediately and externally reactionary”416. The progressive aspect is the combination of the rational 
aspects of antiquity with the German mysticism that, for him, characterizes Middle Ages, where this 
combination is able to create the institutions that can solve the problems that could not be solved in 
Antiquity. 
According to his theory of universal history, the originality of a nation is what gives it strength 
and this also applies to civilizational types. We owe the originality of the modern age to the Middle 
Ages, because there we have side by side the barbaric customs and the Roman code of law, the first 
being oligarchic while the second is democratic417. Therefore, as a mediating figure of a civilizational 
type, Middle Ages is progressive, but it is also reactionary when we consider it in its external 
manifestation. Middle Ages has not yet acquired all the higher forms of civilization which come forward 
with a philosophical understanding of its own civilizational type. The originality only really manifests 
itself when the contradictory elements are harmonized. 
The modern age is the reconstitution of a democratic and civilized epoch that reproduces 
Roman democracy, but it is superior because it can embrace other peoples, it has acquired a 
universalistic character418. This idea of society creating the means of its emancipation is present since 
                                                          
415 See J.P. Oliveira Martins, Política e Economia Nacional, op. cit. pp.96. 
416 “É por isso que a idade-média é uma época mediatamente progressiva, mas imediatamente e exteriormente 
reacionária” Oliveira Martins unpublished letter to Jaime Batalha Reis, Op. cit. 
417 “It had stayed also next to the barbaric customs, the Roman codes of law, philosophical and democratic or 
Caesarist; and the societies, images of Jano, presented simultaneously two faces – one oligarchic, the other 
democratic – contrasting origins and eminently instructive debates” / “tinham ficado também ao lado dos usos 
bárbaros, os códigos do direito romano, filosófico ou democrático ou cesariano; e as sociedades, imagens de 
Jano, apresentavam simultaneamente duas faces – uma oligarquia, outra democrática – origem de contrastes e 
debates eminentemente instructivos” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Tábuas de Cronologia, op. cit. p. XXXI. 
418 “such is the concourse of causes that brought again the European nations to a civilized or democratic epoch, 
to a philosophical age, to a period that reproduces, under a nomological or social-organic point of view, that of 
roman democracy; but it is therefore incomparably superior to antiquity because it embraces in it all the 
branches of the European family, for this reason it expresses the assimilated sentiments by the Semite [family], 
for this reason it is now Universal, whereas ancient democracy, particular to the Latin peoples, expressed only 
the strong but limited genius of the Roman, educated by the subtle Greek intelligence” / “Tal é o concurso de 
causas que trouxe de novo as nações europeias a uma época civilizada ou democrática, a uma idade filosófica, 
a um período que reproduz, sob o ponto de vista nomológico ou orgânico-social, o da democracia romana; mas 
que é incomparávelmente superior á Antiguidade por isso que abraça em si todos os ramos da família 
europeia, por isso exprime os sentimentos assimilados por a do génio semita, por isso que é já agora universal, 
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very early on as, for instance, when Oliveira Martins first attributes a fundamental role to credit in the 
solution of the social question that degladiated Rome. The conditions for the creation of credit were 
essential to the Germanic people with their self-interest and the spirit of independence sedimented in 
the protestant reform. Since the continual renewal of civilizational types comes from unconscious 
forces, both ideal and instinctive, he attaches these forces to religion as its primary natural appearance. 
 The consideration of Roman or Germanic civilizational types still brings with it some positive 
knowledge of those realities, but, given the degree of generality, it also carries with it an ideal that was 
not perfectly realized. The more history becomes concrete, the less the ideal is realized. Therefore, 
Oliveira Martins denies the scientific character of history when it has something to do with positive 
data, but he still does not deny there can be some laws in the spirit as set forward in his O Helenismo 
e Civilização Cristã. The later writings lean, however, towards a history along the lines of positive 
knowledge, furnished by natural sciences with a subsequent approximation to the race theories. He 
thus argues, in his theory of universal history, against laws in history because there his object is 
precisely history in its phenomenal manifestation that is in nature, where history unfolds 
spontaneously, independent of the laws of spirit. 
 The ideal dear to him in the 1870s is later something he is not so enthusiastic about. The 
philosophy of history and the laws it can furnish are something questionable as a philosophy. This 
philosophy of history, in a moral sense, persists. The ideal is still something to regulate development 
but is informed by this theoretical development which pays attention to the role positive existence. 
Besides this notion of an ideal which governs the concrete development, but is never reached, there 
is also another notion of a return onto this ideal, of attaining full conscience of one’s civilizational type 
by realizing it. How are these two notions harmonized? One proclaims the ideal is only a guiding vector, 
the other that this ideal can be realized. 
 In the reception of Silva Cordeiro’ book on philosophy of history, Oliveira Martins warns that 
the ideal is only an ought to and should not be taken to be actually existing. Oliveira Martins prefixes 
an ideal and a return onto the essence to the Hegelian idea of civilization enriching itself by posing 
ever more complex tasks to itself. For Hegel this returning of civilization to what it first was, enlarged 
in what is, as it accomplishes its tasks, is self-produced and achieves its ends. However, for Oliveira 
Martins this ideal, even if returning to itself, is at the same time not achievable, only an approximation 
is possible. This return onto the essence, for Oliveira Martins, happens because the ideal meets the 
limits of human abilities. As a result the ideal is altered and enters another phase. The separation he 
makes of natural and spiritual laws explains why this ideal cannot be enforced; nature and its laws are 
                                                          
ao passo que a democracia antiga, particular dos povos latinos, apenas exprimira o génio forte mas limitado do 
romano, educado pela inteligência subtil do grego” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Tábuas de Cronologia, op. cit. p. XXXIII. 
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of a different kind, they resist the impositions of human spirit and the ideal can be only imperfectly 
realized. 
 The metaphor of a return to the starting point has been used on Oliveira Martins when, in his 
last works, he restarts the writing of biographies of great individualities rather than wider historical 
considerations such as his History of Portugal. Silva Cordeiro also tells us Oliveira Martins’s later 
development in support of monarchy and Caesarism was also something that could already be found 
in his youth. Did he already displayed this conservative side since his youth? It seems contradictory 
when looking at his first texts, when they are the most filled with revolutionary zeal, federalist and 
socialist ideas, some even speaking of a humanist period, while at the same time, these are some of 
the more rigid and dogmatic of his texts with his idea of a natural evolution or even of a fatality in the 
development of society. 
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5. Conclusion 
 In these concluding notes I would like, on the one hand, to recapitulate the complex relation 
between Hegel and Oliveira Martins and, on the other hand, to uncover questions or lines of 
development that remain open. 
 The youthful writings of Oliveira Martins foresaw an interest in German culture and philosophy 
in particular. The judgement on certain political matters, concerning for instance Prussia, fluctuated. 
First, we have a praise of “Berlin’s philosophy” in Febo Moniz. Subsequently, in a series of articles in O 
Comércio he manifests some doubts over Prussian’s political ambitions, whereas around the 1870s in 
A Republica, a newspaper in which he wrote but where authorship of some articles is not certain 
because they are not signed, there, the attack on Prussia’s expansionism is vehement. Finally in Oliveira 
Martins’s Teoria do Socialismo (1872) we have a more clear differentiation between philosophy and 
the politics in Germany, but the relation between Prussia’s expansionism and Hegel’s philosophy is still 
there. Did he maintain this judgement? After the 1880s he seems inclined to view Hegel differently. 
 The interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy in light of the political situation played an important 
role in the readings of Oliveira Martins. The sources from which he became acquainted with Hegel 
tended to portray him predominantly in conservative and absolutist undertones. While Proudhon, who 
also shared this idea, distorted the Hegelian dialectic with his more own Kantian understanding of the 
antinomies supported by Fourier’ serialism, which hampered Oliveira Martins’s understanding of 
Hegel’s dialectic. 
 Although the initial readings of Oliveira Martins are undoubtedly French, the existence of other 
Hegelian sources, especially of Anglo-Saxon and Italian origin is something that could also be further 
explored. Besides Oliveira Martins’s interest in Spain and his relation with Spanish intellectuals, where 
Krausism was widely popular and Hegel also had some audience, or the Italian Hegelians which 
produced numerous studies and translations, these are all possible sources for contact with Hegel’s 
philosophy. He could have become familiar with these later in life as we know he possessed an 1878 
English edition of Hegel’s Philosophy of History, as well as Vico’s original texts in Italian, hence, we may 
then ask if this was a language he read fluently. Moreover, could his Germanism also have come from 
other sources? 
 The political aspects of Oliveira Martins’s thought are embedded in the debates regarding the 
nature of the government and the theory of state, where the politico-juridical texts of Hegel are a 
referential. This is the case with the problem of freedom and authority, which is posed initially by 
Oliveira Martins in the traditional way of opposed tendencies, but with the resolution in justice as a 
third element. The debates around Hegel’s vision of freedom and authority are a topic of heated 
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discussions, with some defending a Hegel closer to liberalism419, others as opposed both to liberal and 
to conservative political theories420, while yet others make a closer relation with conservatism421. Can 
we without a shadow of doubt affirm Hegel was a conservative? It seems easier to do so than to say 
he was a revolutionary, but that would be an oversimplification without a thorough consideration of 
the points or the basis for such an assertion. 
 The ends of history is another issue that was slightly touched upon by us but is a topic of great 
contemporary interest, particularly the idea of tendencies in history. Whereas for Hegel the 
advancement of liberty is the tendency of history, for Oliveira Martins equality enjoys a similar role. 
The modern appropriation of Hegel makes use of this idea of an end to historical development in order 
to justify the current societal relations as inevitable. But is this the case with Hegel? The dialectical idea 
of self-development and the recognition of contradiction as an integral part of reality seems to prohibit 
this interpretation. The latter interpretation seems closer to the detractors of Hegel who accused him 
of taking existent reality for what is rational. 
 In Oliveira Martins’s consideration of the ends of history the idea of humanity’s future is 
further developed when he envisages a society of super-abundance, where in the “plenitude of wealth 
profit will disappear” because capital “becoming superabundant becomes collective”422. This is an idea 
that enjoys acceptance and is expanded by António Sérgio in his cooperativist socialism. These ideas 
tend, in Oliveira Martins, to be balanced out by others emanating from his defense of chance in history, 
drawing him further away from Hegel’s philosophy of history. 
 Such ideas of Oliveira Martins are thus rightly expressed in his economic writings, where the 
search for laws is possible through the study of institutions, while history is on a different level of 
knowledge. These strict divisions that he adopts, which is a tendency we find in the positivists, could 
also be a topic to be explored. Does history not also cover the institutions and the study of laws? 
Oliveira Martins certainly gives indications that “nothing exists by itself, independent, everything 
shakes, everything penetrates and relates [to each other]”423, but then in other writings he makes a 
                                                          
419 See Terry Pinkard, op. cit. 
420 See Domenico Losurdo, Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns, op. cit. 
421 See Renato Cristi, Hegel on Freedom and Authority, University of Wales, Cardiff, 2005. 
422 “Se na plenitude da riqueza o lucro desaparece, como vimos, também no pleno desenvolvimento da 
circulação desaparece o prémio do dinheiro, pois o crédito, nas suas variadíssimas modalidades (notas, 
cheques, letras, etc…) torna-o tão superabundante quanto a civilização em geral torna superabundante os 
capitais móveis.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Regime das Riquezas (elementos de crematística), op. cit. p.177. 
“É por isso que, se nós sabemos já que na plenitude da riqueza o capital não terá juro ou renda, tornando-se 
superabundante se tornou colectivo” idem, ibidem, p.204. 
423 “Nada existe por si, independente: tudo se penetra e se relaciona” idem, ibidem, p.89. 
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distinction “between philosophy of history and nomology”424, precisely because the first one cannot 
give laws, but can it give tendencies? 
 This idea of chance in history is traced by Joaquim de Carvalho, Fernando Catroga and Sergio 
Campos Matos to Cournot, who Oliveira Martins cites while discussing the topic of philosophy of 
history. How he matured these thoughts and moved from the fatality of the laws of history to chance 
in historical development, is important in order to understand his judgement on philosophy of history. 
 Political economy, in the same way as history, is a law of the spirit, “not a physical law” and as 
such the formulas it provides are not absolute, only historical.  In his social and political writings the 
ethicisation of political economy draws him closer to the catheder socialists, which Marx identifies as 
the demise of political economy425. The condemnation of materialism or the interference of the 
physical laws with the spirit, enjoys a similar separateness in the thought of Oliveira Martins because 
the latter should not interfere with the objects of experience426. 
 The relation of Oliveira Martins with philosophy and the alignments or the basis of different 
philosophical schools is something not dealt with but it is a topic of interest, particularly his 
understanding of idealism and materialism. His tendency is to take idealism in a moralizing fashion 
while understanding materialism as instinctive. As such, idealism in philosophy is preferable. 
 The German idealism and culture is thus, as earlier stated, held in high esteem. While the 
passage through France of these ideas initially worries him427, later on he is actually glad they reach 
Portugal via France428. It remains to be seen, however, in which ways, for Oliveira Martins, were these 
ideas altered? The sources of Hegel’s reception in France were looked upon, but what was Oliveira 
Martins’s own critical analysis of this reception of German ideas in France? It remains fragmentary and 
part of it is to be found in newspaper articles, especially when he discusses literary schools. 
 The materialism as something instinctive is similar to the accusation of the lack of dynamism 
attributed to materialism. The historicism which develops in Germany, which was made notice of in 
                                                          
424 “entre filosofia da história e nomologia”[1886?] Letter to Barros Gomes, J.P. Oliveira Martins, 
Correspondência, op. cit. p.84. 
425 See Jan Rehmann, Max Weber: Modernisation as Passive Revolution: Gramscian Analysis, translated by Max 
Henniger, Brill, Leiden, 2015, p.60. 
426 “Materialism in philosophy, individualism in law, free-trade in the economy, [these] are coeval and 
correlative aberrations” / “O materialismo na filosofia, o individualismo na jurisprudência, o livre cambismo na 
economia, são aberrações coevas e correlativas” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Regime das Riquezas (elementos de 
crematística), op. cit. p.8. 
427 See page 59 of the present work. 
428 “There is therefore a side of the Gemanic ideas that has fortunally only been assimilated by us after it has 
passed through France” / “há por isso um lado das ideias germânicas que felizmente só tem sido assimilado por 
entre nós depois de passar por frança” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Os poetas das escola nova, Páginas desconhecidas, 
op. cit. pp.199-200 
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the previous chapter, advocates that humans are historical but only in an ideal sense, where a series 
of variations take place in the mind, but history in a material sense remains outside reason and as such 
the critique of the fixity of rationality is thrown on to materialism. Is matter or are the instinctive based 
physical laws ahistorical for Oliveira Martins? 
 The later approach to Hartmann and Schopenhauer’s philosophy gives another meaning to the 
vocabulary earlier used in relation to Hegel and Proudhon. This study was not able to focus on the 
teachings he reaped from them, as it falls outside our main topic, but he considers those as the 
“modern philosophies” of Germany429. 
 This exposition focused on the main points of interest in the relationship of Oliveira Martins 
with German philosophy and Hegel, having as a nodal point the sources from which he gathered those 
ideas. Certain aspects have turned a thematic guided orientation to which a couple of others could be 
added, such as the anthropological and religious considerations of Oliveira Martins and their 
relationship with the protestant reform. The conclusions of our findings are to be found in the 
exposition itself but Hegel can be said, in short, to have a lasting presence in Oliveira Martins’s thought. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
429 “[The] modern philosophies, (Schopenhauer-Hartmann)taking evolution from the point in which the 
investigations of the wise have left it, have been raionally defining progress, which science recognises as a fact; 
because they also expose in a rational manner, the essence of this force, of which universality the sciencies 
have also discovered and philosophy confirms.” / “Modernas filosofias, (Schopenhauer-Hartmann), tomando a 
evolução no ponto a que as investigações dos sábios a levaram, tém definido racionalmente o progresso, que a 
ciência reconhece como um facto; porque expõem, também de um modo racional, a essência dessa força, cuja 
universalidade também as ciências descobriram, e a filosofia confirma.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, Elementos de 
Antropologia: História natural do homem, op. cit. p.70. 
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